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RESCUING THE INDIVIDUAL FROM NEOLIBERALISM: EDUCATION,
ANARCHISM, AND SUBJECTIVITY

By

GABRIEL T. KEEHN

Under the direction of Deron Boyles, Ph.D.

ABSTRACT
"Individualism" is a term that evokes a wide range of responses, particularly when deployed in
the context of American history and society, with its supposed (and purportedly objectionable)
tradition of so-called "rugged individualism." The images of the cowboy, frontiersman, and lone
entrepreneur spring readily to mind, along with a long list of virtues embodied in these figures:
self-sufficiency, drive, courage, gumption, and the like. It is the project of this dissertation to
rehabilitate the concept of individualism as tool of the Left for resisting the ongoing assault of
neoliberalism, particularly with respect to our educational institutions. I argue that the various
problematic associations commonly made between individualism and various forms of rightwing political and moral commitments, such as free-market capitalism, materialism, self-interest,
and the like are historical mutations of an individualist tradition that is both fundamentally
incompatible with those ideals, but which can also serve as a powerful tool for critiquing them.
More specifically, I argue for an individualism that fuses the ontological commitments of the
historical individualists with the left-individualist tradition in anarchist political theory.
Individualism along the lines argued here is neither an enemy of democracy, communal identity,

or group resistance, but serves as a complement to and ally of those forms of leftist commitment.
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly given the urgency of our current moment,
individualism provides a powerful basis for critiquing the forces that genuinely oppose left
movements. Ultimately I will argue not only that individualism is a much richer, more varied,
and more philosophically tenable position than has been commonly assumed, but also that some
form of individualist commitment is, rather than being incompatible with truly democratic
commitment, actually a fundamental prerequisite thereof. In this, I hope to lend some support to
Emerson's famous and cryptic contention that "individualism has never been tried."
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CHAPTER ONE
ANARCHISMS, SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL; INDIVIDUALISMS, RUGGED AND NOTSO-RUGGED
The Problem: Rehabilitating Individualism
“Individualism” is a term that evokes a wide range of responses, particularly when
deployed in the context of American history and society, with its supposed (and purportedly
objectionable) tradition of so-called “rugged individualism.” The images of the cowboy,
frontiersman, and lone entrepreneur spring readily to mind, along with a long list of virtues
embodied in these figures: self-sufficiency, drive, courage, gumption, and the like. Aside from
the oftentimes vague appeal of these affective personality traits, there is also a countervailing
sense that individualism as a more concrete philosophical doctrine is both morally and politically
corrosive; that it undermines the very possibility of democratic community which has earned
wide general endorsement in the era of modern liberalism, particularly within education,
grounded as the field is in the various liberalisms of John Dewey, John Rawls, Hannah Arendt,
and others.
It is the project of this dissertation to rehabilitate the concept of individualism as tool of
the Left for resisting the ongoing assault of neoliberalism, particularly with respect to our
educational institutions. I argue that the various problematic associations commonly made
between individualism and various forms of right-wing political and moral commitments, such
as free-market capitalism, materialism, self-interest, and the like are historical mutations of an
individualist tradition that is both fundamentally incompatible with those ideals, but which can
also serve as a powerful tool for critiquing them. More specifically, I argue for

1

an individualism that fuses the ontological commitments of the historical individualists
with the left-individualist tradition in anarchist political theory. Individualism along the lines
argued here is neither an enemy of democracy, communal identity, or group resistance, but
serves as a complement to and ally of those forms of leftist commitment. Furthermore, and
perhaps more importantly given the urgency of our current moment, individualism provides a
powerful basis for critiquing the forces that genuinely oppose left movements.
While it is the overall goal of this dissertation to clarify the concept of individualism and
argue for its reconstruction as a tool for the left, it is critical to address at the outset the concept
of anarchism as well, since it is also fundamental to the vision of individualism advocated here,
and notoriously controversial. Before proceeding I will attempt to give something of an overview
of anarchism as an ideology, as well as briefly laying out some of the major schools within
anarchism. It should go without saying that the term “anarchy” and its etymological cousins
(“anarchist,” “anarchism,” etc.) have earned themselves something of a bad rap both within the
academy and without. These terms have come to be synonymous variously with “chaos,”
“violence,” “disorder,” “mob rule,” and so on. As Peter Marshall puts the point in the
introduction to his monumental history of anarchist theory and practice, “it is usual to dismiss
[anarchism's] ideal of pure liberty at best as utopian, at worst, as a dangerous chimera.”1
Individuals who describe themselves or their beliefs as anarchist are often labeled as terrorists,
nihilists, or simply insane. George Woodcock notes that the figure of the anarchist is often
dismissed as “a mere promoter of disorder who offers nothing in place of the order he destroys.”2
The particulars of these misunderstandings are not necessarily important for us here, but it is

1

Peter Marshall, Demanding the Impossible: A History of Anarchism (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2010), ix.
George Woodcock, Anarchism: A History of Libertarian Ideas and Movements (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2009), 11.
2

2

worth noting that they do differ significantly in their tone and origin. For a member of the
general public, the term anarchism cannot but conjure up images of rioting in the streets and
smashed storefront windows. The gradual and historical corruption of the associative content of
“anarchism” in the public consciousness is a large topic that will be outlined more fully in the
dissertation, but one imagines this sort of vulgar misunderstanding to be the progeny, in some
sense, of Hobbes' famous characterization of the pre-Statist state of nature as the bellum omnium
contra omnes,3 perhaps bolstered by the ubiquitous contemporary capitalist consensus regarding
the supposed selfishness inherent in human nature, a position famously taken to its absurd logical
conclusion by Ayn Rand.4
In the academy, the misunderstandings found in the wider public discourse regarding
anarchism are significantly less prevalent, but this fact does not eliminate all obstacles to
academic conversation regarding anarchism. Specifically, there is the widespread endorsement of
Marxism of one type or another by broad swathes of academe, especially in the humanities and
related disciplines, and the attendant attitudes toward anarchism with which the family of
Marxisms is often associated. As David Graeber puts the point, “Anarchism, in the standard
accounts, usually comes out as Marxism's poorer cousin, theoretically a bit flat-footed but
making up for brains, perhaps, with passion and sincerity.”5 Marxism is generally seen, that is, as
the more theoretically serious account both of social relations as they currently exist, and of the
means to change them, as cast against the naive utopianism of the anarchist. There are, it should
be noted, important and deep-rooted, historical dimensions to this antagonism as well, as it was

3

See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan: Parts 1 and II, A.P. Martinich and Brian Battiste, eds. (Peterborough, ON, CAN:
Broadview, 2011), 123.
4
See Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness (New York: Signet, 1964). For an excellent general consideration of
Rand's relationship to contemporary capitalism, see Jennifer Burns, Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the
American Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
5
David Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology (Chicago: Prickly Paradigm Press, 2004), 3.
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precisely the tension between Marx and the Russian communitarian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin
that caused the split and ultimate dissolution of the First International at The Hague Congress in
1872. The core of the disagreement between Bakunin and Marx had to do with competing
interpretations of the events leading up to and following the Paris Commune's two-month
existence in 1871. Bakunin saw the Commune as an opportunity for sustained decentralized
organization between peasants and workers in opposition to all forms of State power, whereas
Marx believed that the lesson of the Commune was that the workers needed a true political party
to help them to seize power from the State, and he saw the role of the International as becoming
that party. Bakunin, somewhat prophetically, argued that Marx's views would at best result in a
changing of the authoritarian guard, and that a dictatorship of the proletariat was no less
objectionable than one of the bourgeoisie.6
The second reason that it is useful to spend some time delineating, or at least positing for
the sake of argument, some of the basic tenets of anarchist thinking is to avoid becoming mired
in a sea of conflicting intuitions and commitments. The organization and development of subcategories of anarchism, unlike in Marxism and its descendants (Leninism, Maoism,
Althusserianism, Gramscianism, etc.), does not follow the family-tree model just suggested,
where one can tie relatively closely the content of one's positions to one or another major namedtradition, founded by a discrete individual. In anarchism, generally speaking, individuals are
grouped on the basis of either tactical commitments (insurrectionists, illegalists, anarchocommunists, etc.) or a basic theoretical commitment (individualists, Christian-anarchists,

There is much excellent historical work done on this topic. See for example, Alvin W. Gouldner, “Marx's Last
Battle: Bakunin and the First International,” Theory and Society 11, no. 6 (1982): 853-884; Donald Clark Hodges,
“Bakunin's Controversy with Marx: An Analysis of the Tensions Within Modern Socialism,” American Journal of
Economics and Sociology 19, no. 3 (1960): 259-274; and August H. Nimtz, “Marxism Versus Anarchism: The First
Encounter,” Science and Society 79, no. 2 (2015): 153-175.
6
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feminist anarchists, etc.).7 Importantly, this manner of carving up the theoretical space does
significantly less toward generating intra-group agreement than it does in the Marxist tradition.
That is, it is far more likely that a random sampling of Gramscians will have a significant level
of pre-established theoretical common-ground than a similar sampling of individualist anarchists,
say. Where the Gramscians might have some slight disagreements about Gramsci's relationship
to Croce or the details of universal intersubjectivity, it is likely that the individualist anarchists
will have a hard time even getting their discussion past the level of the most basic tenets of
individualism or their understanding of the nature of the individual itself. Whether or not this fact
of near total theoretical openness in anarchism is a sign of theoretical underdevelopment or an
encouraging sign of theoretical fertility is up for discussion. The point here is that, in order to
avoid spinning our wheels on the slippery terrain of anarchist theory, it is useful to posit a
provisional fixed point from which to begin. A traditional and, I find, useful such point is Peter
Kropotkin's entry in the 1910 edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica for “Anarchism:”
the name given to a principle or theory of life and conduct under which society is
conceived without government - harmony in such a society being obtained, not by
submission to law, or by obedience to any authority, but by free agreements concluded
between the various groups, territorial and professional, freely constituted for the sake of
production and consumption, as also for the satisfaction of the infinite variety of needs
and aspirations of a civilized being.8
While there is some ambiguity even in this skeletal description of the anarchist framework to
which one could object, amend, or add, I will operate with this basic understanding of anarchism
in the rest of the dissertation.

7

Graeber, Fragments of an Anarchist Anthropology, 5.
Peter Kropotkin, "Anarchism, from The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1910." Anarchist Archives.
http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/anarchist_archives/kropotkin/britanniaanarchy.html.
8
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Schools of Anarchism: A Primer
As suggested above, the various schools of anarchist thought are resistant to easy
categorization, and many have significant areas of overlap. This has become particularly true
with the proliferation of hyphenated and double-hyphenated schools that attempt to hybridize
what they see as the most important theoretical and tactical aspects of a number of other
anarchist forms (e.g. “vegan-queer-anarchism,” “anarcha-trans-feminism,” “green-nihilistanarchism,” and so on). By way of overview, the major schools of anarchism are divided into
two categories. The much larger and more influential of the two is often referred to as “social
anarchism” and the smaller, more marginalized school is that of individualism.9 Given that the
bulk of the dissertation will be dealing with individualism and individualist anarchism, I devote
some time here to three of the major forms of social anarchism, namely mutualism, collectivism,
and anarcho-communism, so as to communicate something of the theoretical landscape into
which individualist anarchism fits.
Mutualism
Mutualism is the oldest of the various schools of thought which explicitly refer to
themselves as anarchist. Developed first by the French economic theorist Pierre Joseph
Proudhon, mutualism was born out of Proudhon's radical theories of property and ownership as a
way of making sense out of economic activity and social production in the face of the conviction
that private property was at bottom philosophically corrupt and indefensible. Proudhon, famous
for his various paradoxical slogans (“Anarchy is Order,” “God is Evil,” etc.)10 summed up his

See Carl Levy, “Social Histories of Anarchism,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 4, no. 2 (2010): 1-44.
For more on Proudhon's obsession with paradox, see Woodcock, Anarchism, 91-121 and Marshall, Demanding
the Impossible, 234-235.
9

10
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view of property with the well-known claim that “Property is Theft.”11 Proudhon's critique of
property is not quite as radical as it may seem at first pass, and indeed he is equally critical of
communist theories of social organization as unacceptably disrespectful of individual rights to
the products of their own labor, “As if the individual came into existence after society, and not
society after the individual.”12 Rather than any global critique of property, Proudhon sought so
chart a course between the gross accumulation of property in the hands of a few wealthy
landowners (his principal target in critiquing property), on the one hand, and the erasure of
individual dignity and labor which he saw as accompanying communism in all its forms. His
answer to this puzzle was mutualism, which he argued would be able to function without any
form of state power or capitalist economic control. He claimed that mutualism would be a
“synthesis of the notions of private property and collective ownership” so as to avoid the
potential dangers he saw in both of those concepts when established on their own and
exclusively.13 Proudhon was perfectly content to have certain types of exclusive usufruct rights
over land and other types of property, but argued that all of these types of possession must be
temporary and conditional on continued use. In this connection, a distinction is sometimes made
between personal property, which Proudhon favored, and private property, which he did not. The
general principles of mutualism are familiar from market capitalism, though they also contain
some built-in safeguards to prevent excessive property accumulation. Firstly, as with all forms of
communitarian anarchism, the workers in a given industry are in control of their own means of
production and are entitled to the fruits of their own labor (again, in the sense of personal

11

It is worth noting that Proudhon's slogan is in a sense self-defeating, since the very concept of theft is only
possible on the condition that one already has a concept of property itself in hand. See, Max Stirner, The Ego and its
Own, ed. David Leopold, trans. Steven Byington (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 251.
12
Quoted in Edward Hyams, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon: His Revolutionary Life, Mind, and Works (London: John
Murray, 1979), 85-86.
13
Quoted in Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 242.
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property, rather than private), which can be used in market exchanges.14 In this sense, mutualism
subscribes to the labor theory of value. Proudhon believed that over time, as workers organized
themselves and formed associations both large and small, and as credit was equalized across all
productive citizens (Proudhon was in favor of a large centralized bank which could track credit),
the functions performed by the State would either become obsolete or would be performed by
other forces, and the need for political organization would disappear entirely in the face of
improved economic organization.
Collectivism
Collectivism as a doctrine developed out of Proudhon’s mutualism. The term was first
explicitly used by the noted Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin during the early days of the first
International Working Men's Association in Geneva in 1866.15 The IWMA was founded to bring
together the various factions concerned with class struggle, labor, and anti-capitalist politics, and
many of the members who attended the first congress could fairly be described as Proudhonists.
Generally, they accepted the principle that society ought to be restructured as a coalition of
individuals who are free to make contracts with one another under conditions of labor value
exchange and free credit through a centralized people's bank. Bakunin generally accepted the
tenets of mutualism, but disagreed significantly with Proudhon on a number of significant points.
While it is difficult to characterize Bakunin as a thinker in any sort of broad terms, since he
published so little and so much of it is fragmentary and incomplete, we can get a general sense of
the areas of tension between his views and those of Proudhon. One of the key planks in the
Proudhonist platform was the abolition of private ownership of land, a point on which
collectivists generally agree. However, where Proudhon would maintain a robust sense of

14
15

Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 243.
Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 7.
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usufruct both for the land itself as well as for the products of one's labor on the land (which we
have called here “possession” or “personal property”), the collectivists, including Bakunin,
moved toward full collective ownership, both of the means of production as well as the land.16
Bakunin only maintained any strong sense of private or personal property for the direct products
of individual labor. In the mutualist framework, the workers associations and industrial groups
were essentially just a means of harnessing the power of large-scale industry, something which
Proudhon himself accepted as necessary only begrudgingly, valuing as he did the individual
worker as the basic unit of social organization. Collectivism, however, fully embraces the need
for collective association not as a distasteful necessity but as fundamentally beneficial for human
flourishing and the economic viability of a stateless society. After the ultimate failure of the Paris
Commune in 1871, Bakunin would point to that episode as a validation of his views, claiming
that in the functioning of the commune “the action of individuals was almost nothing” and that
“the spontaneous action of the masses should be everything.”17 In this sense, Bakunin rejected
the lingering individualist tendencies in the mutualist program in favor of a higher degree of
communal sensibility.
At the same time, Bakunin was also not, at least on the classical definition, a communist.
Where the communist embraced the classic principle “from each according to his means, to each
according to his needs,” Bakuninist collectivism held onto a sense of individual dessert and a
right to the products of one's own labor, holding to the principle of “from each according to his
means, to each according to his deeds.”18 Bakunin described his view, drawing on what he saw

16

Marshall, Demanding the Impossible, 8.
Quoted in Daniel Guerin, Anarchism: From Theory to Practice (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970) 35.
18
Woodcock, Anarchism, 138.
17
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as the guiding principles of the French Revolution, in his Federalism, Socialism and AntiTheologism, writing that the key problem to be solved by collectivism is
to organize society in such a fashion that every individual, man or woman, coming into
life, shall find as nearly as possible equal means for the development of his or her
different faculties and for their utilization by his or her labour; to organize a society
which, rendering for every individual, whoever he may be, the exploitation of anybody
else impossible, permits each to participate in social wealth – which, in reality, is never
produced otherwise than by labour – only in so far as he has contributed to produce it by
his own labour.19
Collectivism was thus defined, and could be still, as an exchange economy where the legal
ownership of the of the instruments of production is held by a network of “collectivities” which
are sorts of workers’ joint stock companies and which themselves serve, rather than individuals,
as the fundamental unit of social organization. In the 1870’s and the 1880’s the anarchistcommunists, who wanted to abolish exchange value in all its forms, would break with the
collectivists, and in so doing revived the tradition of radical communism that had existed in
France in the 1840’s.
Anarcho-Communism
Anarcho-communism, perhaps predictably, takes a step even further in the full
communalization of property and the products of labor. As noted above, Bakunin maintained
certain tendencies in his vision of collectivism which were seen by some in the anarchist
movement of the time as problematically individualistic. Against this, the anarcho-communists
held to the principle of distribution according to need, rather than dessert or actual productive
labor. After the initial meetings of the IWMA, splits began to emerge between Bakuninist
collectivists and the anarcho-communists, with the communist wing led by representatives of the
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Spanish workers parties and the Italian anarchist and early advocate of collectivism Carlo
Cafiero. An important set of victories were won by the anarcho-communists over the course of
the 1870s at the various meetings of the important anarchist international group the Jura
Federation, which finally adopted anarcho-communism as its official economic platform in
1880.20 At this Congress, Cafiero presented a report that was later published in Le Révolté, an
important anarchist periodical of the time, under the title “Anarchy and Communism”. In this
report, Cafiero succinctly exposed the points of rupture with collectivism: rejection of exchange
value; opposition to transferring ownership of the means of production to workers’ corporations
(in favor of communal ownership without reference to the specific nature of the work being
done, that is); and elimination of payment for productive activities. Furthermore, Cafiero
suggested that anarcho-communism was the inevitable development of anarchism in Europe, and
rejected the popular narrative that collectivism was a necessary step on the path to true
communal ownership. Cafiero argued, rather, that collectivism of the type advocated by Bakunin
was actually inimical to ultimate goals of anarchist society. On the one hand, he claimed that the
demand for collective ownership of the means of production and the individual appropriation of
the products of labor would cause the accumulation of capital and the division of society into
classes to reappear. On the other hand, he maintained that retaining some form of payment for
individual labor power would conflict with the socialized character (indivisibility of productive
activities) already imprinted on production by the capitalist mode of production. As to the need
for rationing products, which might occur after the revolutionary victory, nothing would prevent
such rationing from being conducted not according to merits, but according to needs.21
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Another important exponent of anarcho-communism was Peter Kropotkin, another
former collectivist who switched allegiances in the late 1800s. Kropotkin’s arguments in favor of
the communist position at the 1880 Congress were the culmination of a slow evolution of his
position from strict collectivism to communism, by way of an intermediate position where he
saw collectivism as a simple transitional stage. The collectivists favored the ‘right to work’,
which is ‘industrial penal servitude’. In Kropotkin’s view, their pro-worker policy sought to
harness to the same horse the wage system and collective ownership, in particular through their
theory of labor vouchers. Kropotkin opposed labor vouchers on the grounds that they seek to
measure the exact value of labor in an economy that, being socialized, tends to eliminate all
distinctions as far as contribution of each worker considered in isolation is concerned.
Furthermore, the existence of labor vouchers would continue to make society a commercial
company based on debit and credit. Hence he denounced labor vouchers in the following terms:
“The idea... is old. It dates from Robert Owen. Proudhon advocated it in 1848. Today, it has
become 'scientific socialism'”22 In general, Kropotkin believed that collectivism committed two
major errors, both of them tied together by the same blindness. Specifically, “While speaking of
abolishing capitalist rule, they intend nevertheless to retain two institutions which are the very
basis of this rule – representative government and the wages system.”23 Kropotkin believed that
in order for genuine anarchist goals to be achieved, only full communist ownership could be
acceptable as an economic system.
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Method of the Dissertation
Education has a fraught relationship with theory. There are longstanding debates
surrounding the relative merits of various approaches to educational research, and indeed
surrounding the definition of the term “research” itself. Historically this has manifested in the
debate over qualitative versus quantitative methods in educational research that raged during the
1980’s and into the 1990’s. This debate revolved generally around two axes, as outlined by
Kenneth Howe, who’s work became a major factor in the dissolution of that debate. Howe
describes both “literal” and “derivative” aspects to the debate between qualitative and
quantitative methods.24 Literally, quantitative and qualitative approaches to educational research
have distinct techniques and procedures for collecting and analyzing data. Derivatively, these
methods differ in their “broader epistemological assumptions.”25 These epistemological
differences rest on larger debates both in educational research and in the history of philosophy
more generally. The two distinct approaches are, on the one hand, positivistic approaches to
research which emphasize the objective, scientific quality of that research, and, on the other,
more interpretivist understandings of the goals of research. Howe points out that many
researchers (e.g. Yvonne Lincoln and Egon Guba,26 and John K. Smith27) have advocated what
he calls “the incompatibility thesis.”28 Howe’s work ultimately terminates in his advocacy of
what he calls “critical educational research,”29 a concept which is related to what others have
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called, in a similar attempt to bridge the qualitative-quantitative divide, “mixed methods
research.”30
Even more recently, however, discussions of the role of philosophical and theoretical
methods of research have begun to develop in education as well. Despite helping to close the gap
between qualitative and quantitative research, the work of Howe and others did not fully revolve
the question of the role of theory in educational research. Indeed, Rene Arcilla diagnosed as
recently as 2002 what he calls the “uncanny…established silence between philosophy and
education.”31 Arcilla makes an impassioned plea for a bridge between philosophy and education
similar to that constructed by the pioneering work of Howe. Since the publication of Arcilla’s
article, and although it was by no means the first to directly address philosophy and education,
philosophical analysis has made significant gains in terms of legitimacy as research.
In contrast to the generally empirical (whether qualitative or quantitative) approach of
much educational research, this dissertation participates directly in the tradition of theoretical,
philosophical analysis. The analysis is not entirely conceptual, in that I argue that the conclusions
of my investigation have decidedly real-world implications for how we ought to think about
education, schools, and their place in society, and in the sense that there are significant historical
considerations that are brought to bear on the discussion. At the same time, the method of
argumentation is entirely theoretical in nature. Another way of putting this is that I will be
addressing not the current actual state of education and schooling, or at least will only be doing
so in the context of critique, but will focus more directly on a potential future state that I will
argue is preferable to the status quo. In this sense, my argument will be prescriptive, though I
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will also argue that the prescriptivism involved in specifically anarchist theory, such as it is, is
exploratory and open rather than constricting.
Significance: The Need for an Expanded Toolkit of Resistance
In response to the establishment of the neoliberal economic hegemony and its incursions
into education in various contexts, educational theorists have attempted to expose the
corruptions, failures, and contradictions in the neoliberal, corporatist narrative. Innumerable
studies trace back to the neoliberal global order, among other things: the troubling historical
trends in school funding, the rise of school choice rhetoric, the continuing and worsening effects
of racist educational and economic policies at all levels of government, the growing corporate
influence on both k-12 and higher education, the profound and growing emphasis on concepts
such as “accountability” and “standards.” The major assumption made in these exposé-style
studies is that in order to solve, or even to properly address, these issues, we must chronicle in
detail the injustices they perpetuate or cause and hold up their internal workings to others, be
they the broader public or academic colleagues, ideally so as to shock them into anger and
action. Typical of this mode of exposé thinking is Jean Anyon's conclusion to her book Radical
Possibilities in which she writes that “my argumentation has aimed at a more radical
consciousness in readers” which will counteract “the ideological battering most people receive as
schoolchildren, the mangled news they imbibe from newspapers and television, and racial and
class distortions pouring from the media.”32 Michael Apple's concluding reflections in Ideology
and Curriculum echo Anyon's logic. He writes, “I have tried to illuminate how this close
connection between power and control that exists between government and the dominant
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classes...also exists between schools and these groups.”33 Maarten Simons, Mark Olssen, and
Michael Peters introduce their collection on “studying the policy agenda of the 21st century” in
this way, “Indeed re-reading education policies in view of gathering people around matters of
concern-the focus of this handbook-could be regarded as a democratic act or an act of public
advocacy” and they suggest that their ultimate goal is “turning education into a matter of public
concern.”34 It is precisely in this sense that educational theorizing must engage in critique via
illuminating the hidden connections, functionings, and contradictions in neoliberal political and
economic agendas that I mean to refer to by using the phrase “the exposé method.”
At this point, I want to lodge two objections against the exposé method and the attendant
solutions the method generally suggests (“democratize,” “localize,” “purge of racism,” etc.). The
first objection, which at first may seem naive bordering on asinine but which I actually believe
reveals a deep misunderstanding about the nature of neoliberal global capital on the part of
advocates of exposé critique, is that the exposé method simply has a poor track record of
generating changes of any kind in the public discourse surrounding education. This seems almost
too obvious to merit much discussion, but think, for just one example, of the case of charter
schools. In the face of mounting evidence that charter schools do not produce meaningfully
better outcomes than their public counterparts35 as well as the even more troubling emerging
evidence regarding potentially adverse racial and economic implications of large-scale charter
takeovers on vulnerable communities,36 one is still hard pressed to find any high-ranking sitting
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politician at any level of government (other than those with principled opposition to government
activity of any kind) who is anything but emphatically supportive of charter schools. This is
reflected in public opinion as well, with PDK International polling data holding steady at 70%
support for the last five years.37
On the exposé model, the exposing of the problematic racial implications and the
oftentimes suspicious flows of money into, through, and out of the large Educational
Management Organizations (EMOs), coupled with the advancing of proposals to re-democratize
public education ought to be enough to shock public opinion in some way back toward salvaging
public education, but this has not happened. I want to suggest that this is because the exposé
model fundamentally misunderstands the ideology of neoliberal global capitalism. At the root of
this problem, I argue, is Karl Marx's original formulation of the nature of ideology, namely that
ideology is that which people do “without being aware of it,”38 or, as Althusser later puts it, that
ideology represents “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of
existence.”39 That is, this orthodox understanding of ideology conceptualizes ideology as
creating and relying for its persistence on a false consciousness on the part of those under it
regarding the way things really are. We can see immediately why this understanding of ideology
is amenable to the exposé method, which often goes about its aforementioned business of
“illuminating,” “exposing,” and “mapping” the objects of its critique explicitly under the banner
of “consciousness raising.” Again, the assumption of both vulgar Marxism and the exposé
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method is that through a detailed process of ideological demystification of some social
phenomenon to reveal its underlying adverse material effects, false consciousness can be
overcome and, by implication, social change can occur through the activity of the now
enlightened citizenry. If one can clearly expose the ill-effects of neoliberal school reform and
reveal the ideological nature of “school choice” and “competition” discourses, the hearts and
minds of policymakers and the public can be changed and education can move in a different
direction.
I contend that this understanding of ideology is no longer applicable; critical methods that
utilize it as their guiding theoretical commitment are doomed to fail in the face of a capitalism
which is no longer ideological in this sense. While this claim may appear sweeping, it is by no
means new or reactionary, as arguments for the need to rethink ideological critique in light of
recent developments in global capitalism have been advanced and refined since at least the early
80s. Peter Sloterdijk, for instance, opens his extended analysis of contemporary hegemonic
ideologies Critique of Cynical Reason with the following, “The discontent in our culture has
assumed a new quality: It appears as a universal, diffuse cynicism. The traditional critique of
ideology stands at a loss before this cynicism...this critique has remained more naive than the
consciousness it wanted to expose.”40 For Sloterdijk, the modes of orthodox ideology critique
have become stagnant, predictable, and themselves absorbed into the very functioning of
hegemonic ideology more generally, and he goes as far as to isolate eight paradigmatic models of
critique which function as models for all subsequent moves of unmasking and demystifying. The
key point of his analysis is that when we examine the current status of ideological critiques of
unmasking, i.e. the exposé method, we find “a clearly structured playing field with well-known
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players, established tactics, and typical fouls” where “each side has developed certain, almost
rigged, moves of critique.”41 The predictable result of this stagnant culture of critique and its
objects is a generalized attitude of cynical distance in the society at large. All of the exposures of
the functioning of dominant ideology have been made, and the arguments and critical moves
have been rehearsed over and over. It is no longer shocking (if it ever was) to hear the latest
salacious exposé of capitalist exploitation or callous profit-maximization, and neoliberal global
capital no longer relies on the mystification of its inner workings to persist, but rather is always
already exposed, relying instead on the shoulder-shrugging cynicism of contemporary culture
diagnosed by Sloterdijk. Even if we are ignorant of the precise details of how capital is callously
or exploitatively operating in a given arena (e.g. we do not know that Volkswagen is knowingly
cheating emissions tests), we know that it is doing so, and are no longer surprised to find out the
details because the overarching structure of global capital is always the same. As Zizek
characterizes the nature of the cynical subject, he “is quite aware of the distance between the
ideological mask and the social reality, but he none the less still insists upon the mask.”42 In the
context of this new type of cynical culture, where the mask of ideology is a transparent one,
Zizek suggests a reformulation of Marx's understanding of ideology to reflect the fact that
ideology is no longer that which we do without knowing we are doing but that which we know
very well we are doing, but still continue to do.43 If this picture is right, and our society has
shifted to what Sloterdijk refers to as the mode of “enlightened false consciousness” which has
“learned its lessons in enlightenment, but...has not...put them into practice” and “no longer feels
affected by any critique of ideology,”44 then the fact that the exposé method of critique has failed
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to generate change in education or elsewhere should not come as a surprise. On this view, the
exposé method is doomed to fail because its entire critical project consists, finally, in telling
people things they already know. The problem today is not that people care but do not know, as
in traditional ideological critique. Rather, it is that they know but do not care, which is a scenario
that the exposé method is ill equipped to deal adequately with.
The second objection I want to level against the exposé method of critique is that even
the best-case scenarios, when the exposé method actually resonates with some sector of the
public to the degree that they demand change and actually achieve their goals, the overall
outcome is still negative. In such cases, the ultimate effect is does not fundamentally change the
structures of neoliberal global capital, but actually reinforces them. This objection is best
illustrated by an example. Think of the recent push for a fifteen-dollar minimum wage in the
United States. The issue I want to highlight here is connected with what is presupposed in any
demand made of the neoliberal capitalist order, and what the implications of making such
demands are. One presupposition that seems to me to be made in the very act of asking, for lack
of a better term, “the system” for something like an increase in pay (a decrease in police
violence, etc.) is that the system has what you are demanding of it and can give it to you, if only
you ask for it in the right way. Insofar as the public (or whomever) must ask the neoliberal
structure to meet its demands (however supposedly progressive or revolutionary those demands
may be) via the mechanisms of governmental or economic administration, the public cannot help
but affirm its structural subservience to the power of the system more generally. Keeping with
our example, while it is unambiguously true that a fifteen-dollar minimum wage would
somewhat improve the lives of individuals who would receive higher pay, it is also undeniable
that this change would have little to no impact on slowing the pace of the development of
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neoliberal capital. Put another way, this demand, and others like it, are demands made of rather
than against neoliberal capital, and they fundamentally support, rather than challenge, the
continued existence of that system. The spirit of this line of critique is not new either; we have
only to recall Jacques Lacan's admonishment of the student protests of May 1968 to see the
radical heritage of the view I am advancing. Lacan, speaking in front of a large protest, accused
the students of failing to truly challenge the fundamental existence of the structure they claimed
to be against: “As hysterics, you demand a new master. You will get it!”45 A similar sentiment is
echoed by the Bavarian anarchist Max Stirner, who critiqued the earlier French revolution in a
precisely parallel fashion, writing “The revolution was not directed against the established, but
against the establishment in question, against a particular establishment. It did away with this
ruler, not with the ruler, on the contrary, the French were ruled most inexorably.” Later, he adds,
in an even more Lacanian register, “Much as may be improved, strongly as 'discreet progress'
may be adhered to, always there is only a new master set in the old one's place, and the
overturning is a building up.”46 This last point is crucial, namely the idea that in overturning
some particular piece of the established system of rule (changing the minimum wage, reducing
police violence, etc.) the perverse outcome is that the system is actually strengthened. When a
particular goal of a piecemeal reform agenda is fulfilled, those who were participants in that
struggle tend to become mollified and return to their cynical participation in the system feeling
satisfied with their victory, which is in fact a victory for the ruling ideology, which has escaped a
struggle without its fundamental structures being questioned.
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This points to the second, and perhaps even more problematic assumption involved in
demanding piecemeal reforms of the existing system, and brings us directly to the distinction
between the anarchist and the reformer. In advocating for piecemeal changes to the system to
alleviate localized contradictions and injustices we expose via our critique, the assumption is
made that there is something fundamentally right about the existing structure, and all that is left
is to smooth out the problems as we find them. For example, when I expose the ill-effects of a
low minimum wage and demand a higher one, I have already accepted that people should have to
work for wages at all, that money should be the primary mode of social exchange, that income
level should be the measuring stick for quality of life, and so on. In other words, I have accepted
all of the important premises of global capitalism. This view is perhaps most clearly expressed in
Jean Anyon's call for a “kinder, gentler capitalism”47 through piecemeal reforms made to the
current system. One cannot help but see in this Fukuyama-esque relationship to global capitalism
an echo of the archetype of an abusive relationship, where one party consistently abuses the trust
of the other, and the abused party justifies the continued relationship on the grounds that
“somewhere deep down there is a good person” etc.
Though the anarchist will deeply disagree with the method of critique just espoused,
which makes concessions to the system in the hope of changing it from within, it is also
important to realize that the enemy identified in this critique is real and is one that anarchism as a
philosophy and movement shares, namely neoliberal individualism. In the rest of this chapter I
want to survey the origins of American rugged individualism as a personal and economic ideal, a
discussion that will be continued in more detail in Chapter Two.

47

Anyon, Radical Possibilities, 3.

22

The American Tradition of Rugged Individualism
There are deep cultural and historical associations with the figure of the rugged
individual that run through American consciousness and naturally color our understandings of
the concept of individualism writ large. That is, there are genuine and real reasons that people
have come to associate individualism with the kind of selfish, capitalistic attitude embodied in
contemporary neoliberal rationalisms. The phrase “rugged individualism” itself was first
popularized by Herbert Hoover, who deployed it in an untitled campaign speech during the 1928
presidential campaign on October 22 at Madison Square Garden in New York City. The speech
emphasized what Hoover saw as traditional American ideals, including “self-government,”
hostility to bureaucratic centralization, a refusal to look to the government for assistance or ways
out of hardship, and the cultivation of initiative and innovation. The phrase “rugged
individualism” itself appears only once in the text of the speech, but it represents a critical
moment in American understandings of individualism as a philosophico-political doctrine. In the
post-WWI era, Hoover argued, that Americans were “challenged with a peace-time choice
between the American system of rugged individualism and a European philosophy of
diametrically opposed doctrines – doctrines of paternalism and state socialism.”48 It is this
dichotomous characterization of the relationship between rugged American individualism, on the
one hand, and the socialistic and communal practices of Europe (or any variety of generalized
“others”) that I argue has more than anything characterized the American understanding of
individualism. As I will document in this section, this general formula of individualism as
distinctly American and as a sign of mental, emotional, and economic fortitude, and collectivism
as weak, paternalistic, and distinctly un-American has many valences, expressions, and
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permutations, though the basic through line is the same. The purpose of this discussion is both to
detail how individualism came to have the problematic ideological baggage that it currently has,
as well as to set up a contrast class to the vision of individualism I will develop in the remainder
of this dissertation, particularly Chapter Three.
Rugged Individualism as Cultural Ideal
Though Hoover was perhaps the first to popularize the phrase “rugged individualism,”
the spirit and vision embodied in that phrase were embedded in the American psyche much
earlier in the country’s history. Interpreters of American society as early as the great political
critic Alexis de Tocqueville identified this sense of rugged individualism as both central to
American civil and cultural life as well as potentially damaging to the democratic prospects of
the nascent nation. In his 1835 Democracy in America, de Tocqueville, referring to the
predominant attitudes of competition and individualism among the American populace, writes
“Selfishness blights the germ of all virtue; individualism, at first, only saps the virtues of public
life; but in the long run it attacks and destroys all others and is at length absorbed in downright
selfishness.”49 Here we see the roots of the idea, which would eventually see its terminus in the
right-individualist philosophy of Ayn Rand and neoliberal economics, that selfishness and
individualism are inherently bound together, and that they are uniquely threatening to democratic
society and social cohesion in general. Political philosopher Leo Strauss concurs with de
Tocqueville’s diagnosis, but traces the cultural roots of rugged individualism back even further,
namely to the work of John Locke, who has often been seen as the founding father of both
laissez-faire capitalism and the concept of rugged individualism.50 The influence of Locke on the
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American founding fathers (particularly Jefferson), the American revolution, and the
Constitution of the United States itself, has been well documented,51 and Strauss suggests that it
is particularly Locke’s vision of economic competition and the value of rugged individualism
that shaped the early civic values of the United States. Strauss argues that Locke’s theory of
property rights, in which the right of property is established through mixing one’s labor with a
previously unowned resource, represents “the classic doctrine of ‘the spirit of capitalism’” and
goes on to argue that Locke believed that “By building civil society on ‘the low but solid ground’
of selfishness or of certain ‘private vices,’ one will achieve much greater ‘public benefits’ than
by futilely appealing to virtue, which is by nature ‘unendowed.’”52 This is perhaps the foundation
of the ideal of rugged individualism, in which individuals are empowered to compete with one
another for scarce resources and accumulate as many of those resources as possible. The
important addendum to this ideal is that success in this social game is itself representative of a
valuable internal quality, e.g. being a self-starter, having the entrepreneurial spirit, being a “gogetter” and so on. The value place on these supposed personality and character traits is critical to
understanding the American vision of rugged individualism as a cultural and personal ideal.
More recently, anthropologist Francis L.K. Hsu has brought to the fore the American
sense of rugged individualism through comparative ethnographic studies, particularly examining
America in relation to Japanese and Chinese cultures.53 Hsu argues that rugged individualism as
a personal, cultural ideal has driven American society since the moment of its inception. Hsu
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contrasts traditional Chinese culture, which is based on a highly structured set of prescribed
social relations, with the rugged individualist imperative to strike out on one’s own and indeed to
question the dictates of the current social order. Hsu suggests that this type of attitude is valuable
to a degree, particularly in terms of generating certain forms of social progress, necessitating as it
does the breaking of norms, questioning of traditions, and so on. At the same time, it can also be
profoundly socially damaging. Hsu simultaneously echoes the warning of de Tocqueville and
evokes some of the most pernicious historical examples of the rugged individualist spirit when
he suggests that “To succeed, the rugged individualist is driven to treat all other human beings as
things to be manipulated, coerced or eliminated, if they happen to get in the way of his forward
march…the rugged individual is bound to be self-centered. He is taught to shape the world in his
image.”54 For Hsu, examples of both large and small-scale social ills, such as the ideology of
Manifest Destiny, embody and express the logical conclusions of the ideal of rugged
individualism.
Perhaps nowhere is the personal ideal of the rugged individual expressed more fully than
in the cultural artifacts of American society, particularly in literature, film, and advertising.
Many studies have examined the ways rugged individualism has been culturally transmitted in,
especially masculine, cultural artifacts such as sporting magazines,55 literature,56 and workplace
norms,57 among others. However, I want here to focus on one particularly potent example of
ideological rugged individualism in the American consciousness, namely the figure of John
Wayne. While it is beyond the scope of this discussion to examine in detail the large and varied
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academic literature that has been produced around this actor, his work and his persona are of
particular importance to understanding the personal and cultural ideal of rugged individualism in
American culture. As Larry Van Meter has argued, “Even today, almost 40 years after his death,
John Wayne stands for an ‘ideal’ masculinity.”58 Wayne’s professional career was characterized
most notably by a number of successful Western films, including Stagecoach (1939), The
Searchers (1956), Rio Bravo (1959), The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance (1962), and True Grit
(1969), for which he won an Academy Award. Wayne, a former college football player, was
known for depicting Western heroes who were “unsentimental, hard, brutal if necessary, proudly
anachronistic.,”59 and for his gruff and imposing on-screen persona. Jonathan Wyatt evocatively
describes the sense he had of Wayne as a young child watching his films, “The heroes were
strong, rugged men protecting children; pretty, skirted women; and good but ineffectual men
from ruthless, mean men…all set amongst a pitiless, mean landscape and its downbeat,
downtrodden, rundown towns.”60 Even contemporaneously, Wayne was seen as a masculine
ideal, representing fundamental American values of competition and self-reliance. A 1950 article
in the magazine The Saturday Evening Post about Wayne, entitled “The Ladies Like ‘Em
Rugged,” ties Wayne’s ideal on-screen persona to his real life, and suggests in no uncertain
terms that Wayne ought to serve as the ideal not only for American masculinity, but perhaps for
the country’s own self-understanding. The article opens this way, “When John Wayne strides
lankily down a Cowtown street, hands swinging free, ready to draw, millions of female hearts
thump. Old Long Legs just acts natural – while husbands wonder why their wives have that
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faraway look.”61 Here we see a number of the various ways in which Wayne represents the ideal
of rugged individualism, aloof, sexually desirable, ready for a fight and capable of winning. This
ideal is exemplified for Wyatt in an iconic line from The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance, when
Wayne’s character Tom Doniphon explains to a feminized lawyer (played by James Stewart),
who Doniphon will eventually have to save, “Out here a man settles his own problems.”62 This is
a direct endorsement of the competitive ethos of rugged individualism, and an implicit rejection
of the sorts of communal identities and economic relationships that were increasingly visible on
the world stage during Wayne’s heyday.
Indeed, it is critical to note that in many ways John Wayne’s persona was explicitly
politicized, both by observers as well as by Wayne himself. Wayne was very public, for
example, about his staunch anticommunist ideology and support for American capitalism.
Indeed, when he began producing his own films in the 1950’s, some have argued that Wayne
“ended up making propaganda, not art.”63 Wayne publicly positioned himself against “a liberal
establishment that was feminized, and therefore worthy of populist disgust.”64 Wayne’s rugged
individualist was the strongest available counterpoint to the popular images that drove
communist hysteria during that era, and particularly the various feminized and homoeroticized
caricatures that underwrote much of the ideological animus that was directed at communism as
an ideology. In Wayne’s Big Jim McLain (1952), which revolves around Wayne’s character
tracking down communists in post-war Hawaii, the prime villain is a feminized Russian named
“Sturak,” played by Alan Napier, who speaks in a high pitched, lispy accent.65 This feminization
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of communism and anything to do with non-American masculinity was a common tactic of the
right at the time, and as William J. Mann notes, “For many, sexual perversion and political
subversion became interchangeable. The Right linked homosexuality with sedition, equating it
with moral weakness and conflating it with Communism.”66 Wayne represented the polar
opposite of these figures, and embraced the ideological implications of that representation in his
own political expression. In his commitment to capitalism as an economic doctrine, distrust of
anything even remotely communistic, and embodiment of character traits such as grit,
determination, and the like, John Wayne still serves as perhaps the best and most extreme
example of what is mean by the phrase “rugged individualism” as a cultural and personal ideal,
particularly of masculinity.
There is, however, another important aspect to rugged individualism, namely the
economic, to which I turn in the next section. Though the economic ideals of individualism will
be detailed more directly in Chapter Two, I will here point out some examples of how the
concept has influenced American economic and domestic policy, often to disastrous effect. The
rejection of individualism in the sense described here is, I think, entirely justified, and it will be
the project of Chapters Two and Three to distinguish the form of anarcho-individualism I
advocate from these understandings of the term.
Rugged Individualism as Economic and Policy Doctrine
As suggested by the example of John Wayne, a key component of the rugged
individualist mentality is a certain commitment to self-sufficiency, refusal to accept outside
assistance, and resistance to communalism in all its forms. These commitments have variously
found expression in public policy throughout the history of the United States, and continue to be
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reflected in the country’s attitudes toward the poor, disabled, and the like. Perhaps fittingly,
Hoover is again here one of the first to enact policies explicitly from the perspective of rugged
individualism, and would continue his commitment to his vision of rugged individualism as
president during the early years of the Great Depression. In the early 1930s, Hoover vetoed an
important bill, the Muscle Shoals Bill, that would have appropriated funds for the government to
build a dam on the Tennessee River and sell electricity, essentially nationalizing that utility in
that part of the country.67 The idea behind the bill was both that the building of the dam would
provide valuable and then-scarce jobs for a depressed region of the country as well as enable the
sale of cheaper electricity than was being provided by private electric companies. The reasons
Hoover cited for the veto explicitly appealed to the ruggedly individualistic values he had
campaigned on and his economic faith in free market solutions. He wrote that the plan would
“break down the initiative and enterprise of the American people” and would be a fundamental
betrayal of the ideals of innovation and economic competition that he believed America was
based on.68 This economic interpretation of rugged individualism as a philosophical basis for free
market competition, entrepreneurship, and the like is one of the most powerful associations that
has arisen in the discourse about individualism.
Another powerful example of this discourse making its way into the political arena
explicitly was the rhetoric and writing of Republican Senator from Arizona and presidential
candidate Barry Goldwater. Four years before running for President in 1964, Goldwater
published The Conscience of a Conservative, a book that many credit with reigniting the
conservative movement in the United States and laying the ideological groundwork for the
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impending Reagan Revolution that would take place some twenty years later. The book,
ghostwritten by noted conservative and longtime Goldwater speechwriter L. Brent Bozell Jr., 69
was in many ways a distillation of American conservative principles, and in particular the
doctrine of economic rugged individualism. Indeed, one contemporary commentator argued that
the broad support Goldwater’s message was able to amass, particularly on college campuses,
made him “the most attractive ‘conservative’ since Herbert Hoover.”70 Like John Wayne,
Goldwater centered anticommunism in his political messaging, and called for a return to the suite
of classical American values embodied in rugged individualism. In his analysis of Goldwater’s
rhetoric and appeal John Hammerback argues that all of Goldwater’s various themes could be
distilled down to the pervasive ideal of rugged individualism.71 Goldwater, like Wayne, went out
of his way to project an image of rugged individualism in his personal life as well, desiring to
appear as “manly, adventurous, simple, and unpretentious,” and often relating to his audiences
stories of his forefathers, “as when he described his grandfather’s ‘courage and fortitude’ in
crossing the Colorado River under attack by Indians.”72 This was also politically important, as it
reformed the image of conservatism from one of aloof intellectuals that dominated the era, such
as the figure of William F. Buckley. Goldwater’s policy positions flowed directly from his
rugged individualist persona, for example by “de-emphasizing international cooperation,
discontinuing conciliatory foreign policies, and challenging communism directly” as well as
advancing simplified programs of taxation and regulation, positions that have become de rigueur
for conservative politicians to this day.
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Though Goldwater ultimately failed to reach the presidency, his policy influence would
be dramatically felt in the election and presidency of Ronald Reagan. Reagan, who himself
gained fame first as a film actor, was perhaps the most rhetorically and politically effective of
any politician in U.S. history in advocating for the ideal of rugged individualism. As early as
Reagan’s famous speech in support of Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign, Reagan
mobilized discourses of individualism versus communism and the value of individual work ethic
and motivation.73 This theme continued throughout Reagan’s political life and played such a
central role that Robert Rowland and John Jones have claimed that Reagan fundamentally
redefined the “American Dream” in terms of “heroic individualism.”74 Reagan’s policy targets,
which included “unreasonable bureaucrats, criminal-friendly judges, welfare cheats, spoiled
college students, appeasement-minded liberals, soft-headed liberals, narrow-minded liberals” and
any and all other forces that threatened to squelch American individualism,75 have come to serve
as the policy agenda for the Republican party through the present day, and the policy positions
he advocated are nearly all undergirded by a commitment to an economic and cultural form of
rugged individualism. Valuing private property rights, freedom of expression, and so on at the
individual level to the point of excluding nearly all other social values is the hallmark of political
and economic rugged individualism. Reagan often mobilized ruggedly individualist, and
importantly racialized, discourses of laziness and personal motivation, “law and order,” and
personal freedom, even going so far as arguing that “if an individual wants to discriminate
against Negros or others in selling or renting his house, he has a right to do so.”76 These sorts of
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policy proposals, which also included cutting welfare benefits and other forms of the social
safety net, are all fundamentally predicated on the idea that social problems are best addressed
through individual and corporate initiative and creativity rather than government intervention, a
hallmark of rugged individualism in the policy arena. As Rowland and Jones sum up the
Reaganite vision of rugged individualism, Reagan
presented a perfected and condensed form of ultimate definition as a means of reinforcing
a small government perspective and in so doing recasting the meaning of the most
important American political myth, the American Dream, in a way that placed
responsibility for action on the individual rather than the government.77
It is this view that supports the neoliberal narratives that so characterize our contemporary policy
landscape, both within education and elsewhere. I will lay out in more detail in Chapter Two the
historical development of these ideas particularly from the perspective of anarcho-individualism,
but first want to point out briefly some of the ways these ideals of rugged individualism have
manifested in education.
Perhaps predictably, educational policy did not escape the long-term effects of Reagan’s
individualist revolution, and Reagan’s administration itself in many ways set the stage for the
current neoliberal capture of public education. The 1983 publication of A Nation at Risk: The
Imperative for Educational Reform was a key moment in the intrusion of rugged individualism
into the realm of public education. As Jal Mehta notes, “Perhaps the most fundamental shift in
thinking that A Nation at Risk encapsulates is the elevation of the economic purposes of
schooling over its many other purposes.”78 The economization of education, though it took many
forms in the Reagan era, specifically with respect to international competition, was in many ways
most concentrated on the role of education as a means of economic mobility, one’s success in
Rowland and Jones, “Reagan’s Farewell Address,” 638.
Jal Mehta, “Escaping the Shadow: A Nation at Risk and Its Far-Reaching Influence,” American Education,
Summer 2015: 20-44, 23.
77
78

33

which was inherently reflective of the presence or absence of the character traits of the rugged
individual, e.g. perseverance, adaptability, etc.
This fusion of the economic and personal ideals of rugged individualism was further
entrenched by the various testing and accountability regimes that emerged in the wake of the
Reagan Revolution, such as the Bush era “No Child Left Behind” and Barack Obama’s “Race to
the Top”. On the one hand, as many recent commentators have argued, the neoliberal
imperatives of economic production necessitate strict governmental oversight and
“accountability” regarding what is taught and how it is taught.79 At the same time, many of the
traditional values of rugged individualism have become directly infused into the educational
rhetoric of would-be reformers. Indeed, one can see the contemporary echoes of this vision of the
ideal individualist in much recent work on what makes for a successful student, with John
Wayne-esque buzzwords like “resilience,” “adaptability,” “initiative,” “vision,” and so on
coming to describe the ideal student. Perhaps the most illustrative example of this is the recent
controversy surrounding the concept of “grit” as an educational value.80 After the publication of
Angela Duckworth's study on grit as a factor in student academic success and the widespread
adoption of the concept in education circles, a backlash emerged which critiqued Duckworth's
usage of the idea as problematically individualist and reductionist. Ariana Gonzalez Stokas is
representative of this critique when she argues that “to tell the impoverished child in particular
that he or she needs more grit in order to succeed seems at best misguided and at worst classism
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and a return to a culture of poverty ideology that equates pauperism with an unfavorable human
trait that could be bred out of society.”81 The Reaganite narrative that the inherent qualities of
individuals should determine their economic and social success is predicated precisely on the
type of bootstrapping narratives of perseverance that also underwrite educational approaches that
center character traits such as “grit.”
The next chapter will extend the historical account of the development of individualism,
with a particular focus on the ways that it came to be so deeply associated with various rightist
ideals, both economic and social, and distinguish individualism’s radically leftist origins from its
ultimately radically rightist, and perverted, terminus.
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CHAPTER TWO
INDIVIDUALISM AND ANARCHISM: CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT

Within anarchism as an umbrella ideology, individualist anarchism has a particularly
interesting history, and there is significant controversy surrounding many of the key individualist
anarchist thinkers and their place in the tradition. Indeed, there are some within anarchism who
consider individualist views to be fundamentally incompatible with anarchism in the same way
that liberal democrats view individualism as incompatible with genuine democracy. For
example, one of the most well-known public anarchists in modern history, Colin Ward, while
clearly delineating the distinctions between genuinely autonomist individualist anarchism and the
appropriation of the language of individualism by free-market advocates, nonetheless dismisses
as “incomprehensible” and “distasteful” the individualist tradition that grew out of the work of
Max Stirner, one of the major thinkers of individualist anarchism.82 Murray Bookchin, a
progenitor of libertarian municipalism and advocate of communalist anarchism, famously
divided anarchism into two camps, namely social anarchism and lifestyle anarchism (or
lifestylism), with lifestyle anarchism representing essentially the modern iteration of
individualism.83 Bookchin argued that the recent developments in individualistic lifestylism “are
steadily eroding the socialistic character of the libertarian [anarchist] tradition.”84 In this chapter,
I want to review some of the historical developments within anarchism that have affected the
perception of individualism within anarchism specifically, and contextualize individualist
anarchism in the anarchist context by comparing it with a selection of other anarchist schools of
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thought. This discussion will provide the basis for the vision of individualism discussed and
endorsed in chapter three.
The Origins of a Rift: Marx, the Young Hegelians, and Stirner
In his discussion of individualist anarchism, Bookchin seems to endorse a classically
Marxist critique of individualism, voiced most forcefully during the 1930s by anarchosyndicalists and anarcho-communists, namely the idea that individualist anarchism amounts to
little more than “petty-bourgeois exotica” and “middle-class indulgence.”85 By raising this
Marxist critique of individualism (which I will address more directly in Chapter Four), Bookchin
is pointing to what is perhaps the critical moment of rupture between social anarchism and
individualist anarchism (and, perhaps, the broader Left and individualism in general), namely
Marx’s encounter with Stirner. Here I want to survey the genesis and development of Marx’s
Marx’s various clashes with his anarchist contemporaries are well known and have been
documented in great detail. Studies of Marx’s relationship to anarchism often rightly focus on
the importance of his nearly decade-long engagement with Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, a
battle that took place in the arena of the then-newly-formed International Workingman’s
Association (IWA) or the First International.86 One of the core disagreements between Bakunin
and Marx had to do with competing interpretations of the events leading up to and following the
Paris Commune's two-month existence in 1871. Bakunin saw the Commune as an opportunity
for sustained decentralized organization between peasants and workers in opposition to all forms
of State power, whereas Marx believed that the lesson of the Commune was that the workers
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needed a true political party to help them to seize power from the State, and he saw the role of
the International as becoming that party. This was reflective of a more basic doctrinal difference
between the two, namely their visions of post-revolutionary social organization. While both
Marx and Bakunin attacked capitalism, the scope and focus of their approaches differed
critically. Marx relegated his revolutionary ardor to the bourgeoisie property-owning classes,
where Bakunin wanted to expand the revolution to overthrow not only these mechanics of
capitalism but also the state form itself. Bakunin, rather than envisioning a form of centralized
state ownership of the means of production, advocated for a “voluntarily federated set of groups”
as the basis of post-revolutionary social organization.87 Bakunin, somewhat prophetically, argued
that Marx's views would only ever result in a changing of the authoritarian guard, and that a
dictatorship of the proletariat was no less objectionable than one of the bourgeoisie. Alvin
Gouldner refers to this feud, which ultimately resulted in the dissolution of the First International
in 1872 and the exiling of Bakunin’s contingent of IWA members to the United States, as “the
culminating conflict of [Marx’s] political life.88
While this emphasis on the climactic clash between Marx and Bakunin is in many ways
justifiable, there has been comparatively little examination of the arguably equally important
inaugural conflict between Marx and anarchism, which occurred in the form of Marx’s extended
attack on Max Stirner’s The Ego and its Own. Among Marx scholars, the importance of The
German Ideology for Marx’s later work is well established, and many of the themes that find
their ultimate expressions in Capital are first elucidated in The German Ideology. However, what
is often overlooked about that work and its impact on Marx’s later thinking (and the
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development of the relationship between Anarchism and other Leftisms more generally) is the
inclusion of a very lengthy section, indeed the largest in the work, addressing the thought of Max
Stirner. There are a number of interesting historical factors that contributed to the general lack of
sustained analysis of this section of The German Ideology, and the attendant de-emphasizing of
the impact of Stirner’s thought on Marx. For example, the earliest and most widely-read English
translation of that work (the Roy Pascal translation) omitted the section of Stirner, entitled “Saint
Max,” entirely.89 Indeed, this translation was the only English version available until nearly
1970,90 and by the time full translations began to emerge it was generally thought that the
omitted sections from the Pascal translation were either small or of minor theoretical interest.
From a purely editorial standpoint, the omission of “Saint Max” from the text of The German
Ideology is a strange choice. The section, which lays out Marx’s interpretation of Stirner’s
philosophy and methodically attacks nearly every aspect of his work, comprises nearly threefifths of the entire text, is nearly ten thousand words longer than the entirely of Stirner’s own
book, and is over five times longer than Marx’s discussion of his own position.91 The facts seem
to clearly illustrate the importance that Marx himself placed on Stirner’s work, and specifically
the need he felt personally to respond to it in such a lengthy and detailed manner.
The Post-Hegelian Milieu
There is something of a larger context to this discussion that is worth reviewing as well,
and which sheds some light on Marx’s preoccupation with Stirner during this period of his life.
Throughout the early-to-mid-1840’s, Marx was intent on settling his longstanding philosophical
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score with Hegelianism, and specifically the intellectual movement known as “Young
Hegelianism.” The Young Hegelians, sometimes referred to as “Left Hegelians” (as opposed to
their “Old” and “Right” counterparts, who embraced the idea that the dialectic of history had
essentially come to an endpoint with Hegel’s death) was a loose association of German
intellectuals who began to examine and engage with Hegel’s legacy after his death in 1831.
Among their ranks were the brothers Bruno and Edgar Bauer, the theologian David Strauss,
Ludwig Feuerbach, Arnold Ruge, and Max Stirner. The intellectual and political culture of
Germany in the aftermath of Hegel’s death was profoundly divided on the direction in which
Hegel’s work was to be taken, and how the political landscape was to be interpreted through the
lens of Hegel’s work, and the Young Hegelians represented the left-liberal point of view on those
questions. More specifically, the nature and role of the Prussian state and the question of religion
became key objects of contestation and, in the case of the Young Hegelians, critique, for those
who would vie for Hegel’s mantle during these years. These topics dominated the post-Hegelian
intellectual space to such a degree that Karl Rosenkranz, one of the few Hegelian thinkers of the
time who attempted to maintain a relatively orthodox or centrist position, reflected that where
Hegelianism has previously served as a pillar of both the Prussian state and the Church, it was
now “considered to be heretical in religion and revolutionary in politics.”92 The dramatic degree
to which Rosenkranz saw this shift in the perception of Hegelianism was in large part due to the
success of the Young Hegelian project. As it turns out, the most radical developments in Young
Hegelianist leftism were yet to come, and emerged largely in the mid-1840s as Bauer,
Feuerbach, and Stirner began publishing more of their work.
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What Rosenkranz was referring to in 1940 were the early writings of the Young
Hegelians, most notably David Strauss’ 1935 The Life of Jesus, Critically Examined, which
represented the opening salvo of Left Hegelianism against established religious commitments
and theological accepted wisdom. Strauss’ Life, a nearly eight-hundred-page tract, set out to
historically examine the life of Jesus Christ, ultimately arguing, contra church teachings, that the
belief in the incarnation of God in Christ was “the product of collective myth, the truth of which
lies not in the unity of one man with God but in the divinity of humanity itself.”93 Strauss
couched his project in rationalistic terms, claiming to reject the presupposition of any
supernatural facets of the Christ narrative in order “to cling more tenaciously”94 to the historical
truth of the Biblical accounts. The publication of Strauss’ investigation caused an uproar, and
signaled the arrival of the Young Hegelians as a distinct political and philosophical movement.
Importantly, though Strauss’ book was most explicitly religious, in the context of Prussia at the
time, which severely restricted political speech but was comparatively lax when it came to
religious discourse, it served as an important proxy for a political critique of the Prussian
monarchical system. As Walter Jaeschke puts the point, “Much of the extensive literature
devoted to the Hegelian left and right has failed to notice and has consistently disregarded the
fact that it was this [Strauss’ Life] which transformed a debate on the philosophy of religion into
a political debate.”95
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Indeed, the majority of work produced by the Young Hegelians during this period took
the form of religious criticism, but resonated most deeply and in the longer term in the political
arena. A notable example is Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity (1841), in which Feuerbach
advocates for a naturalistic and anthropological view of the origins and fundamental nature of
religious conviction. Specifically, Feuerbach suggests that religious belief is the product of a
confluence of two forms of what he calls “projection,” both of which grow out of immutable and
basic human psychological needs. The first mode of projection arises out of man’s recognition of
his own finitude, and the extension of that finitude to man as a species more generally.96 The
second, and derivative form of projection, is the creation of a personal God in the image of the
human person, a projection that, according to Feuerbach, “is in fact a product of the human
person’s egoistic refusal to recognize his own limits in nature.”97 For Feuerbach, then, the
emergence of Christianity was a historical, naturalistic process that could be objectively studied
anthropologically. Feuerbach’s curative to this was a humanistic return to the individual as the
measure of human value, rather than some immutable and ultimately illusory concept like the
Christian God. Indeed, Feuerbach considered titling The Essence of Christianity, Know Thyself
instead, thus driving home his humanistic desire to dispel “the illusions that alienated man from
his own nature.”98 For Feuerbach, the task of post-Hegelian philosophy was to return man to
himself because, as he puts the point, “It is the species which infuses love into me. A loving
heart is the heart of the species throbbing in the individual.”99
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It was this anthropological critique of Christianity coupled with Feuerbach’s humanistic
return to the value of the individual in society that made his work politically important. In an
echo of Hegel’s early work and indeed as a notable precursor to Marx, Feuerbach saw Christian
belief as a product of its own particular material and historical conditions. He tied the genesis of
the Christian need to “project his quest for personal worth into an afterlife beyond the social and
political world that had ceased to be the sustaining medium of the self”100 to the decline of the
Greek polis and Roman Republic. With the collapse of these archetypical forms of socio-political
relationships, the human need of self-actualization drove humanity to posit a Universal redeemer
who could satisfy that need. However, in doing so, Feuerbach argued that humanity profoundly
and ultimately alienated itself from itself, and “sacrificed man to God, his own creation.”101 The
reduction of human identity and value to a single, isolated individual (Christ, or the personhood
of God), Feuerbach argued for a return to the communal orientation of the polis, and insisted on
a social ontology that prioritized the social nature of humanity.102 While Feuerbach generally
resisted explicit political engagement (he gradually ceased to contribute to Arnold Ruge’s journal
Hallische Jahrbucher as the publication became increasingly politically radical),103 it is critical
to recognize the degree to which philosophical and religious writings were deployed by the
Prussian state to ideological support its foundations among the public and intellectual classes
against what they saw as the potentially subversive advance of certain philosophical positions
(atheism, republicanism, etc.). As Todd Gooch has argued, Feuerbach’s critiques of religion
were often “directed against…representatives of what Feuerbach refers to as the positive
philosophy, who were enlisted by Friedrich Wilhelm IV after he assumed the throne in 1840 to
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combat the influence of Hegelian ‘rationalism’ in the Prussian universities.104 This participation
in the sub rosa political conflict between the Prussian monarchy and the Young Hegelians,
coupled with his lasting influence on Marx (as in his initial articulation of a concept of
alienation), Feuerbach’s political impact was substantial.
A similar case to that of Feuerbach was the work of Bruno Bauer. Bauer, though he
originally rejected Strauss’ interpretation and held to the orthodox view of the historicity of the
Christ narrative, published in quick succession Critique of the Evangelical History of John
(1840) and Critique of the Evangelical History of the Synoptics (1841-1842), in which he argued
that Strauss had not gone far enough in his criticism of religious doctrine. Specifically, where
Strauss accounted for the mythological nature of Christian texts by appealing to a certain
unsophisticated sincerity on the part of their authors, Bauer argued that the gospels he analyzed
were created by “writers who had deliberately set out to achieve a desired effect.”105 This
historically materialistic interpretation of the Gospels led Bauer to critique what he saw as the
Church’s monopolistic, sectarian claim to universality by fusing the particular (in Christ) with
the universal, rather than allowing for a pluralistic understanding of abstract universality in its
myriad instantiations. This deeply Hegelian critique of the Church was tied directly to Bauer’s
then-radical republicanism, in the sense that he saw the Church and the Monarchy as enacting
precisely the same type of “hubristic particularism”106 that tamped down the radical possibilities
embodied in a pluralistic celebration of what Bauer called “Self-Consciousness,” and it is
Bauer’s understanding of this concept that provides the direct bridge between his religious
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critiques and his critiques of the Prussian state (and State power more generally). Though Bauer
did not identify as an anarchist, in the early 1940s he articulated a number of important critiques
of the state and its structural oppression of self-consciousness, both individual and collective. In
classical Hegelian fashion, Bauer saw his revolutionary program, as “rooted in the historical
process of self-consciousness. What the present demands is opposition to alienation and
heteronomy in all their forms,” and one key form in which those things are instantiated is the
State.107 Though the intricacies of Bauer’s political theory are not directly relevant to the
discussion here, what is important to note is that, as in the work of Feuerbach, the seemingly
apological character of the Young Hegelian critiques of religion are also importantly political,
once the Prussian context is understood.
It was at this critical and fecund moment in German intellectual history, that Karl Marx
arrived in Berlin and quickly fell in with the Young Hegelians. It was, importantly, Bruno Bauer,
who was largely responsible for Marx’s being brought into the fold of the Young Hegelian social
circle, and the two would even work on an edition of Hegel’s Philosophy of Religion together.108
Bauer’s influence on Marx was profound, and the two became very close, with many
contemporaries viewing Marx as Bauer’s protégé.109 It is telling, in this regard, that Marx
concluded his dissertation on Epicurus by arguing that the Hellenistic-era Greek thinkers
represented an early instantiation not of the dialectical progress of Spirit, as orthodox
Hegelianism would have it, but rather as participants in the dialectic of self-consciousness, as
Bauer himself had argued.110 Soon after the completion of Marx’s dissertation, Marx accepted an
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invitation from Bauer to visit him in Bonn, where Bauer had been transferred from Berlin to
teach theology. The pair proceeded to spend the summer “shocking the local bourgeoisie –
getting drunk, laughing in church…and penning an anonymous spoof The Last Trumpet of
Judgment Against Hegel the Atheist and the Anti-Christ.”111 The publication of this shorter work,
once the identity of the authors was discerned by a local Hegelian newspaper, ultimately led to
the dismissal of Bauer from his university post and the departure of Marx to Cologne, where his
break with Young Hegelianism would begin. After this time period, Marx’s thinking would
quickly shift to a full rejection of Young Hegelian ideals, both philosophical and political. As he
began his journalistic career at the German radical newspaper Rheinische Zeitung and began to
become more interested in economic theory, he simultaneously began publishing a series of
works attacking the Young Hegelians with whom he had previously been so close. These works
included The Holy Family (1844), Theses on Feuerbach (1845), and The German Ideology
(written around 1845). I have rehearsed briefly the philosophical context of Young Hegelianism
as well as Marx’s interaction with the movement not merely for historical purposes, but because
I argue that Marx’s break with Young Hegelianism, and Max Stirner most importantly,
represents the origin of the more general rift between individualism and more communally
oriented leftist ideologies in general, be they anarchist, communist, socialist, or whatever. That
is, the intra-leftist disagreements between communalist democratic thinking and individualism
always echo the rift between Marx and Stirner. It is to Stirner’s views themselves to which I turn
in the next section, setting as they do the stage for nearly all subsequent developments and
mutations in individualist anarchism, as well as the relationship between individualism and the
Left more generally.
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Stirner’s Egoism and the Culmination of Young Hegelianism
Max Stirner, though closely associated with the Young Hegelian circle, more often
served as a foil to the work produced by the likes of Bauer, Feuerbach, and the like. Indeed, the
little historical evidence we have about Stirner’s personal life and reladtionships suggest that he
purposely remained on the margins of his social circle. William Brazill evokes Stirner’s presence
at the meetings of the Young Hegelians of Berlin as “aloof and calm…willing to talk about
philosophical matters, but never [speaking] about himself.”112 Friedrich Engels, who sketched
the only extant depictions of Stirner, also mentions Stirner in a mock-epic poem, characterizing
him as combining “restraint in his manners and extremity in his views, quietly reflective in
appearance but provoking others with his ideas.”113 In terms of those provocative ideas, Stirner
broadly held the Young Hegelian line on questions of religion and the Prussian monarchy, but
broke with his contemporaries by pushing their lines of critique even further, arguing that the
Young Hegelians had failed to see their project through fully. After having published a series of
shorter articles and pieces of journalism in the early 1840s, Stirner published The Ego and Its
Own (Der Einzige und Sein Eigentum). The book, which was a broad-based critique not only of
the traditional targets of Young Hegelianism, but also the Young Hegelians themselves,
specifically Bruno Bauer and Ludwig Feuerbach, received wildly divergent receptions. Among
the general public, it was largely ignored entirely. Indeed, the manuscript was approved
surprisingly easily by the Prussian censors, given its radical content and explicit critiques of the
state, and was dubbed “too absurd to be dangerous.”114 At the same time, the book has also been

112

William J. Brazill, The Young Hegelians (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1970), 209-210.
David Leopold, “A Solitary Life,” in Max Stirner, ed. Saul Newman (London: Palgrave, 2011), 21-41, 25.
114
John Henry Mackay, Max Stirner: His Life and Work, trans. Hubert Kennedy (Concord, CA: Peremptory
Publications, 2005), 127.
113

47

referred to as “the most revolutionary book ever written,”115 and this characterization is indeed
more apt when the book is placed in the context of Left politics and the relationship between
anarchism, Marxism, and the Young Hegelian milieu of the time. The book provoked direct
responses from Moses Hess (who defended socialism against Stirner’s anarchism), Ludwig
Feuerbach, and an anonymous follower of Bruno Bauer, who went by the name “Szeliga.”116
Stirner, the only Young Hegelian to explicitly declare himself an anarchist, sets up as his
goal in The Ego and its Own, first to critique what he sees as the unfinished Young Hegelian
project of ideological demystification, and second, to provide an individualist account of human
development, both on the level of individual persons as well as as the grounds for a new social
order. The book is divided into two major sections entitled “Man” and “I.” The first section can
be characterized as genealogical, “not only in the mundane sense of tracing a linear progression
through modes of experience, but also in the Foucauldian sense of trying to unsettle by
demonstrating that modernity fails to escape from the very thing that it claims to have
outgrown.”117 Specifically, Stirner argues that in their zeal to transcend the old types of religious
belief and monarchical state power, his contemporaries had only succeeded in replacing those
forms with equally homogenizing and oppressive constructs that changed the type of oppression,
but not its nature. Whether one’s identity is determined by religious strictures, monarchical
nationalism, or abstract ideals of humanism and secular citizenship, the key point is that one’s
identity is being determined at all, and therefore stifled. For Stirner, the individual corporality of
human experience is irreducible, and attempts to subsume individuals under any umbrella
whatever are all fundamentally flawed and represent attacks on subjectivity. He accurately
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glosses the general Young Hegelian humanist consensus in this way, “Be not a Jew, not a
Christian, but be a human being…Assert your humanity against every restrictive specification;
make yourself, by means of it, a human being, and free from those limits; make yourself a ‘free
man,’ that is recognize humanity as your all determining essence.”118 Stirner unambiguously
endorses freeing humanity from the shackles of outmoded religious visions of souls and essences
(Stirner’s pet term for these incorporeal ideals is “spooks”), but argues that this critique is
incomplete. What else is “human being” but yet another restrictive identity specification, much
like “Jew,” “Christian,” “Prussian,” or whatever else? He writes, “I say: You are indeed more
than a Jew, more than a Christian, etc., but you are also more than a human being. Those are all
ideals, but you are corporeal.”119 Stirner is not here advocating some primitive form of
posthumanism, by which we transcend our humanity through technological or other forms of
augmentation,120 (though as I will argue in Chapter Three, individualism is fundamentally
compatible with these sorts of identity play), but rather is calling for a reevaluation of the
identity categories of Enlightenment humanism, and illustrating their discursive limitations.
Stirner’s genealogy of homogenizing, spectral power over identity and subjectivity suggests that
where “political liberalism” attacked the power of individual feudal masters, it merely replaced
that master with the master of state power; where “social liberalism” aims to abolish inequality
in property, it does so only by appealing to the abstract category of “ghostly society,” which
again only serve to subsume the individual; and where “humanistic liberalism” attempts to free
people from the controlling power of religion, it does so only by replacing religious conviction
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with abstract ideals of “Man.”121 Stirner summarizes his view of liberal humanism this way, “In
short, I have no calling, and follow none, not even that to be a man.”122 Importantly, Stirner
directly attacked socialist communism as participating in this religious return to abstract ideals of
humanity and community membership. Stirner accurately points out that the socialist
preoccupation with alienation is important not because of the process of alienation (on which
Stirner largely agrees with Marx), but because of the question of what one becomes alienated
from. The socialist view of alienation, on Stirner’s view is that “if a factory worker must tire
himself to death twelve hours and more, he is cut off from becoming man,”123 where “man” is
used as a proxy for a prescriptive vision of humane excellence or value. The communist still
neglects the individuality of discrete human persons in favor of their preferred religious ideals of
“laborer,” “fellow worker,” and the like. This discourse is still unacceptably essentialist on
Stirner’s view, and is itself merely a form of religious orthodoxy. He writes, “As the communists
first declare free activity to be man’s essence, they, like all work-day dispositions, need a
Sunday; like all material endeavours, they need a God.”124 It was this form of critique that so
predictably incensed Marx, and pushed him to directly and lengthily attack Stirner. Though it is
generally agreed upon that Marx’s dealings with the anarchists, Stirner in particular, were
interpretively ungenerous, reliant on personal attacks, and revealing of “the authoritarian
tendency of his own social and political thought, but also the authoritarian nature of his own
personality,”125 Marx did recognize that Stirner’s extremism did indeed represent the culmination
of the Young Hegelian project of critique, and took seriously his diagnosis of concepts such as
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“man,” and historical actors such as “the worker” as merely vestigial and covert religious
abstractions.126
The truly radical project of individualism, for Stirner, is to subvert all categories of
homogenizing identification and expose the relations of power and control that exist in even the
purportedly liberal rejections of things like religion and monarchical authority. In this sense, Saul
Newman argues that Stirner represents an important precursor to more recent critiques of power
and calls for a “politics of difference” pursued by poststructuralist thinkers such as Foucault and
Derrida.127 Stirner’s exposure of a political imaginary, in mid-19th century Germany, that was
still indelibly polluted with “essentialist categories that are derived from Enlightenment
humanism,”128 Stirner was inarguably ahead of his time. His positive views for a society
compatible with individualist values will be discussed along with those of other individualists in
Chapter Three, but the key point here is to illustrate Stirner’s inauguration of anarchist
individualism and his break with Marx, which I argue represents the larger break between leftist
thinking and individualism in general, particularly once individualist ideas are exported to the
United States and undergo certain proto-libertarian mutations.
American Anarcho-Individualism
As discussed in Chapter One, a certain breed of rugged individualism is deeply embedded
in the American cultural and political consciousness. I want in this section to discuss how the
arrival of Max Stirner’s egoist anarchism on American shores influenced the libertarian left of
the age, as well as examine how these developments set the stage for the ultimate appropriation
of individualism by the current neoliberal forces of right libertarianism and conservatism.
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While there were certainly important precursors to individualist anarchism in American
philosophical history, the majority of the nineteenth century in American radicalism was marked
much more dramatically by a tendency toward communal utopianism, which was both not
generally anarchist in its orientation and much more willing to treat individuals as explicitly
subordinate to communal identities. During this period, figures like Robert Owen, George Rapp,
and various religious sects, drawing their inspiration often from the work of utopian social
planner Charles Fourier, set out to establish perfectly harmonious communal societies apart from
the control of state authority.129 It was this utopian socialist milieu that produced arguably the
first American anarchist,130 Josiah Warren, as well as primed the American left to receive the
impending English translation of The Ego and its Own on terms very different than those of the
European context.
Warren, of whose life relatively little is known, first appears in the history of American
radicalism as a follower of the utopian Robert Owen, and one of the founding settlers of an
Owenite utopian socialist community, New Harmony, in Indiana in 1925. The colony at New
Harmony fell apart two years later in 1927, but unlike many of the disillusioned would-be
utopians, Warren’s conviction of the possibility of autonomous government apart from State
authority only strengthened. For Warren, the failure of New Harmony was that it had entirely
failed to respect individuality and, crucially, concepts of private property and personal
responsibility.131 Warren argued that attempts to subjugate individual will and personality to a
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sense of collectivity was ultimately what doomed New Harmony, and was the fatal flaw in all
forms of communalist organization, be they utopian, communist, or merely state-socialist. He
wrote in his “Narrative of Practical Experiments,” “It [the utopian movement] had been defeated
by our attempt to govern each other, to regulate each other’s movements for the common benefit,
no two having the same view from one week to another. Infinite diversity instead of unity is
inevitable…”132 Though Warren was by no means opposed to the concept of common benefit,
and held that rigorous respect for individuality would on the whole lead to the benefit of all, one
can already see here the seeds of the right-libertarian wholesale rejection of community and
valorization of private property.
Another key aspect of Warren’s philosophy that serves as a precursor to explicit rightlibertarianism, and contributed to the misinterpretation of Stirner among American anarchists,
was his emphasis on economic exchange. The year that New Harmony failed also represented a
banner year for the American labor movement, with laborers from a number of disciplines
forming the Mechanics Union of Trade Associations and successfully striking for a ten-hour
work day, as well the founding of the radical trade newspaper The Mechanic’s Free Press.133
Warren, who saw Robert Owen’s proposed solutions to the problems of labor as paternalistic and
wrongly capitulating to the demands of capital at the level of ownership, saw this as an
opportunity for him to put forth his theory of voluntary association and economic production as a
solution that genuinely respected the individual and his rights. One of the cornerstones of
Warren’s economic theory, which he referred in a work by the same name as “equitable
commerce,” was the concept of the “Time Store.”134 Effectively, the Time Stores, of which a
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number were actually established in Cincinnati and elsewhere, were meant to be places where
goods could be exchanged directly for labor, represented by labor notes. Rather than a currency
in the sense that the term is usually understood, Warren argued that “a stable, rational circulating
medium must be nothing but a representation of a certain amount of goods or labor, a sheer
placeholder for things of intrinsic value.”135 In Warren’s system, if I want to purchase x number
of bushels of wheat, I need to pay the wheat farmer with labor directly equivalent to the labor
utilized in the production of the wheat. This system, Warren argued, both solved some of the
intrinsic problems with money (inflation, speculation, artificial limitation on supply, etc.) and
provided opportunities to those traditionally left behind by usual monetary systems (the
homeless, poor, etc.) since they would immediately gain wealth in the form of their direct labor
under this system. While there are examples of Warren’s system finding success, as in his later
utopian experiment on Long Island, Modern Times, it should be obvious given more recent
mutations in the discourse of responsibility and personal initiative (as in Reagan and Thatcher),
that Warren’s vision of fair economic exchange was ripe for exploitation and appropriation by
conservative and right libertarian forces.136
Warren’s emphasis on private property and exchange, along with his interpretation of
self-ownership in an economic sense centered around one’s right to economically dispose of
one’s own labor, rather than in a metaphysical sense centered around the imperative of selfcreation (as in Stirner, Emerson, and Thoreau), runs through the American individualists. Take,
for example, William Batchelder Greene, another American anarchist individualist whose views
were, like Warren’s, significantly shaped by a negative experience with an experimental socialist
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utopia, this time at George Ripley’s137 Brook Farm in eastern Massachusetts. Greene is by far
most well-known not as an anarchist per se, but rather as an economic critic, specifically of the
concept of interest. James J. Martin, one of the most important historians of American
individualist anarchism refers to Greene as “a product of the currency radicalism that
accompanied and followed the business and financial panic of 1837.”138 Greene’s most wellknown works, Mutual Banking (1850) and Equality (1849), echoed Warren’s critiques of
centralized state and private power in the form of banks and other organization, arguing that the
various forms of speculation, interest, and the like that had plagued the banking system in the
United States be eliminated from financial transaction. Greene, though developing a less
thoroughgoing individualist metaphysic than Warren, still couched many of his economic
critiques in the language of individualism. He writes, for example, in Equality, that centralized
banking, with interest and the like, puts banks in a prime position “to enable the few to bring the
many under tribute…On the side of the bank there is a small army, well equipped, well officered,
and well disciplined.”139 Greene saw the banks as essentially paramilitary organizations that
tamped down individual freedom, productivity, and generally damaged social relations. At the
same time, his solutions to the issues he saw with banking and the excesses of centralized capital
were articulated in precisely the same language as what we would today think of as rightlibertarianism, namely “increasing personal freedom” and “increasing competition and choice.”
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Greene’s economic individualism was importantly formative in the thought of the most
influential of the American individualists, Benjamin Tucker. It would be through Tucker, and his
series of anarchist periodicals The Radical Review and Liberty, that European individualism of
the type advocated by Stirner first made its way to the United States. Tucker, who referred to his
politics not as anarchism, but as “unterrified Jeffersonianism,”140 was in some senses the
philosophical heir of a wide swathe of American leftisms, less an original thinker than a
synthesizer and, in some ways, a popularizer.141 The wide and popular distribution of Liberty
(active from 1881-1908), which counted among its contributors and subscribers the likes of
George Bernard Shaw and Walt Whitman,142 provided the perfect avenue for the distribution of
anarchist thought and writing, and was taken full advantage of by Tucker and his
contemporaries. The purpose of the periodical was entirely and explicitly to advocate anarchist
ideals, particularly in the tradition of Josiah Warren. The influence of Warren’s economistic
individualism on Tucker’s early thought is apparent in the initial advertisement for Liberty,
which read in part that the chief enemy of the publication was
the State – The State that corrupts children, the State that trammels law; the State that
stifles thought; the State that monopolizes land, the State that limits credit; the State that
restricts exchange; the State that gives idle capital the power of increase, and through
interest, rent, profit, and taxes, robs industrious labor of its products.143
Given Tucker’s philosophical proclivities and the global reach of his influential publication, it
was inevitable that Tucker would eventually become acquainted with Stirner’s work and its
European advocates, most notably John Henry Mackay, a prominent advocate of Stirnerite
individualism and eventual biographer of Stirner. While the historical timeline is somewhat
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muddled regarding who introduced who to Stirner’s work, and though Stirner had been known in
certain American anarchist circles prior to Tucker’s first meeting with Mackay in the Summer of
1889, what is clear is that Tucker and Mackay immediately felt a philosophical kinship and
began working together very quickly.144 Mackay was himself a fascinating figure, and a poet and
anarchist thinker of some merit in his own right. He was a prominent homosexual in European
radical circles and penned a number of highly polemical and controversial defenses of free love,
up to and including pederasty.145 After the meeting between Tucker and Mackay, Mackay began
publishing regularly in Liberty from an explicitly Stirnerite perspective, and Tucker began
working, along with fellow Anarchist Steven T. Byington, on preparing the first English
translation of The Ego and its Own, which would eventually appear in 1907. Tucker’s
interpretation of Stirner’s individualism was directly in line with and colored by his already
established commitments to the Americanized individualism of Warren, Greene, and the like,
and so he saw in the work of the German a philosophical tool to advance his own vision of
individualism, which again was much more economistic and reductive than Stirner ever
intended. Indeed, controversies surrounding Tucker’s interpretation of Stirner arose almost
immediately, with Dora Marsden, a suffragette and individualist who published a Stirnerite
journal The Egoist in the early 1900s, pointing out that Tucker was reading into Stirner and other
European individualists economic themes and commitments that were simply not there, or at
least were being wildly exaggerated and misinterpreted.146 At this point, however the die of
American individualist anarchism had largely been cast, and the term was fastened strongly to
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ideas of economic freedom, choice, competition, and reductive dichotomies of selfishness and
altruism, and government and private industry.
In 1908, Tucker’s anarchist book shop, and the publishing office of Liberty, burned to the
ground, forcing Tucker to flee to France. Many saw the fall of Liberty, the dissolution of the
individualist group that had formed around the figure of Tucker, and the simultaneous rise of
Anarcho-communism as the preferred radical leftist position (exemplified in Emma Goldman’s
Mother Earth), as the end of individualist sentiment in America, and it is indeed where James J.
Martin ends his authoritative study of that subject.147 However, when Tucker died in France in
1939, though his work would not be as influential on the development of the Left as Stirner’s was
in his time, his economistic rhetoric of individualist self-interest was already shaping the views of
a very different group of political thinkers that would come to define right-libertarianism in the
years to come. In the next section I will survey some of these thinkers and their thought, as well
as complete my genealogical account of the development and eventual subversion of individualism
in the American context, culminating in its appropriation for explicitly conservative capitalist
ends.148
The Conservative Appropriation of Individualism
Much has recently been written about the prominent (re)emergence of individualist
economic and social discourses on the American right. Perhaps the figure who has prompted the
most interest in the ideological foundations of these views is that of Paul Ryan, Republican
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congressman from Wisconsin and current Speaker of the House. Ryan has been very public about
his philosophical affection for the work of Russian novelist Ayn Rand, who is credited by many
with popularizing rightist libertarian individualism among the American populace during the
middle of the 20th century. Ryan credits reading Rand in high school with sparking his interest in
politics and economic policy, and claims to direct all of his congressional interns to read her most
well-known work Atlas Shrugged (1957).149 Donald Trump has spoken highly of Rand’s The
Fountainhead (1943), stating that “it relates to business (and) beauty (and) life and inner emotions.
The book relates to…everything,” and claims to personally identify with the novel’s egoist
protagonist Howard Roark.150 Trump’s nominee for labor secretary Andrew Pudzer (who was
forced to withdraw from consideration after documents detailing alleged spousal abuse surfaced),
has stated that he instructed all six of his children to read The Fountainhead.151 Clearly, Rand has
had a large influence on the ideology of the contemporary right, particularly on economic issues.
Jennifer Burns, who has painstakingly documented Rand’s work and rise in conservative circles
in her Goddess of the Market (2009), assesses Rand’s legacy in this way, “She does, however,
remain a veritable institution within the American right…For over half a century Rand has been
the ultimate gateway drug to life on the right.”152 It is worth mentioning here that, despite her
undeniable political staying power, Rand has exerted precisely zero influence in academic
philosophical circles, even among those who identify as conservative or libertarian. Robert Nozick,
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who authored the standard account of academic right-libertarian philosophy Anarchy, State, and
Utopia (1974) is one of the few academic philosophers to even address Rand by name, and he
more-or-less dismisses her philosophy as a potential moral foundation for capitalism out of
hand.153 This fact is perhaps indicative of yet another splintering of individualism once it entered
the consciousness of the right, but since Rand and those in her orbit much more readily took up
the mantle and language of individualism explicitly, it is their work that will be the focus of this
section.
Rand seems to have viewed her philosophy and work as historically sui generis,
conditioned neither by the material conditions of her life or his theoretical forebears. Speaking
through the character of Howard Roark, she writes in a not-so-thinly-veiled reference to her own
work, “I inherit nothing. I stand at the end of no tradition. I may, perhaps, stand at the beginning
of one.”154 In reality, of course, Rand was undeniably in theoretical conversation with the
American individualists and their European counterparts (particularly Nietzsche, in Rand’s case),
and she developed much of her thinking in the same way that many of the American individualists
did, namely as a response to a deeply negative formative experience with communal existence, as
she witnessed her father’s self-made wealth forcefully reappropriated by the Red Guard during the
Bolshevik Revolution in 1918, and was forced to relocate multiple times as a child due to
communist-induced instability in Europe.155 Rand’s philosophy extolled the polar opposite of
communal values, as well, in her eyes the repressive and irrational Christian morality, namely what
she famously referred to as “the virtue of selfishness,” and correspondingly preached the inherent
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destructiveness of altruism.156 For Rand, any proper ethic that would claim to be able to guide
human conduct must above all else be rational. Her proposed system, which she called
“objectivism,” purported to be the first ever rational answer to “the question of why man needs a
code of values.”157 Rand’s answer to this question is, essentially, the pursuit of survival and selfinterest by individuals. Rand interpreted the Nietzschean conception of the ubermensch to refer to
the individualized forms of genius and creativity that are constantly tamped down by the strictures
of society and political power.158 While this interpretation of Nietzsche, as will be discussed in
Chapter Three, is crude and reductive, as well as likely a product of Rand’s own bitterness at her
early professional and social failures, it lent her work a particular appeal amongst disaffected youth
and individuals who felt that their own greatness had been overlooked or even suppressed by some
or other aspect of society. For Rand, the solution was, essentially, capitalism. The freedom of the
market was the most “rational” way of releasing the shackles that had previously fettered the great
geniuses of society and provide a rational basis for organizing society, namely along the lines of
intellectual, physical, and economic prowess.
Rand’s work emerged alongside both a series of Red Scares in the United States, which
contributed to a generalized skepticism regarding communism and communally-based political
systems in general, as well as the emergence of a chorus of new economists who defended Rand’s
vision of the free market on economic, rather the moral grounds favored by Rand. Specifically, the
rise of so-called Austrian economics and its outpost at the University of Chicago in the United
States purported to empirically prop up Randian assumptions regarding individuals, capitalism,
and the good. This era in economic theory represents the rise of what we know today as
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“neoliberalism,” a term that has undergone a number of mutations and alterations, sometimes
going by the aliases of “late capitalism,” “liquid capitalism,”159 and others. Neoliberalism is itself,
as the name implies, a type of mutation, namely of economic liberalism, or what is sometimes
called “classical liberalism” to emphasize the distinction. The basic principles of neoliberalism
were elaborated following the 1938 Walter Lippman Colloquium in Paris, which was called
explicitly to form a new liberalism as interest in classical liberal economic thinking waned. The
foundational commitments ultimately produced by the participants at the colloquium are “the
priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise, the system of competition, and a strong and
impartial state.”160 Two of the most important neoliberal economic theorists who were to emerge
in the postwar period were attendees at the original Colloquium, namely Friedrich Hayek and
Ludwig von Mises. Hayek and von Mises, along with Chicago economist Milton Friedman would
go on to found the Mont Pelerin Society, an organization dedicated to developing and, critically,
disseminating the ideas of neoliberal economics. The neoliberals took on board nearly all of the
most foundational commitments of classical liberalism, namely a vision of economics as an
objective science akin to the hard sciences of physics and chemistry, a fundamentalist Lockean
view of property rights,161 and a strong preference for negative over positive freedom. That is, the
neoliberal theorists, in advocating for a government detached from people’s economic lives in
every way other than military protection, argued that the primary mode of freedom to be accorded
individuals is that of freedom from outside interference. Individuals ought to be free from
interference or restriction by government power up until the point that they threaten to infringe on
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the rights of another, third party. Naturally, this implies the freedom to dispose of one’s labor and
capital in whatever way one likes.162 While this view of freedom goes back as far as John Stuart
Mill’s On Liberty,163 it was particularly centered in the economic theories advocated by the
classical liberals and their neoliberal progeny.
It was the publication of Hayek’s 1944 The Road to Serfdom that signaled the fusion in the
American political imaginary of the moralistic Nietzschean individualism of Rand with the
dispassionate economic individualism of the Austrian school of economics. Both Rand and Hayek
pointed to the deteriorating situation in Europe as evidence of the failures of collectivism and
directly mobilized individualist language, tied in their work directly to capitalism, as a
counterpoint to the evils of socialism. Though neither thinker would directly identify American
anarcho-individualism as an influence on their thought, the connections were made by their
followers both in the public and in the academy. Followers of Rand on the student Right, for
example, fashioned a new logo for the nascent Objectivist movement that imposed a shining, gold
dollar sign (one of the avatars of John Galt, the hero of Atlas Shrugged) over the traditional
anarchist black flag.164 Murray Rothbard, a radical devotee of von Mises and the first to use the
term “anarcho-capitalism” to describe his economic views, deeply admired the work of Benjamin
Tucker and his lesser known contemporary Lysander Spooner. Rothbard opened his analysis of
what he called “The Spooner-Tucker Doctrine,” that “nothing is more needed today than a revival
and development of the largely forgotten legacy that they left to political philosophy.”165 Rothbard
advocated, like Tucker and Warren, the complete elimination of the state so as to maximize
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personal liberty in the economic realm, and agreed with Rand that this would open up the space
for human creativity to unfold unhindered.
Rothbard’s anarcho-capitalist individualism is the philosophical terminus at the extreme
right of the individualist anarchism of Max Stirner, a view with which, as Chapter Three will
demonstrate, it is fundamentally incompatible. When “individualism” is attacked by those on the
left who advocate the range of views from state socialism to communistic anarchism, it is generally
the views described in the last section of this chapter that they have in mind, and these views are
indeed anathema to many traditionally leftist commitments, such as democratic community, a
sense of the common good, and basic human empathy. Having traced the mutation of Stirner’s
original articulation of individualist anarchism, and particularly his negative critique of the state
and the project of enlightenment humanism, up to the current era of neoliberal capitalism, the next
chapter will, drawing on not only Stirner but a suite of other early individualist thinkers, construct
a view of individualism that not only runs counter to the neoliberal individualisms just discussed,
but also serves as a powerful ally to other leftisms.
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CHAPTER THREE
LEFT-ANARCHO-INDIVIDUALISM: A POSITIVE VISION

Having reviewed the historical development of individualist thinking within anarchism,
and diagnosing what I see as the perversion of the core of individualism by neoliberal capitalist
rationality, this chapter will, drawing on the work of some of the individualist thinkers surveyed
in Chapter 2, lay out a positive, synthetic understanding of individualism as both an ontological
and socio-political worldview that I believe ought to be attractive to leftists of many types,
particularly in the struggle to resist neoliberal late capitalism. I have previously spoken in terms
of “individualism” or “anarcho-individualism” in general terms, focusing more on the historical
development of the tradition. In this chapter I will articulate a view of what I will call “leftanarcho-individualism” and distinguish that view from the “right-anarcho-individualism”
described in the conclusion of the previous chapter.166 While both views are “individualist” in a
basic sense, it is the political and ethical dimensions of each view that render them importantly
distinct. Chapter 4 will lay out what I see as some of the most powerful objections to the leftanarcho-individualist view presented here and answer them.
Individualism as an Ontological Commitment: The Primacy of Subjectivity and Identity
At the foundation of individualism lies a suite of ontological claims about the nature of
the individual, the nature of freedom, and, by extension, the nature of society. Eunice Minette
Schuster, in her study of the American anarchist tradition, succinctly sums the individualist view
(which she controversially attributes to all anarchists) this way, “The Individual for the anarchist
is the only social reality. Society has no existence, per se, as distinct from the individuals who
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compose it.”167 Put more expansively in the words of American anarchist Benjamin Tucker,
“Man sums up in his being all the universe contains.”168 This particular social ontology, which
centers the individual as of primary importance in philosophical and political theorizing, runs
throughout all of the individualist thinkers, including those who would mobilize their thought for
conservative capitalist ends, an overlap which has led many to dismiss individualism out of hand
as a useful tool for leftist resistance, a mistake that I will address in Chapter 4.
The particular approaches taken by the various individualist thinkers differ in some minor
ways, but the general thrust of their ontological approaches to individualism are, in the main,
very similar. In general, individualists are interested in the unavoidably subjective, first-person
nature of human experience of being a specific, discrete person in the world. In this sense, the
foundational ontological concern of individualism can be said to be existentialist in some
regards, and many commentators have made explicit the connections between the left-anarchoindividualism of Stirner, Emerson, and others with the existentialist tradition represented by
Nietzsche, Sartre, and others. Herbert Read, for example, makes this connection perhaps most
explicitly, noting that
Existentialism is eliminating all systems of idealism, all theories of life or being that
subordinate man to an idea, to an abstraction of some sort. It is also eliminating all
systems of materialism that subordinate man to the operation of physical and economic
laws. It is saying that man is the reality - not even man in the abstract, but the human
person, you and I; and that everything else – freedom, love, reason, God – is a
contingency depending on the will of the individual.169
The point Read is making here is simply that, for the existentialists and individualists alike, the
individual both is ontologically primary (rather than abstract concepts of society and so on) and
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ought never to be treated as subsumable under any other abstract heading. The individualist
begins with the subjective lived-experience of the individual, and lets those experiences serve as
the basis of all further theorizing and action. Max Stirner ably elucidates the starting point of
individualist philosophy in the opening to The Ego and its Own, writing “From the moment
when he catches sight of the light of the world a man seeks to find out himself and get hold of
himself out of its confusion, in which he, with everything else, is tossed about in motley
mixture.”170 Emerson poetically echoes Stirner’s vision of the “motley mixture” of our subjective
experience in the opening of his aptly titled “Experience,”
Where do we find ourselves? In a series of which we do not know the extremes, and
believe that it has none. We wake and find ourselves on a stair; there are stairs below us,
which we seem to have ascended; there are stairs above us, many a one, which go upward
and out of sight…All things swim and glitter.171
Both Stirner and Emerson here are describing what they take to be the fundamental nature of
human existence and experience, namely the fact that we are always engaged in a never-ending
process of attempting to make sense of the world and of ourselves as beings in that world. It is
the first task of the individual, on the individualist view, to reckon with the simple but strange
fact that we exist at all. Agnese Maria Fortuna argues that both Emerson and his
Transcendentalist contemporary Henry David Thoreau saw the search for authenticity and the
expression thereof as an unavoidable ontological fact of human existence. She writes that for the
Transcendentalists, “Individuals are basically conceived as expressing selves…Therefore, to
express self is not evidently a matter of self-satisfaction or complacency…nor is it a simple
question of finding a good use for personal talents. The worth of expression rests on its
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unavoidability.”172 It is this unavoidability of confrontation with the self and the need for selfcreation that forms the most fundamental ontological commitment of the individualist.
In this sense, the early individualists seem to be prefiguring some aspects of the work of
Martin Heidegger, who, in his Being and Time, would famously call for a philosophical return to
the question of Being as such that he felt had been lost in Western philosophy. Specifically, the
individualist attitude toward experience seems to be of a piece with Heidegger’s concept of
“thrownness” (Geworfenheit).173 The essential aspects of thrownness have to do with the
unchosen and yet unavoidable fact of simply being somebody in the world, with concerns,
responsibilities, relationships, and the full suite of human limitations and capacities. As Taylor
Carman puts it, “I am constantly thrown into taking on responsibility for my being…my
responsibility for my own being is thrust upon me; it accrues to me just in virtue of my being-inthe-world.”174 Katherine Withy glosses the concept of thrownness in terms more directly in line
with Stirner and Emerson, claiming that “Pure thrownness is the fact that there is and has to be
sense-making, rather than not…Explicitly formulated, the reflective question…is, ‘What is it to
be a sense-maker (rather than not)?’”175 While it would be wrong to label Heidegger as an
individualist in the same way that one might use that term apropos Emerson or Stirner, there is
no doubt that Heidegger’s understanding of the fundamental nature of the human subject is
deeply in line with the understanding of the individual shared by the individualist thinkers.
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In this sense, there is an important distinction to be made in the individualist
understanding of the nature of the individual herself. By centering the individual ontologically,
the individualist does not simply mean that all humans are atomically isolated, Leibnizian
monads that do not interact or comingle in meaningful ways. Rather, the claim of the
individualist is that the question of what is it like to be a person, of the inside-out view of the
world that we invariably have as humans, and of how we create ourselves and our identities out
of the experiences that we have from that subjective first-person point of view must be central in
our thinking about the world. What this means in practice is that individualists reject both the
claim that social forms and identities are intelligible apart from individuals as well as the claim
that individuals are always invariably subject to the influences of these social forms. Social
identities and forms are viewed by the individualist as generally stifling, oppressive, and to be
subverted by individual expressions of uniqueness and the quest for self-creation. The
individualist rejects hierarchically imposed forms of homogenization as unacceptable forms of
oppression, and calls for a rethinking of social forms so as to allow more space for the free
development and self-creation of all people.
There is an important parallel here to draw between this positive understanding of the
individualist claim regarding social forms and a critical insight provided by critical feminist and
race scholarship, namely the rejection of essentializing narratives regarding groups of people as a
way of undermining and subverting the power relations that those narratives reinforce and
instantiate. Anti-essentialism, as theorized by critical race, feminist, queer, and other theorists of
identity construction and formation, holds that overly general claims and narratives about
oppressed populations are often deployed by social power structures in order to uphold and
justify the systems of oppression that are in place in a given historical context. In feminist
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thinking, for example, there is a long tradition, going back even to Simone de Beauvoir’s protoconstructionist claim that “One is not born, but rather becomes woman,”176 of critiquing
essentialist narratives that “deploy accounts of women’s hormones, anatomy, and physiology
(especially in terms of menstruation and reproduction) to justify the political and social
domination of women by men.”177 In recent years, the critique of essentialism has been
importantly expanded by women of color and women who otherwise do not fit the standard
historical feminist mold of white and middle-class. For these critics, the traditional feminist
subject has been problematically generalized along racial, economic, ability, and other lines that
obscures and flattens the unique and deeply diverse experiences of women cross-contextually.178
These developments have in large part been spurred on by the encounter between feminist theory
and the various postmodern decenterings of the subject in relation to social power relations
exposed by the likes of Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, and others.179 Some have argued that
the critiques of essentialism have been overapplied or otherwise taken too far beyond their
usefulness,180 but the general spirit of the anti-essentialist critique, i.e. that it problematically
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erases critical differences between individuals’ experiences in a way that reinscribes oppressive
power relations, is one that is still of profound importance in the struggle for liberation among
oppressed groups.
A relatively extreme representative example of this anti-essentialist insight in racial
theory is the work of Paul Gilroy, who has called for a fundamental break with “the dangerous
and destructive patterns that were established when the rational absurdity of ‘race’ was elevated
into an essential concept and endowed with a unique power to both determine history and
explain its selective unfolding.”181 Gilroy argues for a radically humanist, and admittedly
utopian, vision of social relationships that does not employ racial concepts, either for solidarity
and communal organization or, more importantly perhaps, oppression and persecution. Despite
the “hard-won, oppositional identities” that racial categories can and do support among
marginalized peoples, Gilroy argues that these categories are always ultimately the concepts of
“rulers, owners, and persecutors,” and for that reason must be rejected by those on which they
are foisted.182 In this sense, Gilroy’s critique of the use of racialized thinking both by those who
use it as a basis of oppression as well as those who would take it up for their own uses is
fundamentally individualist in orientation, and the classic individualists would emphatically
support Gilroy’s call for eliminating race as a social category that is imposed from the top down
and, importantly, all-too-often utilized for purposes of oppression.
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Perhaps the clearest example of the individualist approach to social categories and
relations is the advent and development of transgender studies and the various other approaches
to “queering” gendered identities as a theoretical and political force in intellectual life. The
subversion and disruption of historical and contemporary gender norms of appearance, dress,
behavior, and the like represented by the transgender community, what Stephen Whittle has
referred to as the effects of “gender outlaws,”183 is precisely the type of identity-work called for
by Emerson, Stirner, Vaneigem, and others in the individualist tradition. The emphasis on the
fluidity, irreducibility, and play184 in the approach to gender identity advocated by many
transgender and queer theorists is something that the individualist tradition calls for to be applied
across the board to all possible types of identity. As Judith Butler suggests, the idea that gender
identities are fundamentally spectral, and socially imposed in order to maintain certain types of
power relations can “open up possibilities for reassignment that excite [their] sense of agency,
play, and possibility.”185
This language of possibility, freedom, and play with respect to the creation and, often,
changing of one’s own identity runs throughout the classical individualists, and is applied to all
types of problematically homogenizing imposed identities. The individualist equally rejects
imposed gender identities, imposed racial identities, and imposed cultural identities. The critical
point for the individualist understanding of identity is that the individual is the one who is in
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control of who they are, and who they want to be. This is not a one-time choice made with any
sort of deterministic outcome, but is rather an ongoing and slippery process. In much the same
way that critical race theorists have argued that culture is fluid, malleable, and fundamentally not
static in any meaningful way, individualists argue that the self and identity should be thought of
as open to change, play, and fluidity. In a similar way to how thinkers like Butler speak about
and understand gender and the queering thereof, the individualist can be understood as
suggesting that we explore how we might be able to queer all identity formations and socially
imposed roles.186
Many of the individualists couch their understanding of identity explicitly in this type of
language of experimentation. Emerson, for example, speaks approvingly in “Self-Reliance” of
the feeling of whimsy that his experiments in identity can provide, and in an anticipation of
modern-day concepts like gender non-conformity, argues that self-reliance, rather than the
rugged individualist caricature often suggested by his less charitable interpreters, is the aversion
to conformity, which in his eyes is “the virtue in most request” by society in general.187 Stanley
Cavell interprets Emerson’s admonishment to self-creation and experimentation as an injunction
not to follow some set standard of excellence or a predetermined identity, but rather to follow
one’s own whim and internal compass. He writes, “To say, ‘follow me and you will be saved,’
you must be sure you are of God. But to say, ‘follow in yourself what I have followed in mine
and you will be saved,’ you merely have to be sure you are following yourself.”188 What is
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critical about this injunction of Emerson’s is that what is to be followed in each individual may
be, and indeed is likely to be, radically different, but each individual identity, though they may
change over time and even moment to moment, grants to each individual the same feeling of
subjective belonging to oneself and authenticity that cannot be attained simply by participating in
large-scale social identities or labels. This common subjective sense of self-belonging is what
Emerson will eventually argue serves as the basis of friendship and social relations.
A related approach to self-creation and freedom from social identity formations is taken
by Friedrich Nietzsche, a thinker who, along with Stirner, is often cited as a philosophical
precursor to existentialism. One of the important aspects of the perpetual and rigorous critique of
all homogenizing and reductive social forms, for the individualist, is the conviction that the
individual has a right (and indeed a duty, as Emerson suggests) to take control of shaping herself
according to her own vision of herself and of the good life. This aspect of individualism is
clearly articulated in the work of Nietzsche, which attempts to bridge the divide between a
conviction that individuals are inherently called to mold themselves in the ways they see fit and
the knowledge that the conditions of human existence are often largely not of our own choosing.
Ariela Tubert refers to this strain of Nietzsche's work as “freedom as self-creation,” and argues
that, for Nietzsche, “freedom is acting in accordance with one's own values, which he often
refers to as self-mastery and self-creation.”189 Indeed, this is reflected in a number of passages
from Nietzsche's work, as when he remarks in Beyond Good and Evil, that “In man creature and
creator are united: in man there is material, fragment, excess, clay, dirt, nonsense, chaos; but in
man there is also creator, formgiver, hammer, hardness, spectator, divinity, and seventh day...”190
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Similarly, in characterizing his vision of the truly free individual, he argues that “the 'free' human
being, the possessor of a long, unbreakable will, has in this possession his standard of value as
well...the proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, the consciousness of
this rare freedom, this power over oneself and fate, has sunk into his lowest depths and has
become instinct.”191 Importantly, this freedom to self-create in Nietzsche's work is not simply an
option which is available to humans but is rather, in a way which aligns Nietzsche closely with
the thinking of Emerson, a moral imperative that we as humans cannot avoid.
Taking on board the ontological commitments of individualism outlined above, namely
the immediacy of our subjective experience of our own individuality as thrown into a morass
from which we must differentiate ourselves, Nietzsche moves toward the normative position that
humans ought to engage with this freedom to self-creation which is offered them by their
ontological lot in life. One who fully and creatively participates in the process of constant selfovercoming and re-making is what Nietzsche famously refers to as the Ubermensch. This term is
one which needs a significant amount of explication to avoid some of the historically
problematic associations which have grown up around Nietzsche's use of it and its subsequent
interpretations and the uses to which it has politically been put, particularly in connection to the
rise of Nazism in WWII Germany. Generally speaking, the term Ubermensch has been construed
as what Bernd Magnus refers to as an “ideal type,”192 which represents a prescriptive set of traits,
qualities, and values which must be aspired to by each individual person in society; a sort of
heroic individual which is set apart from the mediocrity of the crowd and who serves as model
for their own behavior and self-shaping activity. An important aspect of this interpretation of the
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Ubermensch has to do with the idea that he embodies a new moral code which is somehow
higher or more transcendent than the current moral standards, something which is often seen to
play directly into the fascistic tendencies which are often drawn out of Nietzsche's work.193
Going back as far as the introduction written for Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Nietzsche's sister
(herself the fount of many of the most pernicious and egregious misinterpretations of her
brother's work, including the imagined ties to Nazism), we see this interpretation at work. She
writes,
The phrase 'the rearing of the Ubermensch' has very often been misunderstood. By
the word 'rearing,' in this case, is meant the act of modifying by means of new and
higher values – values which, as laws and guides of conduct and opinion, are now
to rule over mankind...a new table of valuations must be placed over mankind –
namely, that of the strong, mighty, and magnificent man, overflowing with life and
elevated to his zenith – the Ubermensch, who is now put before us with overpowering
passion as the aim of our life, hope, and will...This type must not be regarded as a
fanciful figure...it is meant to be a possibility which mean of the present could realize
with all their spiritual and physical energies, provided they adopted the new values.194
This interpretation of the Ubermensch figure is not one which was simply advocated by
Nietzsche's sister, well known for bastardizing for her own political ends her brother's work.
Much more recently, a similar view is advocated by J.P. Stern, who makes the ties to fascism
quite explicit, writing of the Ubermensch,
We for our part are bound to look askance at this questionable doctrine. We can hardly
forget that the solemn avowal of this reduplicated self – the pathos of personal
authenticity – was the chief tenet of fascism and National Socialism. No man came closer
to the full realization of self-created 'values' than A. Hitler.195
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While it would be disingenuous to deny that there are moments in Nietzsche's writing
that are tempting to cite in support of these types of interpretations, particularly when taken out
of context, it is equally important to recognize the countervailing tendencies in Nietzsche as well
as the fact that he himself explicitly rejected this interpretation of the concept of the Ubermensch
in Ecce Homo, writing that

The word 'Ubermensch,' as a designation of a type of supreme achievement, as opposed
to 'modern' men, to 'good' men, to Christians and other nihilists...has been understood
almost everywhere with perfect innocence in the sense of those very values whose
opposite Zarathustra was meant to represent – that is, as an 'idealistic' type of a higher
kind of man, half 'saint,' half 'genius.'196
Given that there are good reasons to be suspicious of the “ideal type” interpretation of
Nietzsche's Ubermensch here, we ought to ask after a better, more consistent interpretation.
Bernd Magnus has proposed what he refers to as the “attitudinal” or “diagnostic” interpretation
of the Ubermensch, which emphasizes not any specific set of qualities or values which the
Ubermensch is supposed to embody or model, but rather certain attitudes or approaches which
are characteristic of the Ubermensch.197 For Magnus, we ought to reject the interpretation of
Nietzsche's Ubermensch which holds him up as any kind of human ideal of perfection or “an
algorithm telling us how, what, and when to choose”198 in favor of an understanding of the
Ubermensch as a diagnostic concept which serves as “an underdetermined embodiment...of a
certain attitude toward life and the world.”199 This less prescriptive understanding of the
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Ubermensch as a general guideline for how one is to approach life, namely taking on the burden
of self-creation and, indeed, self-perfection, seriously.
Ultimately, the key difference, then, between the social ontologies of left-individualism a
la Stirner, Nietzsche, and Emerson, and the right-individualism discussed in Chapter Two has to
do with their orientation toward the self. The major focus of the anarcho-capitalist individualism
of Rothbard, Rand, and the like is fundamentally objective in its orientation. The individual is
conceptualized and treated as above all else rational, and as playing a role in the objective
science of free-market economics. Insofar as subjectivity in right-individualism is considered at
all, it is in the attempt to capture and quantify the economic preferences and desires of
individuals. By contrast, left-individualism centers subjectivity from the beginning, orienting its
entire view of the social space around the experiences of the individuals who exist in and create
both that space and themselves in it. Emerson’s understanding of self-reliance as self-creation
would be entirely foreign to Hayek, for example, who understands individuals only as nodes of
economic exchange.
Having detailed the ontological commitments of the individualism I advocate here, as
well as describing the ways in which that individualism sees the relation of individuals to their
identity formations, I want to address directly the understanding of society and political
commitments of individualism. I argue that an anarchist political theory is the most consistent
with the individualism I have been discussing, and that it is the distinct set of political beliefs,
strategies, and ideals that set apart left-anarcho-individualism from other forms individualist
thought, such as anarcho-capitalism. In the next section, I discuss how left-anarchoindividualism sees society, social forms, and why these socio-political commitments necessitate
a rejection of both state and corporate authority. I will then conclude the chapter with a
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somewhat briefer discussion of various potentialities for left-anarcho-individualist society, and
illustrate why, despite how it may appear, such a term is in no way a contradiction or
oxymoronic.
Individualism as a Political Commitment: State, Economy, and Culture as Homogenizing Forces
In her 1993 book The Return of the Political, Chantal Mouffe provides a set of
considerations and questions that can be seen as inaugurating the turn from ontological
individualism to political, and ultimately, anarchist individualism. She writes,

How can we grasp the multiplicity of relations of subordination that affect an individual
if we envisage social agents as homogeneous and united entities? What characterizes the
struggle of the new social movements is precisely the multiplicity of subject positions
which constitute a single agent and the possibility that this multiplicity can become the
site of an antagonism and thereby politicized.200
While Mouffe’s broader goal in that book is, roughly, to attempt to rescue liberal democracy
from itself, a project that the individualist, for reasons that will become clear, sees as
fundamentally flawed, the animating concerns she lays out here are in many ways the same as
those animating the left-anarcho-individualist political project. It is, I argue, the socio-political
project of left-anarcho-individualism that sets it apart more than its ontological commitments.
After all, one might readily accept that individuals are ontologically primary while still holding
that social roles, mores, and cooperative goals still supersede the individual once they are
established. This is arguably the view held by the classical social contract theorists.
For left-anarcho-individualism, the political and social corollary to the ontological
emphasis on individual subjectivity is a global critique of all imposed political and social
identifications, which individualists see as serving only to homogenize, reduce, and flatten
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subjective experience unjustifiably and to both individual and collective detriment. I argue that
this takes two major forms in individualist thinking: first, a critique of capitalism, and second a
critique of state power and socio-cultural categories. Importantly, these imposed identifications
also always reinforce pre-existing power relations and mechanisms of both state and social
control. Recall from Chapter Two Max Stirner’s extension of the Young Hegelian critique of
religious identification to the concept of “Man” itself. For the left-anarcho-individualists, where
the identifications of “Christian,” “Jew,” “Muslim,” and so on (even more pernicious, is adding
the modifier “good” to any of those) represented a type of reductive control of individual
identities and a way of maintaining the power of the various churches, so do concepts like
“Man,” “Consumer,” “Citizen,” and the like serve the same structural purpose. Some such
identifications directly undergird state power, others the power of capital, and still others social
relations of control. Political ideologies of all stripes, be they fascist, liberal, nationalist, or
whatever all mobilize homogenizing identities to ensure conformity and control. Thus, where the
left-anarcho-individualist would concur with the anarcho-capitalist in their commitment to
dismantling governmental power, the rationales could not be more different, as the left-anarchoindividualist calls also for the dismantling of the power of capital.
The thinker who has theorized the socio-political import of left-anarcho-individualism
perhaps most thoroughly is Raoul Vaneigem, associate of the Situationist International.
Vaneigem is often represented as the more poetic, chaotic foil to the more well-known Guy
Debord, whose The Society of the Spectacle, represents the most influential and lasting
contribution of the SI.201 It was, however, arguably the publication of Vaneigem’s The
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Revolution of Everyday Life202 in 1967 that more directly inspired and fed the revolutionary ardor
that exploded in the student protests of May 1968 in France.203 Vaneigem’s book would be
quoted at rallies, used in graffiti, and carried in the back pockets of protestors throughout that
event and others afterwards. Though Vaneigem’s work is often reductively juxtaposed with
Debord’s on a spectrum of anarchism to Marxism, subjectivity to objectivity,204 Vaneigem had
an important and well-developed theory of socio-political control and homogenization via
identifications and social roles. Vaneigem diagnosed the various forms of oppression, violence,
malaise, and depression experienced in their various modalities in modern life as stemming from
forced, rote participation in ideological social identities. Vaneigem stands firmly on the primacy
of the subjective in the project of political and economic liberation. He writes,
The concept of class struggle constituted the first marshalling of responses to the shocks
and injuries which people experience as individuals; it was born in the whirlpool of
suffering which the reduction of human relationships to the mechanisms of exploitation
created everywhere in industrial societies. It issued from a will to transform the world
and change life...Anyone who talks about revolution and class struggle without referring
explicitly to everyday life – without grasping what is subversive about love and positive
in the refusal of constraints – has a corpse in his mouth.205
For Vaneigem, and I would argue the individualists more generally, both the fundamental evils
of capitalist oppression and the primary means of ultimately subverting that oppression206 are
inescapably subjective, and begin with our inner experiences of our social world and roles in it.
In this connection. Vaneigem makes a distinction between “identity,” which is the authentic and
self-fulfilled expression of our genuine interiority, and “identification,” which represents the
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uncritical ways we play our various social roles at the behest of power.207 In the context of our
roles as consumers under capitalism, for example, he writes “At first glance the main thing
would seem to be the choice of the ‘consumable image.’ The housewife-who-uses-Fairy-Snow is
different…to the housewife-who-uses-Tide.”208 Here Vaneigem is rehearsing the common but
important critique of capitalism that it provides merely surface-level, meaningless choices as a
way of providing an illusion of identity and individuality when in reality all individuals are
precisely the same in the eyes of capital, i.e. they are consumers; what is consumed is of nearly
no importance whatsoever to the fundamental structure of the system.209 These types of
meaningless loyalties to a label (e.g. Tide or Fairy Snow) are what Vaneigem calls
“identifications.” In keeping with the individualist centering of subjectivity, Vaneigem argues
that capitalist oppression functions most insidiously in its effects on subjective experience,
homogenizing totally both individual identities as well as every moment of our daily existences.
He writes “The bourgeoisie for its part does not dominate. It exploits. It does not subject people
so much as wear them out.”210 Though the term “neoliberalism” had not entered the popular
lexicon at the time, Vaneigem importantly anticipated David Harvey’s characterization of that
particular mutation of capitalism as “the financialization of everything,”211 in that he was able to
diagnose the ways in which neoliberal capitalism had begun to seep into every aspect of human
existence, robbing them of those aspects that made them distinctly human to begin with. He
traces the gradual phasing out of joy, love, friendship, and so on under the imperatives of
neoliberal production and rationality, concluding that these forms of human relation and
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expression only temporarily “found refuge in…oases doomed to disappear as the dictatorship of
quantified exchange (market value) colonized everyday life and turned that too into a market.”212
The individualists hold that the evil of the marketization is not solely, nor even primarily, the
material conditions it imposes on people, but that it is fundamentally anti-human, reducing
human beings to mere objects of exchange and homogenizing them under umbrella identities
(worker, producer, owner, slave, etc.). The relationships, activities, and interactions that make
human life something worth celebrating are undercut when they are subjected to the dictates of
the market. Vaneigem writes,
Systematically quantified (first by money and then by what might be called ‘sociometric
units of power’), exchange corrupts all human relationships, feelings, and thoughts.
Wherever exchange rules, only things remain in a world of human objects frozen in place
in the organigrams of the cybernetic powers-that-be: a world of reification.213
This critique of capitalist rationality, though it extends to the suffering that that economic form
inflicts materially on a daily basis, argues that the fundamental evil committed by capitalism, that
which enables all the other harm it causes, is its view of the human person, namely as an object
reducible to brand identifications and relations of exchange. The individualist holds, rather, that
“The individual is irreducible: subject to change but not to exchange.”214 However, this
irreducibility applies beyond the realm of neoliberal economic reductionism into the political and
social realms as well.
Much like Stirner extended the Young Hegelian critique of religion to the very categories
employed by the Young Hegelians themselves, Vaneigem mobilizes the common leftist critique
of capitalism to critique the left itself as participating in the same type of ultimately meaningless,
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homogenizing identification. He writes, referring back to the false distinction between the Tide
user and the Fairy Snow user,
The Labour voter differs from the Conservative voter, and the Communist from the
Christian Democrat, in much the same way. But such differences are increasingly hard to
discern…Eventually identification with anything at all, like the need to consume anything
at all, becomes more important than brand loyalty to a particular type of car, idol, or
politician. The essential thing, surely, is to alienate people from their desires and pen
them in the spectacle, the policed zone. Good or bad, honest or criminal, left-wing or
right-wing – what does the mould matter, so long as we are engulfed by it?215
This extension of the critique of capital to the political and social realm is of critical importance
to the left-anarcho-individualist project, as it suggests that not only are the choices that we are
presented by capital meaningless, but similarly the choices we are presented by political parties,
economic doctrines, cultural group identifications, and so on are also fundamentally
meaningless, predicated as they are on the existence of larger-scale relations of power and
control. Identification as a Communist, Christian, Latino, and so on are all the socio-political
equivalents of brand identities, and falsely homogenize the irreducible nature of subjectivity in
precisely the same way that the pseudo-choices of capitalism do. For the individualist, so long as
our identities are simply chosen, or assumed unconsciously, out of a pre-established array of
acceptable options presented to us by power, power wins. It is only the radical rejection of these
homogenizing identifications and subversion of their expectations that genuine revolutionary
progress can be made. The ontological irreducibility of subjective experience then serves as a
grounding for the rejection of those socio-political forces that would attempt that reduction.
Emerson is again illustrative of this rejection of socially dictated identifications when he
calls for the continual rejection of conformity and his famous “hobgoblin of little minds, adored
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by little statesmen and philosophers and divines,” namely consistency.216 For Emerson,
authenticity (Vaneigem’s “identity”) requires aversion to conformity, which “loves not realities
and creators, but names and customs.”217 He goes on to name various social identifications that
impinge on uniqueness and authenticity, including familial roles and conceptions of right and
wrong, writing “Good and bad are but names very readily transferrable to that or this; the only
right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it.”218 Stirner makes similar
claims regarding the stifling nature of imposed social values, explicitly arguing that control over
the levers of social morality grants incredible power to the State and the upper classes. In
reference to this social power, he writes,
What was so longed for and striven for through thousands of years – namely, to find that
absolute lord beside whom no other lords and lordlings any longer exist to clip his power
– the bourgeoisie has brought to pass. It has revealed the Lord who alone confers
‘rightful titles,’ and without whose warrant nothing is justified.219
Stirner, after making the political ground of his objections to talk of right and wrong, argues that
we must reject these concepts in their traditional, externally imposed, forms. In an almost
verbatim echo of Emerson’s essay, published only three years prior to The Ego and its Own,
Stirner writes “I decide whether it is the right thing in me; there is no right outside me. If it is
right for me, it is right.”220 Stirner goes on to extend this critique to the concept of political
rights, which he sees as also fundamentally dependent on an external authority, and therefore to
be rejected, executing again the maneuver of taking an accepted position on the left and
extending its own logic, to a less intuitive but relevantly similar example. He begins with the
rejection of certain objectionable sorts of birthrights, particularly for the communists and
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socialists who are his primary interlocutors, namely “the right to receive an entailed estate, to
inherit a throne, to enjoy a princely or noble education.”221 Similarly, the disadvantage foisted on
the poor and oppressed underclasses by the genetic lottery must also be rejected. The rejection,
or at least social and economic counterbalancing, of these sorts of unearned benefits and harms
under the guise of the language of rights is in many ways the foundation of liberal democratic
thinking,222 and Stirner agrees here with the advocates of liberal humanist democracy that these
sorts of inequalities are fundamentally unacceptable. However, the proposed liberal democratic
solution, i.e. to “affirm that every one is by birth equal to another – namely, a man” must also be
rejected.223 The issue with rights is not that they are unjustly distributed, but that their existence
necessitates an outside authority to grant, enforce, and even create them. Attempting to solve the
issues of human interaction by subsuming all individuals under the abstract heading “man” and
submitting them to the authority of an external power that grants them certain rights and
withholds others is to entirely retain the pre-enlightenment religious structure of authority, only
substituting in for God things like State power and social expectation. For the left-anarchoindividualists, the political and social dimensions of the assertion of the self and the rejection of
homogenizing categories of identification extends past religious and nationalistic fervor to all
imposed forms, racial, gendered, and even the concepts of right and wrong themselves.
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Individualism and Relativism
It is critical here to preemptively address an obvious objection that might be levelled
against left-anarcho-individualism, namely that of moral relativism. This interpretation of the
individualists is tempting due to their explicit rejection of imposed moral categories and the
locating of moral authority at the level of the individual, as opposed to social norms or religious
doctrine. Peter Marshall, for example, seems to suggest this view when he claims that Stirner’s
ethic can be summed up as the “completely subjective” view that “right is merely might.” 224
Admittedly, Stirner’s polemical writing style does little to assuage these worries about nihilistic
moral relativism. However, I argue that neither Stirner nor Emerson, nor the other left-anarchoindividualist thinkers are advocating any sort of simplistic ethical relativism of this type, but are
rather calling for individuals to reject imposed categories, moral categories included. That is, the
individualists do not reject the concept of morality or the concept of empathic engagement with
fellow human beings tout court, but rather argue that our morality must grow out of our own
experiences and interactions, rather than be dictated from an outside source. While Marshall is
indeed correct that individualism holds that “there are not eternal moral truths and no values to
be discovered in nature,”225 he is wrong that this view implies a wholesale rejection of ethical
thinking.226 There are of course many moral theories that reject eternal and immutable moral
truths apart from human existence but that do not collapse into relativism, and individualism is, I
argue, to be counted among these.
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Emerson, for example, advocates a pragmatist view of morality, that is neither imposed
from outside nor fixed immutably, but rather shifts with experience and self-understanding. He
writes, “Yesterday I was asked what I mean by Morals. I reply that I cannot define & care not to
define. It is man’s business to observe & the definition of Moral Nature must be the slow result
of years, of lives, of states perhaps of being.”227 Indeed, it was Emerson’s rejection of imposed
external categories, both moral and other, that ultimately led him to reject traditional Christian
derivations of morality from God.228 Emerson was quite circumspect regarding the danger of
what David M. Robinson has called the possibility of a “subjectivism run amok.”229 He warned,
for example, in “Experience” that as humans we have a certain tendency to “permit all things to
ourselves, and that which we call sin in others, is experiment for us.”230 Emerson’s point here is
neither an endorsement of ethical relativism nor a call to hold ourselves to an objective moral
standard, but rather to acknowledge that ethical engagement requires deep self-reflection. This
also entails a disciplined refusal to simply dismiss other’s actions as simply wrong or ours as
simply right, but rather to attempt to subvert these categories altogether through experimentation
and reflection. For Emerson, though morality is in some sense unknowable, the best we can do is
to attempt to reach a place of self-trust and comfort in our moral action, such that morality
becomes a type of epiphenomenon of self-knowledge and expression, coupled with rejection of
imposed standards and categories. As David Robinson puts the point, “Emerson overcame moral
paralysis with a…recognition that subjectivity generates ‘self-trust,’ which is valuable finally in
insulating us from the imperatives of others,” and argues further that “the acts of the self-trusting
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individual will cohere with the larger good more closely than those of the imitative or unoriginal
individual.”231 Put slightly differently, so-called “’immoralism’ often appears to amount to no
more than mere transgression…; but the essential principles of the immoralist are ever found in
strength and inwardness, which strong assertion from within contrasts most strikingly with weak
submission to that which is without.”232 Individual experience and self-reflection are, Emerson
would argue, better guides to behavior than imposed external standards. This is not a rejection of
morality, but a call to take our own moral lives seriously.
Stirner argues along similar lines, holding that what is objectionable about moral
strictures is not their content, but their form, imposed as they are by an outside source and
uncritically accepted by individuals without regard to the ways in which those moral rules
resonate or fail to with the experiences of that individual. This is not a rejection of the concept of
ethical behavior or morality as such, but only of a certain attitude toward moral concepts, namely
that they are outside the subjective experiences of individuals and must be obeyed regardless of
context. For Stirner, this is to treat morality in the same way that we treat any other religious
concept, namely as beyond questioning, and it is the positive project of individualism to
empower the individual to question that which is foisted on her as given. When morality is
treated as a sacred end beyond questioning, it becomes anathema to the individualist. It is in the
constant reassessment and evaluation (what Nietzsche would call “transvaluation”) of our moral
categories in light of our experience that constitutes individualist morality. For Stirner, like
Emerson, the content of our moral lives is fundamentally comparative and experiential. As John
Carroll suggests,
“The quality of an experience – its noumenal intensity, its sensual abundance, or however
it is described – can be assessed only in the same manner in which the individual
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subjectively makes value judgments about phenomena external to him. The
actor/observer can compare it with other experiences only by making judgments as
imprecise (‘unscientific’), and as open to subsequent revaluation, as moral rankings of
good and evil.”233

Moral evaluation and behavior are, on individualism, unscientific in the sense that they can never
be objectively specified by appeal to outside, objective authority, but are always undergoing
continued examination and questioning by those that engage in them. On individualism, one can
never say when considering some potential course of action or evaluating the actions of others “it
is objectively and for-all-time wrong in light of a third-person standard handed down from an
infallible authority,” but one can say “in light of what I have myself experienced and what I have
observed in the experiences of others up until this point, this action is wrong.” To this, one must
always add the proviso that subsequent experiences and interactions with others can always
induce a re-evaluation of the judgment rendered previously, and that all such judgments are to be
constantly subject to scrutiny and one must “remain toward [them] frostily cold, unbelieving.”234
That is, one must remain constantly skeptical even of one’s own ethical evaluations,
understanding that they are always open and never final. The individualist holds that
autonomous, self-actualized individuals are better equipped to perform this constant movement
of evaluation and re-evaluation than are those who are still subject to the dictates of this or that
imposed moral system.
This raises a related worry about individualist ethics, namely the idea that the
individualist is in some sense cheating in their use of evaluative language at all. After all, is not
individualism itself a value set, both ontological and political, like any other? If so, how can the
individualist justify their assertion of the superiority of individualism over, say, religious
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subservience? I think there are two things to be said here. First, while individualism is
undeniably a value set, complete with evaluative claims about the types of life that we as humans
ought to aspire to, namely a free life of self-actualization, individualism is better thought of as a
meta-evaluative claim, compatible with many forms of life. In his book-length reply to the
various critiques that emerged after the publication of The Ego and its Own, Stirner addresses
those who accused him of nihilism and the rejection of any and all human relationships
whatever. Writing in the third person, assuming the identity of an anonymous interpreter of
Stirner, he writes,
Egoism, as Stirner uses it, is not opposed to love nor to thought; it is no enemy of the
sweet life of love, nor of devotion and sacrifice; it is no enemy of intimate warmth, but it
is also no enemy of critique, nor of socialism, nor, in short, of any actual interest. It
doesn’t exclude any interest. It is directed against only disinterestedness and the
uninteresting; not against love, but against sacred love, not against thought, but against
sacred thought, not against socialists, but against sacred socialists, etc.235
Here Stirner makes clear that the egoist does not oppose any and all forms of identity,
relationship, and belief, but only opposes the essentializing reification of those things as anything
other than contingent human creations, and hence impervious to human change, mutation, and
intervention. For Stirner, there is no contradiction between individualism and socialism, selfsacrifice, and even deeply altruistic devotion to others, so long as the latter are not imposed from
without by either state or social authorities, are taken on willingly by free individuals, and are
always open to re-evaluation. As David Leopold argues, “Stirner’s rejection of morality is
grounded not, as is often suggested, in a rejection of values as such, but in the affirmation of
what might be called non-moral goods, that is, he allows a realm of actions and desires which,
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although not moral…are still to be evaluated positively.”236 That is, while Stirner reject moral
claims in the sense of traditional objectivist moral realism, he further holds that moral claims do
not exhaust the evaluative space, and that certain forms of life can be superior or inferior to
others on grounds unrelated to their moral content or lack thereof. Leopold suggests Stirner’s
discussion of the famed, and famously immoral, Roman Emperor Nero as an example of what
Stirner sees as a non-moral evaluative claim justified on the basis of his individualism. While
Stirner and traditional moralists would agree in negatively assessing Nero’s behavior, they would
do so for critically different reasons. Where the moralist would hold that Nero had violated some
or other moral rule, Stirner argues that Nero’s behavior is to be negatively assessed because his
“obsessive predilections violated his self-mastery.”237 This is not a moral claim in any traditional
sense, since moral claims fundamentally deal with relations between individuals, but is rather an
evaluative assessment of Nero’s relationship with himself. Nero is to be viewed negatively
because his behavior and beliefs were alien to himself, dictated by various obsessions and the
belief that he possessed some divine, sacred quality. There are, in the Foucauldian sense, “styles
of life” that are preferable for non-moral reasons, i.e. they are preferable for reasons other than
whether or not they conform to an objective list of duties to others. The individualists hold that
those who partake in the constant evaluation and questioning of their own relationships with
themselves, actualizing their subjectivity and living truthfully with it are not prone to this type of
self-alienated behavior, and this ideal of self-relation serves as the basis for the individualist
ethic.
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Individualism and Social Construction
Another potential problem that is important to address here is the idea that individualists
must deny the influence of social forms and power structures on individuals. That is, it is
possible to read the individualists as rejecting the concept of the social construction of identity
and relations of power.238 The idea here is that individualists, in emphasizing the primacy both
ontologically and politically of subjectivity and individual identity formation, must
correspondingly de-emphasize the role of unchosen social forces beyond our control in the
shaping of our identities and beliefs. I think that this type of objection, formulated in this way,
fundamentally misunderstands the position of individualism. The individualist does not minimize
the influence of external forces on our day to day lives, since it is precisely the strength and
depth of that influence to which the individualist objects. The claim of the individualist is
precisely that these forces exert much too strong a force on the shaping of our identities and our
lives in the world, and that we should rather assert ourselves against their oppressive control.
One might restate the objection to say not that the individualists downplay the power of
social construction, but rather even in their acknowledgement still underestimate it in their
assumption that we ever could transcend or subvert socially imposed identities and categories.
The forces that bear down on our self-understandings, identities as members of groups, and
understandings of our place in the world are simply too strong and pervasive to be overcome by
any amount of introspection or willful rejection. This critique could be offered as a parallel
version of a related critique levelled by Michel Foucault against the dominant understanding of
Kantian freedom. For Foucault, the transcendental rationality and objectivity at the core of
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Kant’s conception of freedom, which does seem to imply the ability of individuals to transcend
contingent sociopolitical factors, ignores the fact that all humans are always already implicated
in relations of power, whether aware of those relations or not. Essentially, Kant had confused the
ontological conditions of freedom with the actual historical conditions that restrict and hem-in
autonomous action.239 Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is Foucault’s analysis of
discipline and internalized moral strictures found in modern society. The advent of a type of
Panopticism that subjects all individuals to constant surveillance finds its ultimate expression in
the unconscious internalizing of that surveillance. The individualist ideal of a free or autonomous
individual is belied by the fact of our own internalizing of various moral categories, selfsurveillance practices, social categories and power relations, and so on. Foucault writes “The
man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is already in himself the effect of a subjection
much more profound than himself.”240 The advocate of this line of objection might, in
performing a Foucauldian genealogical move, argue that the individualist is inadvertently
mobilizing enlightenment visions of the transcendentally free individual that have been since
undermined by increased understandings of social forces and power relations. I find this line of
objection to be both more plausible and addressing more directly the claim of individualism,
however, I do think that this critique also operates on a significant misinterpretation of the
individualist view of the self, as well as of freedom.
The individualist need not deny the overriding power of social constructs on our selfunderstanding, and can readily admit that no individual can ever achieve full freedom in the
Kantian sense of ridding oneself of all outside conditioning. Stirner, for his part, explicitly rejects
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the concept of “freedom” as yet another pseudo-religious deflection of genuine selfhood. He
writes,
‘Freedom’ awakens your rage against everything that is not you; ‘egoism’ [Stirner’s term
for individualism] calls you to joy over yourselves, to self-enjoyment; ‘freedom’ is and
remains a longing, a romantic plaint, a Christian hope for unearthliness and futurity;
‘ownness’ is a reality, which of itself removes just so much unfreedom as by barring your
own way hinders you…Freedom teaches only: Get yourselves rid, relieve yourselves of
everything burdensome; it does not teach you who you yourselves are.241
Stirner’s conception of individualism here rejects the merely negative understanding of freedom,
endorsed by the anarcho-capitalist right-individualists, as the removal of barriers. The leftanarcho-individualist views this type of freedom as problematic because it must be conferred,
guaranteed, and administered by a higher authority. In this negative sense, I am free to the degree
that I am guaranteed (by some third force) a lack of intervention in my life. Again, the question
of individualism is considered in an objective, external way. Individualism as I am understanding
it here again returns to subjectivity as the site of freedom, and calls for an ongoing positive
project of self-creation, understanding, and experimentation.
Interestingly, Foucault himself was deeply engaged in questions of freedom, and I would
argue that he ultimately arrived at strikingly similar conclusions to those of the left-anarchoindividualists.242 For Foucault, re-situating the problematic of freedom within rather than
abstracted from relations of power and social control (a la Kant) opens up new paths for
discussions of freedom.243 Foucault saw freedom under the strictures of modernity as essentially
a process of self-formation. He writes in his late essay “What is Enlightenment?,” itself an
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attempt to rethink the Kantian legacy of critique, “This modernity does not ‘liberate man in his
own being’; it compels him to face the task of producing himself.”244 Referring to the
“indispensable example” of Baudelaire’s vision of the figure of the dandy, Foucault takes up a
certain attitude of self-aestheticism, suggesting that the modern individual is “not the man who
goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth,” as these would participate in the
abstracted Kantian metaphysic of freedom and essences, but rather the individual who “makes of
his body, his behavior, his feelings and passions, his very existence, a work of art.”245 Foucault
increasingly, particularly in his later years, turned to ideas of self-work, aestheticization, and
style as fundamental to freedom and also as important instances of political resistance. It is worth
quoting Paul Veyne at some length in this connection:
The idea of style of existence played a major role in Foucault’s conversations and
doubtless in his inner life during the final months of his life that only he knew to be in
danger. Style does not mean distinction here; the word is to be taken in the sense of the
Greeks, for whom an artist was first of all an artisan and a work of art was first of all a
work. Greek ethics is quite dead and Foucault judged it as undesirable as it would be
impossible to resuscitate this ethics; but he considered one of its elements, namely the
idea of work of self on self, to be capable of acquiring a contemporary meaning, in the
manner of one of those pagan temple columns that are occasionally reutilised in more
recent structures. We can guess at what might emerge from this diagnosis: the self, taking
itself as a work to be accomplished, could sustain an ethics that is no longer supported by
either tradition or reason; as an artist of itself, the self would enjoy that autonomy that
Enlightenment can no longer do without.246
This conception of self-work and the artistic, expressive nature of subjectivity in the face of
oppressive and homogenizing categories and power relations articulated by Foucault is directly
in line with the calls of Emerson, Stirner, Nietzsche, and Vaneigem to assert as ontologically and
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politically meaningful our own subjectivity247, and to define that subjectivity for ourselves.
Freedom and selfhood are not simply acts of bursting free of the myriad chains placed upon us
by (post)modernity, but are rather the constant negotiations, refusals, and interrogations we
articulate within those structures. In this sense, the left-anarcho-individualist both sides with the
Foucauldian critique of abstracted Kantian concepts of “Man” and “Freedom” as themselves
homogenizing categories as well as endorses the view of freedom as an ongoing individualized
movement of self-creation. The more direct question of how these interactions might eventually
change or undermine the structures to which we are subject, and the degree to which
individualism can serve as a basis for political resistance, is addressed in Chapter Four.
Individualist Society?
I want to conclude this chapter with a somewhat brief discussion of how individualists
have conceived of how societies might be organized along individualist principles. Given the
individualist rejection of formalized State power and imposed socio-cultural forms, it is
reasonable to ask what is proposed in their place. This discussion will serve in some ways to set
the stage for the concluding discussion in Chapter Five regarding how individualism might
manifest itself in the organization of schools and in pedagogical principles. This discussion is
brief largely out of necessity. That is, for reasons that ought to be clear from the account given in
this chapter of the commitments of left-anarcho-individualism, individualists have generally
refrained from engaging in robust and detailed prescriptions for how society ought to be
organized. This would be, of course, to simply impose another system of external strictures on
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the free expression and self-work of unique individuals, something that runs fundamentally
against individualism. That said, there are some common themes that arise in the writing of the
individualists regarding what a possible individualist society might look like.
Max Stirner makes and important distinction that helps indicate a first pass at what forms
individualist society might take, namely the distinction between “society,” on the one hand, and
“coalition” or “union” (he uses the terms more-or-less interchangeably) on the other, and refers
to his vision of individualist society as a “union of egoists.”248 The key distinction between the
two has to do with their orientation toward those individuals that make them up. Society, in
Stirner’s usage of the term, is fundamentally indifferent to the individual, swallowing her into its
generalizing, homogenizing sense of membership. Accordingly, Stirner views society as fixed
and static, rehearsing the same formal relationships of work, labor, love, and so on via the preestablished roles that operate within its structures. He lays out the various distinctions in this
way,
You bring into a union your whole power, your competence, and make yourself count; in
a society you are employed, with your working power; in the former you live egoistically,
in the latter humanly, that is, religiously, as a ‘member in the body of this Lord’; to a
society you owe what you have, and are in duty bound to it, are – possessed by ‘social
duties’; a union you utilize, and give it up undutifully and unfaithfully when you see no
way to utilize it further. If a society is more than you, then it is more to you than yourself;
a union is only your instrument…the union exists for you and through you, the society
conversely lays claim to you for itself and exists even without you; in short, the society is
sacred, the union your own; the society consumes you, you consume the union.249
This paragraph makes an important connection between Stirner’s vision of social relationships
and the cultivation of the self, namely the fact that in both cases impermanence, change, and
mutability are fundamental. The sort of constant self-work and experimentation called for by the
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left-anarcho-individualists expresses itself socially as well, with all social relations being sorts of
ad hoc experiments or associations directed at a particular goal or problem, to be dissolved or
altered once that goal is reached. The freedom to enter into and remove oneself from social
relationships is key to the left-anarcho-individualist conception of society. Stirner writes that a
coalition or a union “is an incessant self-uniting”250 and insofar as relationships calcify and
become fixed, as they do in societies that impose pre-established roles on their members, those
relationships cease to be unions. In the same way that my individual identity cannot be subsumed
under social roles and disciplinary mores, neither can my relationships with others be reduced to
interactions between those roles. The key point here is that relationships and identities are ideally
to be entered into and assumed by choice and self-expression. If one’s internal selfunderstanding demands assertion as a Latino or a Father or a Woman, or if the material facts of
one’s existence make such an assertion of identity useful, as in the case of mobilizing larger
groups of individuals for some political or social purpose,251 the individualist is in complete
support, so long as the proviso is included that those identity and relational forms are not
imposed from without and are malleable, open to exit and reentry, and not viewed as some sort
of metaphysical essence expressing the totality of one’s unique self. A society predicated on
left-anarcho-individualist principles would retain many of the relationships and identities
familiar from our current order, but would radically change the signification of those
relationships and identities, from essentialist divine edicts of society or the state to subjective
expressions of interiority. Importantly, as in the case of individualist ethics, there is no
contradiction between the individualist focus on individual autonomy and self-actualization and
the existence of social structures and relationships, which again the individualist recognizes as an
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inevitable and even desirable aspect of human existence. As Daniel Guerin argues with respect to
Stirner’s view of social institutions, “The individual needs help and friends…He joins with his
fellow man in order to increase his strength and fulfill himself more completely through their
combined strength than either could in isolation.”252 In his critique of the homogenizing
ideological tendencies of political parties, Stirner even goes so far as to directly allow for the
possibility of an individual joining such a party or identifying with their cause, but with certain
conditions. He writes, “So then an egoist could never embrace a party or take up with a party?
Oh, yes, only he cannot let himself be embraced and taken up by the party. For him the party
remains all the time nothing but a gathering: he is one of the party, he takes part.”253 Again,
individualism does not foreclose the possibility of social structures, organizations, and
relationships, but only suggests that these structures and relationships must be predicated on
voluntary association between free individuals, where “free” is understood in the Foucauldian
sense discussed earlier. Much like the self, social institutions and relationships must always be
subject to re-evaluation, repudiation, and restructuring. This does not mean that they cannot exist
or are inherently oppressive, only that they become so when they hinder the freedom of selfcreation through imposed identifications or behavioral strictures.
Vaneigem, for his part, is predictably more poetic in his envisioning of a world that
respects subjectivity, and suggests that part of what makes that possibility so exciting is precisely
how radically open it is to our own influence. That is, it is impossible to say what the
unshackling of human subjectivity and creativity would ultimately produce, but that unshackling
is itself desirable. He writes, “Everyone wants their own subjectivity to triumph; the unification
of human beings ought therefore to be built on this common desire. Nobody can strengthen their
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subjectivity without the help of others, without the help of a group that concentrates subjectivity,
that faithfully expresses the subjectivity of its members.”254 Again, Vaneigem rejects the
subsuming of individual identity and subjectivity into social roles, but rather calls for social
organizations that respect and create space for the unique expression of that subjectivity. The
left-anarcho-individualist desires a world where people are not forced to identify as a given
racial, gender, or other socio-cultural category out of either the demands of their social group or
out of economic or political necessity, and remains optimistic about the possibilities for the
freedom granted in such a world.
Perhaps the best microcosm of this understanding of social relationships advocated by
Stirner and Vaneigem, and the one perhaps best suited as a model for individualist education, is
Emerson’s understanding of friendship. Friendship was one of Emerson’s preoccupations
throughout his career, and he dedicated significant thought to the matter of reconciling both his
own understanding of individualism and his own tendency toward introspective isolation with
the importance of sociality and relationships in all human endeavors. In many ways Emerson
echoes Stirner’s distinction between society and union, only substituting the even smaller-scale
notion of friendship into the latter position. He certainly rejects society in terms similar to
Stirner, writing in “Self-Reliance” that “Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the
manhood of every one of its members. Society is a joint-stock company in which the members
agree for the better securing of his bread to each shareholder, to surrender the liberty and culture
of the eater.”255 In contrast to the homogenizing surrender of individuality to the dictates of
society, genuine friendship recognizes the unique beauty and identity of the other, a recognition
that inspires within us a greater understanding of our own subjectivity. This relationship is
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mutual, continual, and constantly changing and evolving. He writes in “Friendship,” “In good
company, the individuals merge their egotism into a social soul exactly coextensive with the
several consciousnesses there present.”256 True friendship represented, for Emerson, the desire
for “a just and even fellowship, or none.”257 As David Robinson has argued at length, Emerson’s
understanding of friendship importantly centers the choice of the individuals united in friendship
to enter and continually affirm that friendship for its duration, whatever that may be.258
Friendship is both a recognition of value and individuality in another, but also a means of my
own self-expression and discovery. It is this sort of interaction that would be encouraged in a
society founded on principles of individualism, and precisely that which is denied under the
oppressive homogenization of the State, capital, and social roles.
It is worth briefly noting, to conclude, that the individualist vision of society as a
mutually beneficial series of temporary, organic, and spontaneously arising relationships was,
perhaps ironically, has been given an important layer of empirical legitimacy through the work
of mutualist anarchist Peter Kropotkin, particularly in his collection of scientific essays Mutual
Aid: A Factor of Evolution, published in 1902.259 Kropotkin, an amateur scientist and naturalist,
spent a number of years during the 1860s as an officer of the Russian military exploring Siberia
and cataloging his observations of the wildlife and their behaviors. His observations led him to
conclude that rather than the classical Darwinian picture of competition for scarce resources and
natural selection as the fundamental driving forces of evolution and social harmony within a
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species, cooperative behavior for mutual benefit played a much larger role than had been
previously believed. He wrote “I failed to find…that bitter struggle for the means of
existence…which was considered by most Darwinists…as the dominant characteristic of the
struggle for life,” but rather “saw Mutual Aid and Mutual Support carried on to an extend which
made me suspect in it a feature of the greatest importance for the maintenance of life, the
preservation of each species, and its further evolution.”260 Kropotkin argued, and his views have
been generally upheld in the scientific community up to the present day,261 that rather than
surviving through competitive or adaptive advantage, species tended to persist and flourish more
to the degree that they exhibited cooperative behavior based on mutual benefit. The concept of
mutual benefit is critical here, as Kropotkin aimed not only to dismantle the myth of pure
Darwinian competition in the vein of Hobbes’ “war of all against all,” but also the romantic
visions of thinkers like Rousseau, “who saw in nature but love, peace, and harmony.”262 Rather,
individuals were motivated to cooperative behavior not out of any large-scale sense of species
survival or altruism, but out of a form of self-interest, and that this form of motivation created as
an epiphenomenon evolutionary success. Though Kropotkin is not considered an individualist,
his view of human society based around these same mutualist principles is remarkably similar to
the view of left-anarcho-individualism, which sees social organizations as arising out of a mutual
sense of need or desire between individuals and dissolving once that need has been met, rather
than remaining and calcifying into the oppressive organs of state power.
Having laid out the positive vision of individualism that I wish to defend (i.e. as
fundamentally anticapitalist, anti-statist, and against homogenizing and reductive domination of
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all types) and distinguishing it from the traditions of “rugged individualism” and rightist
anarcho-capitalism, the next chapter addresses in more detail two of what I see as the most
powerful objections against the view of individualism presented here. Specifically, I will argue
that individualism can serve as a base of political resistance as well for the compatibility of
individualism and a genuine democratic impulse.
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CHAPTER FOUR
TWO OBJECTIONS TO INDIVIDUALISM

The Objection of Inefficacy: Individualism and Resistance
Having discussed in Chapter Three the compatibility of individualism and group identity,
I will now respond to a related objection, namely that individualism is incapable of providing a
solid basis of resistance to organized oppression and violence. Discussions of resistance in
education are commonplace, particularly in our era of neoliberal incursions, takeovers, and
augmentations within the public school system. It is natural that under the pressure of the
constantly changing and ever more onerous suite of burdensome and deprofessionalizing policies
and demands placed on teachers and students alike that these groups would seek out ways of
resisting and pushing back against the forces of neoliberalism. In this section I will address two
major points. First, I will discuss the predominant ways in which resistance is conceptualized in
contemporary educational thought and practice, as well as examine some of the theoretical and
ideological underpinnings of those conceptualizations. Second, drawing from the work of some
of the most politically active individualists, argue that anarchist individualism offers a valuable
tool for those on the Left who seek to resist neoliberalism in education. Counter to the prevailing
discourse that paints individualized resistance as at worst counterproductive and disorganized,
and at best merely emotionally cathartic for those who undertake it, I will suggest that
individualist resistance both has a rich theoretical tradition as well as a history of legitimate
success. From desertion to poaching to work sabotage, individualism has much to offer us as
educators and students in our struggle against neoliberal capture.
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Teacher and Student Resistance: The Contemporary Consensus
It is interesting to begin this discussion of educational resistance by noting that teacher
and student resistance in the way that I mean to discuss it here is rarely named in the literature as
such. Rather, resistance is most commonly discussed as an obstacle to be overcome by
administrators dealing with recalcitrant, stubborn teachers who simply refuse to adapt to the
changing needs of their workplace environment, or students who are in need of the ubiquitous
“behavior modification.” Resistance, in this understanding of the term, is a flaw in an educator or
a student, something to be overcome, worked through, and managed by administrators and
outside reformers. Typical of this type of approach to teacher resistance are quotes such as this
one from Joo-Ho Park & Dong Wook Jeong, who argue that “Eliminating or reducing teachers’
negative attitude toward change is a common and persistent challenge to interveners, in
particular, outside the school.” 263Jim Knight concludes his article, simply entitled “What Can
We Do About Teacher Resistance?” by arguing for having a small group of educators and
administrators “do the thinking for teachers” because “Schools need programs implemented
consistently across a district, and it’s not especially efficient for many teachers to be deeply
involved in curriculum revision.”264 Often administrators are cautioned about how to approach
teachers with policies or ideas for change because of the emotional responses such “innovations”
might trigger in the change-resistant teaching force, and teachers’ dissatisfaction with reforms
are often dismissed in psychological terms that reduce their agency and expertise to simple
attachment to older ways of doing things, force of habit, or even simple laziness.265 One group of
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researchers has even claimed to have found a “solution for the treatment of teacher resistance”
based on a “combination of five theoretical approaches to preventing, diagnosing, and
remediating misbehavior.”266 The infantilizing language of “misbehavior” here is, I argue, not
accidental, as it appeals to dominant deprofessionalizing narratives of teachers as in need of
direction from the outside and childishly resistant to change. It also fuses the literature on teacher
resistance with the literature on student resistance, which often participates in precisely the same
psychologizing discourses of misbehavior and behavior modification.267
While a number of criticisms can and have been made of these ways of talking about
teachers and students (e.g. that this discourse removes autonomy, reduces legitimate critique to
psychology, etc.), my purpose in referencing it here is slightly different. The point I want to
emphasize about how resistance is talked about in education today is that the word itself has been
robbed of whatever radical or political implications it might have had by discourses of
management and psychologism. If “resistance” is reduced to a minor managerial inconvenience,
then those who would use the term more expansively must find alternative ways of expressing
themselves, and this itself is already a significant victory for the neoliberal project, and is
something worth acknowledging.
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By and large, the language that has been picked up by teachers and students who would
politicize their resistance is the language of “activism.” Discussions of both student activism on
college campuses and at the K-12 level, and work on teacher activism have long been important
aspects of education as an academic discipline, and interest in these topics has only escalated in
the era of Donald Trump. The discourse of activism, both student and teacher, takes a number of
different forms. Mark R. Warren and Karen L. Mapp, for example, conceptualize resistance to
neoliberal school as a form of community organizing, which they see as a catalytic force not just
for resistance but also for creative and grassroots generation of new, democratic forms of
community education.268 Warren and Mapp specifically situate their understanding of
community organizing within the larger historical context of civil rights struggles of minoritized
and oppressed communities, who have long mobilized along community lines to achieve
political and social ends. They argue, for example, that “the struggle for quality education and
the struggle for liberation have been fundamentally interconnected in the African American
community,” and go on to emphasize the importance of shared histories and identities in the
process of building communities and bases of resistance in sociopolitical struggle.269 Russell H.
Carlock Jr. argues that community organizing around education has been instrumental in the
Latinx struggle for social justice as well, pointing out that “As early as the nineteenth century,
social reformers in the United States combined organizing with adult education to impact social
change, especially in immigrant communities.”270 There is perhaps no better illustration of the
power of community organizing to alter educational conditions than the East Lost Angeles
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“blowouts” of March 1968, which saw thousands of Latinx students walk out of their high and
middle schools in protest of the way they had been treated by their school districts.271 The
students led by teacher Sal Castro, parental groups, college students, and many other community
members, whose schools had been systematically ignored and defunded, demanded equality in
facilities, funding, supplies, as well as a more inclusive curriculum and diverse schools staff that
more completely reflected Chicano culture.272
These community-based forms of resistance and protest often draw on the work of Paulo
Freire, who centered the need for communal identity formation and consciousness in his
educational philosophy and pedagogical practice. For Freire, critical education occurred only
through dialogue with others in one’s own context to address the specific material conditions of
that context, a commitment which grew out of the well-documented influence of Marx on
Freire’s educational thought and practice.273 In classic Marxian fashion, Freire often refers to the
fact of humanity being “something constructed socially and historically and not there simply a
priori.”274 Freire’s own interest in education and community-oriented pedagogy began during his
time spent educating illiterate and economically disadvantaged rural adults in his native Brazil,
where he would eventually, after being exiled for his views, serve as Secretary of Education and
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come to profoundly influence the development of national education.275 Freire’s radically
communal and situated pedagogy has had wide appeal among Marxist and Leftist educators
throughout the world, particularly with his emphasis on the building of shared identities to
address shared struggles and oppressions (a sine qua non of community organizing, as elucidated
by Warren and Mapp), and Freirean experiments have taken place in locations as disparate as
South Africa,276 Scotland,277 Grenada, Jamaica, and Australia.278
A second major current in the contemporary discussions of educational resistance takes
as its main source of inspiration not the community-building critical pedagogy of Freire,279 but
rather the radical group organizing and action of the historical labor movement and working
class. This strain of thinking, which tends to focus more on teacher activism than student, or at
least views them as inseparably linked, sees teachers primarily as workers in a capitalist system
that exploits their labor and advocates for teacher organizing along the lines of the traditional
labor unions. The decline of labor unions and the continued attacks on their sources of influence
and indeed their very existence, as in the various moves to implement so-called “right to work”
(RTW) policies across the United States,280 has been a growing source of concern on the left
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broadly, and has produced passionate calls for the revitalization of labor unions and radical
working-class politics in general. One of the most well-known and respected diagnostician of the
neoliberal paradigm, David Harvey, has argued the construction of “strong collective institutions
(such as trade unions)” is one of the most threatening possibilities to neoliberal rationality,
committed as it is to free market ideologies and the fracturing of collective identities of all kinds
in the name of the type of rugged individualism discussed in Chapter 1.281
The labor view of resistance is also fundamentally Marxist in orientation, though with
important caveats and modifications. Though Marx clearly advocated for organized worker
resistance to capital and somewhat infamously held that worker uprisings would inevitably end
capitalism and usher in the dictatorship of the proletariat, there are tensions between the
orthodox Marxist view and the traditional modes of trade unionism. For example, where trade
unions tend to advocate for things like higher wages, Marxism ostensibly calls for the
elimination of the wage system altogether.282 That being said, it is undeniable that there is a deep
affinity between the Marxist vision of worker resistance and the activity of the historical trade
unions. Advocates of this view often look to figures such as Bill Haywood, one of the founders
of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) and prominent figure in early radical labor
organizing in the United States, organizing a number of textile strikes in the early 1900s for
inspiration.283 Haywood had deeply revolutionary views about class relations and capitalism,
claiming in the very first line of the preamble to the IWW constitution that “The working class
and the employing class have nothing in common” and going on to directly evoke Marx, writing
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that “between these two classes a struggle must go on until the workers of the world organize as
a class, take possession of the means of production, abolish the wage system, and live in
harmony with the Earth.”284
Within education, many have argued that teachers today under neoliberalism find
themselves in much the same position that industrial workers found themselves in when
Haywood founded the IWW, and so should respond with similarly radical forms of organization.
Mary Compton and Lois Weiner open their collection detailing the global neoliberal assault on
education and teacher unions in this way, “Teachers are in a war being fought over the future of
education, and though at times it might seem as though we are losing the war without firing a
shot, we have a potentially powerful weapon in our hands – our solidarity and organization into
powerful teachers unions.”285 Bob Peterson argues for a “social justice unionism” that fuses
together the classical trade union perspectives and advocacy for better wages and conditions with
the insights of community organizing and the realization that, in a direct echo of Haywood,
“teachers’ long-term interests are closer to those of poor people and working people whose
children are in our public schools, than to the corporate leaders and politicians who run our
society.”286 The overriding idea of the labor vision of educational resistance is that educators
must bind together as a unified force in order to articulate and ultimately achieve their political
and social ends.
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What I want to point out at this point regarding these two dominant strains of thinking
about educational resistance is that they are both fundamentally rooted in the centrality of
community and group identity of some kind. In the case of community organizing, that identity
is likely to be some form of shared marginalization or oppression, often along racial or cultural
lines, and in the case of labor organizing, the identity in question is that of a worker under
neoliberal capitalism, and particularly an educational worker. This focus on community and
shared identity should not be surprising, given the Marxist roots of both types of thinking
documented above. In the next section, I want to argue that communally-oriented thinking about
resistance, whatever historical successes it may have had and whatever theoretical considerations
weigh in its favor, ought not to exhaust the resources we have as educators for resisting
neoliberal global capitalism, nor for pursuing our own vision of the good in education and
without.
The Critique of Individualized Resistance
The discourse of political resistance, particularly on the left, has been so dominated by
the community-oriented modes discussed in the previous section that it has becomes nearly
commonsensical to believe that resistance at the individual level is at best ineffectual and at
worst corrosive to larger-scale leftist goals. The debate between organized, communal resistance
and decentralized individualist resistance has been particularly fierce among anarchists and other
revolutionary ideologies, specifically socialism and communism. A representative instance of
this debate has been ongoing roughly since the advent of the Occupy Wall Street (OWS)
movement in 2011, and centers around the tactics employed by a subset of protesters at that and
related events referred to as the “Black Bloc.” Strictly speaking, the Black Bloc is not a discrete
group or identity, but is rather a tactic used within protests and movements, or, as Francis
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Dupuis-Deri refers to it, a collective action that forms a contingent within an already existing
protest or rally.287 These Blocs are not homogenous or uniform in either size or composition, but
emerge organically in specific circumstances, and multiple Blocs can be active within a single
event. The Bloc is easily identifiable by the uniformly black colors its members don, often
covering their faces with bandanas and glasses, as well as their controversial tactics which can
include vandalism, burning or otherwise destroying property (a particularly well-known example
here is the breaking of windows at large corporate businesses, e.g. Starbucks, McDonalds, or
certain banks), and anti-capitalist and anarchist signage and imagery.288 The Black Blocs first
made their appearance on the American political scene during the massive demonstrations
against the World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle in late 1999.289 They returned in full
force during OWS and immediately generated very public and heated debates surrounding their
tactics and ideology.
While the description of the Black Blocs I have given here may suggest that the tactic is a
fundamentally communal one, predicated as it is on the anonymous dissolution of individuality
within a group for a shared tactical purpose, the critiques leveled against the Black Bloc
protesters of OWS argue precisely the opposite, namely that Black Bloc tactics were childish
expressions of individual frustrations or predilections that fundamentally cut against the more
collectively organized factions within the movement. The most forceful proponent of this line of
thinking at the time was Chris Hedges, a journalist who identifies closely with radical worker

Francis Dupuis-Deri, “The Black Blocs Ten Years after Seattle: Anarchism, Direct Action, and Deliberative
Practices,” Journal for the Study of Radicalism 4, no. 2 (2010): 45-82, 46.
288
Dupuis-Deri, “The Black Blocs,” 46.
289
For a first-hand account of the protests, including some discussion of the role of Black Blocs, see Alexander
Cockburn, Jeffrey St. Clair, & Allan Sekula, 5 Days that Shook the World: Seattle and Beyond (London: Verso,
2000). A more academic treatment with the benefit of over a decade of hindsight is Lesley J. Wood, Direct Action,
Deliberation, and Diffusion: Collective Action After the WTO Protests in Seattle (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2012). David Graeber’s Direct Action: An Ethnography (Oakland, CA: AK Press, 2009) also includes useful
discussions about Seattle and Black Blocs in general.
287

114

movements (he often cites Haywood, along with the founder of the Catholic Workers movement
and anarchist Dorothy Day) and advocates powerfully for unionization and anti-war organizing.
In early 2012, Hedges, who participated in OWS and often spoke to the initial group that formed
at Zuccotti Park in New York City, published a piece entitled “The Cancer in Occupy” that
fiercely critiqued the Black Bloc contingents in OWS.290 The thrust of Hedges’ case against
Black Bloc protestors was that they mistakenly eschewed traditional leftist organization in favor
of wanton violence, criminal activity, and even “a deeply disturbing hypermasculinity.”291
Hedges argued that the fundamental motivations of Black Bloc-ers292 were individualistic, and
that their tactics were, rather than any form of serious critique or protest against capitalism or
corporate power, but expression of “the lust that lurks within us to destroy, not only things but
human beings,” even going so far as to equate the motivations of Black Bloc-ers to “the same
sickness that fuels the swarms of police who pepper-spray and beat peaceful protestors.”293 The
selfish, individualistic, “progressive adolescentization” of the anarchist movement, in Hedges’
eyes, fundamentally undercut the organized leftists movements, primarily by “open[ing] the way
for hundreds or thousands of peaceful marchers to be discredited by a handful of hooligans.”294
The debate surrounding Black Bloc tactics has, with the advent of Donald Trump, begun
again with full force, this time surrounding the group known as “Antifa,” which has become a
household term after the violent protest clashes in Charlottesville, Virginia and Berkeley,
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California during the Summer of 2017. Antifa, which is a shortening of Anti-Fascist, is a
complex of loose group associations that has a long history dating back to the rise of fascism
under Benito Mussolini in Italy during the 1920s.295 Like the Black Bloc, Antifa is as much of a
tactic as it is a discrete grouping or organization. While the specific details of Antifa as a
movement are not directly relevant to my discussion, the response to their emergence in
American politics in recent months is a further example of the type of thinking represented by
Hedges with respect to supposedly individualized resistance on the American far left. Many of
the same types of dismissals and insults that had been levelled against the Black Bloc are now
being deployed against Antifa, with similar effect. Even mainstream figures have participated in
this type of critique, as when Trevor Noah, the host of the massively popular The Daily Show,
referred to Antifa as “vegan ISIS.”296 Noah went on to more directly echo the sentiments of
Hedges and the like, claiming with respect to the common Antifa tactic of breaking windows of
major corporations, most famously Starbucks,
Seriously, though, breaking a window was a ‘symbolic act’? You might think it’s some
deep statement, but most people see that and think, ‘Great, now I’ve got to walk a whole
block up to the next Starbucks.’ Like, who is that supposed to convince? What are you
trying to do? It definitely doesn’t convince the Starbucks guy, the person who’s gonna be
in the store cleaning up the glass, like, ‘Yeah, they made a good point about fascism. I
understand what they mean. I understand it.’297
Whether they are aware of it or not, these critics of what they see as individualized, expressive
forms of resistance are echoing a well-known intra-anarchist critique articulated most forcefully
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by Murray Bookchin in his Social Anarchism or Lifestyle Anarchism: An Unbridgeable
Chasm.298 What Bookchin refers to as “lifestyle anarchism” or simply “lifestylism,” is what he
sees as the depoliticized, individualistic, and even metaphysical forms of anarchism represented
by Max Stirner and, moreso for Bookchin, Hakim Bey and John Zerzan. It is worth quoting
Bookchin at some length here, as he singles out many of the figures discussed in this dissertation
and references many of the concepts I have been concerned to rehabilitate. He writes,
With its aversion for institutions, mass-based organizations, its largely subcultural
orientation, its moral decadence, its celebration of transience, and its rejection of
programs, this kind of narcissistic anarchism is socially innocuous, often merely a safety
valve for discontent toward the prevailing social order. With the Bey [Bookchin’s
disparaging nickname for Hakim Bey, much as Marx had referred to Stirner as “Saint
Max”], lifestyle anarchism takes flight from all meaningful social activism and a
steadfast commitment to lasting and creative projects by dissolving itself into kicks,
postmodernist nihilism, and a dizzying Nietzschean sense of elitist superiority. The price
that anarchism will pay if it permits this swill to displace the libertarian ideals of an
earlier period could be enormous. The Bey’s egocentric anarchism, with its
postmodernist withdrawal into individualistic “autonomy,”…threatens to render the very
word anarchism politically and socially harmless – a mere fad for the titillation of the
petty bourgeois of all ages.299
Here I believe that Bookchin distills not only the intra-anarchist critique of individualized
resistance, but also touches on many of the worries expressed by other leftists in general, as well
as advocates of the reductionist objection against individualism, i.e. that it problematically
rejects group identities as bases of resistance and sites of communal bonding. In the next section
I argue that this is a mistaken view of individualized resistance. I show that individualized
resistance is both effective, as well as compatible with the sorts of empowering, curative effects
that can come from a strong sense of communal identity, particularly in the face of trauma.
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The Case for Individualized Resistance: The Politics of Refusal and Withdrawal
The case I want to make here for individualized resistance is both negative and positive.
The negative case has to do with a general social tendency to overstate the effectiveness of
resistance in the form of mass movements, and the positive case has to do with a correlative
tendency to downplay the successes of individualized resistance, often for reasons, I argue, that
are inscribed directly into the way individualized resistance functions. I will also offer a qualified
defense of the expressive, emotive value of individualized resistance. I conclude the section by
discussing the potential for individualized resistance within the current context of neoliberal
education.
James C. Scott, a political anthropologist with an anarchist bent, has long written about
grassroots peasant and popular resistance to government power and oppressive social orders. His
The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia, for example,
examines a large region of Asia300 that he argues is a world “in which the state has not come to
close, as it now has, to sweeping all before it.”301 Scott details the various strategies and tactics
used by the peoples of this area, often existing in small tribal or familial groups, for avoiding
state power and outside intervention. For example, Scott describes a number of examples of the
ways in which people on the margins of society evaded conscription into the armies of the
Burmese-Manipur Wars, which took place from the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. These
tactics included everything from simply fleeing into more remote areas outside of the marching
paths of the armies to, in an interesting form of identity play, altering official kinship records,
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since conscription was almost always done by family or household. For Scott, the evidence of
the effectiveness of these small-scale, individualized forms of resistance is provided by the
increasing desperation of the conscription efforts, which expanded over time from one out of
every hundred households, to one out of every fifty, to one of ten, and so on.302 Much of the
success of these resistance efforts, Scott holds, came from the malleability of the identities of the
populations involved, from their willingness to alter and blur kinship lines to their ability to alter
cultural norms based on their location, he argues that
they [the peoples of Zomia] have multiple histories they can deploy singly or in
combination depending on the circumstances. They can…create long, elaborate
genealogies or…have minimally short genealogies and migration histories. If they appear
to be without a definite history, it is because they have learned to travel light, not
knowing what their next destination might be…They have just as much history as they
require.303
What is important about Scott’s insight here are not the details of the Southeast Asian context,
but the fact that this example provides what Scott sees as a general template for successful smallscale, individualized resistance to oppression. For Scott, the example set by the unincorporated,
stateless regions of Southeast Asia is illustrative of the more general point that “More regimes
have been brought, piecemeal, to their knees by what was once called ‘Irish democracy,’ the
silent, dogged resistance, withdrawal, and truculence of millions of ordinary people, than by
revolutionary vanguards or rioting mobs.”304 Scott suggests two other important examples of this
principle in action, arguing that both the outcomes of the Civil War and the ultimate defeat of
Napoleon “can almost certainly be attributed to a vast aggregation of acts of desertion and
insubordination.”305
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Indeed, much work has been done on the role of small-scale, individualized resistance in
both the abolitionist movement and the Civil Rights movement. Robin D.G. Kelly frames his
critical study of the history of black working-class resistance in precisely the same terms that
Scott uses to describe anti-statist strategies in Southeast Asia.306 Kelly writes that his goal is to
“dig a little deeper, beneath ‘below,’ to those workers whose record of resistance and survival is
far more elusive. I’m referring here to evasive, day-to-day strategies: from footdragging to
sabotage, theft at the workplace to absenteeism, cursing to graffiti.”307 Kelly’s various examples
of individualized forms of resistance and, importantly expression, such as the subversive uses of
urban Black musical spaces that operated as venues for oppressed Black workers subject to
brutal hours and treatment to “take back their bodies”308 all suggest a fusion between the political
value of small-scale, individualized resistance strategies and the subjective, expressive, eruptive
nature of these types of acts. It is illustrative to look, for example, at the ways in which
autonomous, undirected groups of resisters were treated both contemporaneously and historically
during the Civil Rights movement. Kelley points out that the vast majority of marchers that took
part in the critically important May 1963 Civil Rights demonstrations in Birmingham, organized
by Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), were actually not
native to the city, nor were they those who bore the brunt of oppression in Birmingham’s worst
slums. However, as Kelly puts it “The slum dwellers…did show up to Ingram Park to participate
on their own terms in the May demonstrations.”309 This group of protestors, who were outside
the organizational authority of the SCLC, famous for its advocacy of nonviolent resistance,
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responded to the infamous water guns and dogs of the Birmingham police with violence and
force, engaging directly with police via throwing bottles, rocks, and hand to hand combat. These
protestors returned the next day, lining the route of the planned march armed with pistols and
knives, ultimately causing the SCLS to call the demonstration off altogether.310 One can clearly
see the echoes and spirit of Black Bloc and Antifa tactics in the behaviors of the Birmingham
slum dwellers, refusing to be subsumed under an organizational head and engaging in direct
insurrectionary action against oppressive authoritarian power. It is telling, both as a metric of the
attitudes toward this type of resistance and the invisibility of individualized resistance in the
historical record that, as Kelly points out, historians and contemporary activists have generally
dismissed this aspect of the May Birmingham protests as the fringe activity of “onlookers” or
“bystanders.”311
Kelly is not the only scholar of Black history to point out the power of individualized,
guerilla resistance. Both Akinyele Omowale Umoja and Charles E. Cobb, Jr. have written
powerful counterhistorical narratives regarding the role of insurrectionary violence in the Civil
Rights movement.312 Umoja, who focuses his work on Mississippi during the Civil Rights era
and before, notes that “The armed resistance of the post-Reconstruction period does not
generally manifest as intentionally organized collective action, but rather as emergency selfdefense, often in the form of individual acts, in response to the threat of White violence.”313
Though Cobb’s analysis tends to emphasize the efforts to organize resistance among armed
militia groups in the South, he concurs with Kelly that one of the most critical and

310

Kelly, Race Rebels, 88.
Kelly, Race Rebels, 88.
312
Akinyele Omowale Umoja, We Will Shoot Back: Armed Resistance in the Mississippi Freedom Movement (New
York: New York University Press, 2013); and Charles E. Cobb, Jr., This Nonviolent Stuff’ll Get You Killed: How
Guns Made the Civil Rights Movement Possible (New York: Basic Books, 2014).
313
Umoja, We Will Shoot Back, 19.
311

121

underappreciated aspects of the Civil Rights movement was the individual, dogged resistance of
“small farmers, sharecroppers, day laborers, craftsmen,…and church leaders.”314
The overarching idea, shared by Scott, Kelly, Stirner, and others is that while large-scale
mobilizations like protests, marches, strikes, and so on are, for obvious reasons, more historically
visible than individual forms of resistance such as desertion, tax evasion, poaching, squatting,
and the like, the accumulated effect of these seemingly innocuous individual acts is ultimately
more damaging to established orders of power and oppression than the mass movements that are
much more often credited with generating social and historical change. Indeed, a common theme
running through all of the individualist thinkers and advocates of guerilla resistance is the idea
that part of the strength of individualized forms of resistance lies precisely in their refusal to
participate in established and accepted channels of contestation. As Scott puts the point apropos
the rampant wildcat strikes, looting, rent boycotts, slow work, and so on that marked depression
era economic life, “they represented no coherent policy agenda. Instead it was genuinely
unstructured, chaotic, and full of menace to the established order. For this very reason, there was
no one to bargain with, no one to credibly offer peace in return for policy changes. The menace
was directly proportional to their lack of institutionalization…there were no coherent demands,
no one to talk to.” Neoliberal capitalism thrives at bargaining with and ultimately defusing
established, organized, institutions of resistance, even purportedly radical ones. Individualized
resistance, on the other hand, is much more threatening, precisely because it is sub rosa, with no
manifestoes, platforms, or lists of demands. The practitioner of individualized resistance says to
neoliberal capital “I will not negotiate with you because you have nothing to offer me.”315 There

Cobb, “This Nonviolent Stuff’ll,” 15.
This way of putting things raises the interesting and complex question of intentionality regarding individualized
resistance. That is to say, to what degree do those who participate individualized resistance need to have some sense
of the larger scale political context of their actions or of the philosophical underpinnings of their resistance? Both
314
315

122

is, then, a political value to being disorganized, to refusing to be subsumed under established
organization norms of engagement, and that political value is the difficulty such disorganized
resistance presents for systems of power predicated on negotiating with those who would resist
them, and on offering piecemeal versions of reform.
Slavoj Zizek makes precisely this point with respect to a more recent instance of eruptive,
individualized resistance, namely OWS. One of the most common critiques of OWS, which
emerged organically and captured national attention when they effectively turned parks and
public places around the country into temporary autonomous zones, was that they articulated no
clear policy agenda, had no demands, and were generally uninterested in communicating with
outside media or reporters.316 For Zizek, this recalcitrance and unwillingness to couch their
resistance in familiar terms and fields of play was precisely one of the strengths of the
movement. Referring to Bill Clinton’s suggestion that the protestors of OWS focus on getting
then President Obama’s jobs plan passed, Zizek writes that “they [Clinton and others like him]
will try to make the protests into a harmless moralistic gesture…What one should resist at this
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stage is precisely such a quick translation of the energy of the protest into a set of ‘concrete’
pragmatic demands” and goes on to praise the eruptive, expressive force of the OWS episode,
arguing that “The reason the protestors went out is that they had enough of the world where to
recycle your Coke cans, to give a couple of dollars for charity, or to buy Starbucks cappuccino
where 1% goes for the third world troubles is enough to make them feel good.”317 For Zizek, it is
precisely the undirected rage, frustration, and disgust that made OWS such a potentially fertile
moment in history. The moment one capitulates, even conceptually and linguistically, to the
terms of hegemonic power structures, one has already given up significant ground.
Zizek’s conceptualization of the impetuses for OWS in specifically quotidian, expressive
terms (the infantilizing false morality of Western capital, the malaise of daily life under
neoliberalism, and so on) leads me to address another objection commonly levelled against
individualist resistance, namely that it is more about emotional expression than legitimate
political change. Having demonstrated the political potential of individualized resistance, I want
to conclude this section by briefly arguing for the value of subjective expression in resistance.
The bifurcation between political organization and individualized resistance is, I suggest, a false
dichotomy, and wrongly assumes that political change can never occur out of eruptive,
expressive actions that themselves grow out of various forms of dissatisfaction with the current
order of things. This, in essence, is the objection favored by critics of individualist resistance like
Bookchin and Hedges, who see this type of action as merely “lifestylist” and emotive, and hence
inherently unpolitical.
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Few would deny, at this stage in political history, the power of subjective, personal
experiences of daily life to spur political action and change. When Betty Freidan diagnosed the
quiet oppression of the female sexual underclass of the 1950s as “the problem that has no
name,”318 the Second-wave feminist movement organically coined the phrase “the personal is
political.” Or when James Baldwin wrote of his friends “in twos and threes and fours, in a
hallway, sharing a jug of wine or a bottle of whiskey, talking, cursing, fighting, sometimes
weeping: lost, and unable to say what it was that oppressed them, except that they knew it was
‘the man,’”319 they are all asserting the value of individual experiences of oppression, depression,
frustration, and anger as of fundamental importance for political resistance and movements.
What is often assumed, however, and what the individualist rejects, is the idea that the only
acceptable outlets for these types of frustrations are organized political parties, protests,
organizations, and language. That is, the subjective experiences of oppression and violence under
neoliberal capitalism and state authority are taken as legitimate and are understood to influence
political engagement, but the outlets for those feelings must be regulated, approved, and
generally accepted in the wider socio-political landscape (e.g. unions, parties, community
groups, etc.). For the left-anarcho-individualist, the eruptive power of these subjective
experiences is inherently political, regardless of their modes of expression.
One of the most articulate and passionate defenders of the political power of subjective,
individual experience and eruptive expression is Raoul Vaneigem, an anarchist affiliate of the
loose politico-artistic group the Situationist International (SI).320 According to Peter Marshall,
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the Situationist critique of capitalism and oppressive state authority suggested that “the way
out…was not to wait for a distant revolution but to reinvent everyday life here and now. To
transform the perception of the world and to change the structure of society is the same thing.”321
The Situationists, and Vaneigem in particular, saw the subjective experience of oppression, and
the invisible forms of microresistance that organically erupt in our daily experience as
fundamental to any revolutionary politics, not simply as a basis for larger scale organized
resistance, but in themselves. Vaneigem summarized his position, and, I argue, the position of
the left-anarcho-individualists in general, this way,
The unstated agenda of every insurrectionary movement is the transformation of the
world, and the reinvention of life…Revolution is made every day despite, and indeed in
opposition to the specialists of revolution. This revolution is nameless, like everything
that springs from lived experience. Its explosive integrity is forged continuously in the
everyday clandestinity of acts and dreams.322
This is of course not to say that individualized expressions of refusal are the sole means of
revolutionary political change, but only that their political value is their own and that they must
not be seen as entirely subordinate to or precursors of larger-scale forms of resistance. The SI
explicitly supported many of the forms of individualized resistance discussed above (e.g.
vandalism, wildcat strikes, work sabotage, etc.) and saw these types of refusal as signs of
creativity and always already political acts of expression.323 Vaneigem, in an echo of Baldwin’s
description of his despondent and frustrated friends, vividly describes a scene where the eruptive,
inarticulable force of refusal expresses itself in a deeply quotidian manner, but with critical
political implications.
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He writes,
The malaise assails me as the crowd around me grows. The concessions I have made to
stupidity, under the pressure of circumstances, rush to meet me, surging around me in
hallucinatory waves of faceless heads…Carried along by a crowd which only he can see,
a man suddenly screams out in an attempt to break the spell, to call himself back to
himself, to get back inside his own skin. All the tacit compliance, all the fixed smiles,
lifeless words, cowardice and humiliation strewn along his path suddenly coalesce and
possess him, driving him out of his desires and his dreams and exploding the illusion of
‘being together.’324
Here the individualist commitment to the primacy of subjective experience is on full display. The
individual lived experience of oppression, boredom, and generalized feelings of dissatisfaction is
the impetus for the desire to construct new forms of living and interacting. For Vaneigem,
structured political revolution and the development of new social forms are inseparable from
subjective oppression. Vaneigem argues that subjectivity and rigorous systematic critique must
work in tandem, writing that the various structures and ideologies of violence and control
“withstand neither analysis nor the anxiety that assails me.”325 That is, subjective, individualized
experiences and their outward expression are as valid in terms of political resistance and
diagnosis as any form of more structured, organized engagement.
The expression of these subjective states of humiliation and despair serve as important
shared spaces of connection and construction as well. Importantly for left-anarcho-individualists,
the alienation from the self and subjective oppression are not only key forms of resistance, but
also form the basis from which new forms of social relations can be constructed. Individualism
ultimately holds that inverting alienation and actualizing individuals is also the truest form of
democratic society. It is to this question, and the anti-democratic objection that I turn in the next
section.
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The Anti-Democratic Objection: Individualism versus Democracy?
It is difficult to overstate the influence of liberal democratic thinking on contemporary
educational philosophy, and specifically the thinking of John Dewey. Dewey scholar Mordechai
Gordon has gone so far as to compare the scope and depth of Dewey's impact on education to
those of Marx and Freud on sociology and psychology respectively.326 Perhaps the most
important of Dewey’s many theoretical legacies has been the sense among philosophers of
education that the fundamental project of schooling is a social, democratic, and communicative
one; that, as Dewey said, “…learning is the accompaniment of continuous activities or
occupations which have a social aim and utilize the materials of typical social situations. For
under such conditions, the school itself becomes a form of social life, a miniature
community.”327 Schooling, for Dewey, is to develop in children “the means to be fully and
adequately what one is capable of becoming through association with others in all the offices in
life.”328 While Dewey recognized the significant challenge of how to balance the concerns and
needs of individuals, on the one hand, and the large democratic community, on the other (indeed,
he once referred to this problem as “the ultimate problem of all education,”)329 it is undeniable
that Dewey viewed the community building, democratic aspects of the educational project to be
of primary importance. This legacy has had two major implications for the purposes of this
dissertation. First, there is the enduring sense that Dewey was fundamentally correct about the
nature and goals of education in modern society, i.e. that it ought to promote liberal democracy,
broadly understood. There is a certain affinity between the current state of political thinking in
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educational philosophy and the thesis of Francis Fukuyama’s controversial 1992 book The End
of History and the Last Man, in which he famously suggests that “What we may be witnessing is
not just the end of the Cold war, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the
end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government.”330 With
certain provisos, e.g. that we incorporate into our democratic political theorizing the insights of
identitarian movements and thinking, many educational theorists seem to think that we have
more or less hit on the best possible vision of schooling, and that we must simply tweak our
approaches to bring that vision into practice in reality or add this or that theoretical addendum as
necessary.331
A corollary to the “end of history” mentality regarding liberal democratic education, and
the second major implication of Dewey’s legacy, has been that contemporary educational
thinking has developed a list of foes and anathematic concepts against which the ideal of
democratic schooling must be defended. Generally speaking, the discourse of resistance and
incursion revolves around capitalism, markets, privatization, and the ubiquitous “neoliberalism.”
The particular features of this historical epoch and its guiding philosophy, both of which are
potential referents of these terms, are certainly in dispute, but there is widespread agreement on
some of the fundamentals. For example, there is a general consensus that the basic tenets of
neoliberalism tend to guide global and national economic policies, perhaps particularly so in the
United States. The basic principles of neoliberalism were elaborated following the 1938 Walter
Lippman Colloquium in Paris, which was called explicitly to form a new liberalism as interest in
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classical liberal economic thinking waned. The foundational commitments ultimately produced
by the participants at the colloquium are “the priority of the price mechanism, the free enterprise,
the system of competition, and a strong and impartial state.”332 Although neoliberalism as a term
has become a generalized shorthand form of criticism toward both classical and properly
neoliberal economic policies, we ought, as implied by the conditions of neoliberalism's initial
articulation, to note the important differences that exist between these principles and the pure
free-market philosophies of, say, F.A. Hayek or Ludwig von Mises, who initially did object to
the commitment to strong state intervention in economic matters on the part of neoliberals.
Another important aspect of neoliberalism is the shift from manufacture and labor as the main
founts of profit and productivity to an emphasis on financial markets and speculation for those
purposes. David Harvey puts the point pithily, claiming that “Neoliberalization has meant, in
short, the financialization of everything.”333 I take this pervasive influence of globalized financial
capital to be one of the defining features of the current political problematic, and it is the one
against which the majority of current politico-educational critique is leveled.334 Crucially for this
dissertation, it is generally assumed that a handmaiden to the destructive logics of efficiency,
market ideology, and neoliberalism more generally is individualism, and the two are casually
paired together with such notably frequency that one could be forgiven for thinking that
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neoliberalism and individualism just are one and the same, or at the very least parasitic on one
another. Critical pedagogue Henry Giroux groups individualism with “the ethic of consumption,
“empire-building,” “the dictates of the market” and “patriotic jingoism,” and goes on to contrasts
it directly with “civic responsibility.”335 In another piece, he ties individualism to “excessive
commercialism” and “selfishness” which “undermine and displace the values necessary to define
ourselves as active and critical citizens rather than as consumers.”336 Peter McLaren, another
critical pedagogue, groups individualism together with what he calls “myths of the nuclear
family” and “imperialism.”337 One of the most widely-cited theorists of neoliberalism, David
Harvey, sees individualism as fundamentally tied to “the anarchy of the market, of competition”
and “a breakdown of all bonds of solidarity and a condition verging on social anarchy and
nihilism.”338 Many other writers prefer to appropriate C.B. Macpherson’s famous term
“possessive individualism”339 to more directly tie individualism to consumerism and capitalism.
This despite the fact, it must be noted, that Macpherson himself explicitly denied the association
between individualism and capitalism, writing that his entire philosophical project has in part
revolved around “rescuing that valuable part of the liberal tradition which is submerged when
liberalism is identified with capitalist market relations.”340 Wendy Brown, another important
recent critic of neoliberalism, historically links the ideology of possessive individualism to “the
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growth of capitalism and its overtaking of public life.”341 Pauline Lipman similarly deploys the
term when she suggests that “Antidemocratic policies take root in a culture of possessive
individualism and White supremacy that makes them seem natural and inevitable…”342 Clearly,
there is a sense in much of the educational literature that individualism is fundamentally
complicit with neoliberal capitalism and its attendant corruptions of democracy, community, and
even human meaning, as in Harvey’s charge of nihilism. In short, the anti-democratic objection
to individualism holds that individualism is fundamentally incompatible with democratic social
organization, treating individuals as atomistic, disconnected, and in some cases fundamentally
driven only by their own selfish desires. The next section argues that individualism is actually
entirely consistent with democratic organization, and may even be a more truly radical form of
democracy than traditional understandings of the term. I argue that the target of the critiques of
individualism surveyed above is the type of rightist-individualism discussed in the conclusion of
Chapter Two, and that the left-anarcho-individualism I advocate would wholeheartedly endorse
the critiques of that rightist form of individualism as racist, atomistic, and oppressive. That is, to
argue that individualism is incompatible with democracy is to fail to make the critical distinction
between rightist-anarcho-capitalist individualism and left-anarcho-individualism. I will also
argue that this distinction is one of which Dewey himself was keenly aware, and that his vision
of democratic life is of a piece with that of the left-anarcho-individualist view.
Individualist Democracy
It is worth acknowledging at the outset of responding to the antidemocratic objection that
it is manifestly true that forms of rugged, capitalist individualism that are the intended target of
the antidemocratic objection are not in any way democratic, predicated as they are on ideologies
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of domination, pseudo-Darwinian competition, and isolation. The argument of this section is that
the anarchist individualism advocated in this dissertation is united with traditional advocates of
democracy in both opposing these tendencies as well as in calling for a freer, more just social
world, though apart from state control. In nearly all of the major individualist thinkers,
particularly those of the anarchist tradition, one finds political considerations to be of critical
importance. While the political principles on which individualism is based, and some of the
potential implications of those principles for social organization have already been articulated in
Chapter Three, what I want to focus on here are the ways in which those principles align with the
explicit commitments of democratic social organization. Given the broadly educational context
of this discussion, I find it helpful to appeal to Dewey in terms of thinking about the nature of
democracy and the values that underpin it. Dewey is rightly considered one of the most
important theorists of democracy in the history of thinking about the concept, and any discussion
of democracy must inevitably move through his work in some way. Here I will outline Dewey’s
understanding of democracy, and go on to illustrate its fundamental compatibility with anarchist
individualism.
The first critical point to note about how Dewey understands democracy is that, for him,
democracy is not only, nor even primarily, a form of governmental organization. Rather,
democracy is a way of life, an ethic, and, critically, a subjective experience. In his early
articulation of democracy “The Ethics of Democracy,” Dewey argues that democracy as
government or social organization is at best derivative of the subjective, inner sense of
democracy as a moral commitment. He writes that democracy “is not to be put into a man from
without. It must begin in the man himself, however much the good and the wise of society
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contribute. Personal responsibility, individual initiation, these are the notes of democracy.”343
Indeed, in 1927’s The Public and Its Problems, Dewey derides those who would restrict
democracy to political organization at the expense of the subjective component, arguing that
mere political democracy is weak, mechanistic, and narrow, stealthily relying on implied
premises of rugged individualist liberalism.344 This centering of the individual in Dewey’s
conception of democratic life is by no means marginal or limited to his early work, but rather is
shot through the entire philosophical framework he establishes for democracy. In “A Resume of
Four Lectures on Common Sense, Science and Philosophy,” from 1932, Dewey again describes
the fundamental aspect of the democratic sensibility in individual terms, describing the
democratic society as one in which “every individual has a degree of power to govern himself
and be free in the ordinary concerns of life.”345 Critically for Dewey, democracy is constantly
evolving, always creative, and always in the process of becoming. That is, there is no fixed
endpoint at which we reach perfect democracy. Rather, as he puts the point in “The Challenge of
Democracy to Education,” democracy “as a form of life cannot stand still.”346 Indeed, James
Albrecht glosses Dewey’s experimentalist democracy as primarily a means of attempting to
usher in a new vision of individualism, one that should immediately be familiar from discussion
of individualism in Chapter Three. Albrecht writes that Dewey envisioned an individualism “that
rejects classic liberalism’s negative conception of liberty and its rigid laissez-faire opposition to
public regulation, in favor of a broad commitment to creating the positive conditions of
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individual liberty and equality by whatever means…are best suited to each particular
situation.”347 The ultimate goal of democratic organization, and the inner experience of the
democratic spirit, is to unlock individual subjectivity, rather than achieve some objective form of
freedom (as in the right-individualist tradition). Dewey, critically, extended this goal of
individual cultivation into the realm of education as well, a connection that will be drawn more
explicitly in Chapter Five.
Perhaps the most important statement of Dewey’s understanding of individualism, and a
text that in many ways can serve as a bridge between Dewey and the left-anarcho-individualists
on the question of democratic individualism, is Individualism Old and New (1930). Dewey
argues that the gradual advance of capitalist social capture and its infiltration into all aspects of
modern life has fundamentally undercut the ability of individuals to achieve subjective
fulfillment or band together for social progress. In an argument that parallels the rhetoric of
Vaneigem, Dewey isolates as particularly oppressive “the unrest, impatience, irritation and hurry
that are so marked in American life” and suggests that the ubiquity of these pathological
subjective phenomena can only signal “an acute maladjustment between individuals and the
social conditions under which they live,”348 namely a global capitalism that centers private
pecuniary accumulation as the ultimate goal of human existence. Dewey argues that the “old”
view of individualism is, as I argued in Chapter Two, fundamentally complicit with this view,
situating the individual as merely an agent of capital. On the “old” view of individualism, “The
individual is told that by indulging in the enjoyment of free purchasing he performs his economic
duty, transferring his surplus income into the corporate store where it can be most effectively
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used.”349 This is the view of right-individualism and anarcho-capitalism, holding as they do to
the model of homo economicus as the ideal of individual activity. Dewey also echoes the
discussion of Herbert Hoover from Chapter One, arguing that Hoover positioned himself, and by
extension the Republican party at large, not as political entities, but rather as engineers of order
and prosperity, taking a supposedly more objective view of economic relations.350 This is of
course a sine qua non of neoliberal capitalist rationality of the Randian and Hayekian variety. As
should be clear, the left-anarcho-individualist agrees with Dewey’s critique of this form of
individualism.
These developments in capitalism and the entrenchment of the “old” vision of
individualism that supports those developments has resulted, Dewey argues, in the subversion of
the individual, who is divided within himself between the alienating and homogenizing forces of
capitalist production and his genuine desire for self-realization and expression. Dewey argues
that the individual needs to be reconstructed in an organic way that responds to the currently
existing problematic and set of social relationships. In a similar argument to that made by
Stirner, Dewey argues that traditionally imposed mores and social roles must be re-evaluated in
light of new social conditions and forms of living, writing “Traditional ideas are more than
irrelevant. They are an encumbrance; they are the chief obstacle to the formation of a new
individuality integrated within itself and with a liberated function in the society wherein it
exists.”351 The new individual must be free to develop in conversation with both her genuine self
and those around her. For Dewey, this spark of individuality and the desire to escape oppressive
social forms (and indeed create new ones) is, as Vaneigem also argues, “inexpugnable” and
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asserts itself everywhere that it is tamped down, even in small ways.352 The mode of individualist
democracy begins within the individual and the recapturing of the individual spirit of
experimentation and engagement with one’s surroundings.
This individualist orientation in terms of the spirit of democracy is shared by all the great
individualists, as is the sense that democratic forms can never become static or rigid, falling back
into the homogenizing subsuming of the individual under the heading of “Society” as understood
by Emerson and Stirner in Chapter Three. The left-anarcho-individualists, if anything, see
themselves as calling for a more rigorously thorough democratic reimagining of society, so as to
maximize the value and variation of human experiences and freedoms. This view is in keeping
with the individualist tendency to extend the logic of a traditional leftist position to its logical
conclusions. If democracy is decoupled from its associations with this or that particular way of
organizing political representation, and is viewed as an attitude toward the world and other
individuals in it, it becomes clear that Dewey and the left-anarcho-individualists share much the
same understanding of the concept. Stirner’s call for a reconfiguration of human relationships
from society to union and Emerson’s extension of the ideal of friendship into the realm of the
social are both of a piece with Dewey’s definition of democracy as “a name for a life of free and
enriching communion.”353 The emphasis here on freedom and enrichment is key, as it represents
a critical point of agreement between Dewey and the left-anarcho-individualists, namely on the
issue that true democracy, while acknowledging the unavoidable entanglements into which we
are thrown as human being, must not unilaterally impose on us unchosen relations of force, or
put us in positions that sap our individuality and unique identities. For Dewey, these free and
enriching communities (or “publics” in his preferred terminology) emerge and develop in
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response to specific, localized conditions and problems that confront the members of that public
in their daily lives. There is no predetermined model or theoretical ideal to which the emergence
of a public must adhere, and indeed, “to form itself, the public has to break existing political
forms.”354 This understanding of the emergence of publics as contingent and dependent on
shifting, localized contexts, is certainly consistent with how Stirner understands the formation of
unions, namely for mutual benefit and in response to a desire or need. These types of ad hoc
social forms that do not exist long enough to become hardened by social roles or other strictures
are hallmarks of the left-anarcho-individualist understanding of democracy and democratic
decision making.
Dewey is similarly clear, and in agreement with the left-anarcho-individualists, that one
of the main forces that has come to oppress and stifle subjectivity, and hence democracy, is the
advent of neoliberal capitalism and the attendant flattening of human relations under the
demands of production, work, and capital accumulation. Dewey clearly recognized that “the
problem of democracy is no longer chiefly governmental and political. It is industrial and
financial – economic.”355 For Dewey, industrial capitalism and the various indignities and
humiliations it produced, along with its demand for competition among all of those under its
control, had snuffed out the spirit of democracy. Mere political democracy in the form of
elections and the like is neither able to spark or nourish the democratic impulse, and Dewey calls
for a radical reshaping of our social order so that democracy can be reborn anew. He goes so far
as to explicitly call for the people’s ownership and control of “the land, banks, the producing and
distributing agencies of the nation.”356 Certainly Vaneigem would agree with Dewey regarding
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the false promises and antidemocratic foundation of capitalist production, a when he describes
the reality of day to day life under capitalism as “working to survive, surviving by consuming
and for the sake of consuming: the hellish cycle is complete. According to the logic of theeconomy-rules, survival is both necessary and sufficient.”357 Modes of modern capitalist
production, for both Dewey and the left-anarcho-individualist, are fundamentally antidemocratic
and corrosive to the ultimate goals of self-actualization and development of agency.
Both in their understanding of the fundamental goals of democracy (i.e. the cultivation of
individuality), their conception of how democratic social organization is to be approached, as
well as their critiques of capitalism as antithetical to democratic life, the left-anarchoindividualists and Dewey agree. Broadening the conception of democracy from mere formal
political organization to include certain types of attitudes and subjective dispositions shows
clearly that left-anarcho-individualism is not only compatible with, but an ally of, democracy. 358
In the final chapter, I will approach educational issues specifically, applying the positive leftanarcho-individualist view espoused in Chapter Three to specifically educational concerns,
namely concerns of school organization, pedagogy, curriculum, and the relationship of schools to
society.
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CHAPTER FIVE
LEFT-ANARCHO-INDIVIDUALIST EDUCATION

In this chapter I synthesize the critiques of state power and social homogenization offered
by individualism with the positive picture of that view offered in Chapter Three specifically with
respect to educational questions. I will argue first that left-anarcho-individualism provides a
strong and important critique of the current neoliberal problematic in education, defined as it is
by increasing calls for standardization, measurement, accountability, and the like. Second, I
discuss some possible futures suggested by the left-anarcho-individualist program for reshaping
and rebuilding education for individual liberation and expression. I also address the potential
objection that left-anarcho-individualist education in practice simply collapses into a type of
existentialism, an educational approach that has a long theoretical and practical history of its
own.
Education as a Fundamental Anarchist Interest
Education has long been a central preoccupation of anarchist thinking in general, apart
from the individualist tradition. Despite anarchism’s notorious inability to generate meaningful
theoretical consensus among those who actually identity as anarchists,359 one of the few nearly
universal points of agreement among anarchists of various stripes is the conviction that education
and schools are of foundational importance in any long-term project of social change or
revolution. Leonard Krimerman and Lewis Parry go so far as to claim of anarchism that “Indeed,
no other movement whatever has assigned to educational principles, concepts, experiments, and
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practices a more significant place in its writings and activities.”360 The reasons for this are both
negative and positive. That is, anarchists recognize both the importance of wresting the powerful
tool of ideological reproduction and indoctrination represented by the educational system from
State control, as well as seeing education as a critical positive project for building a new society.
With respect to the negative aspect of the anarchist interest in education, anarchists are
largely in agreement with the analysis of schools as social institutions provided by Marxist
philosopher Louis Althusser in his influential essay “Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses,” which diagnosed the ways in which State and Capital power reproduce the
conditions of their persistence, specifically with respect to production.361 For Althusser, the key
function of social formations of all types is to “reproduce the conditions of its production at the
same time as it produces, and in order to be able to produce.”362 That is, social forms must
participate in maintaining the material bases of their existence, such that they can continue with
their productive imperatives. Crucially, this “endless chain” of social reproduction necessitates
not just the reproduction of the means of production (e.g. raw materials, factories, etc.), but also
of what Althusser calls “productive forces,” by which he simply means labor power itself.363
Althusser argues that the most influential and important institution in the process of reproducing
labor power is the ideological State apparatus (ISA) of the educational system.364 Althusser
performs a genealogical exposure not unlike those undertaken by Stirner and Foucault to
demonstrate how the educational ISA has come to perform the same reproductive functions and
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occupy the same structural position as the previously dominant ISA, namely the Church. He
argues that “the ideological State apparatus which has been installed in the dominant position in
mature-capitalist social formations as a result of a violent political and ideological class struggle
against the old dominant ideological State apparatus [the Church], is the educational ideological
apparatus.”365 The school is where children are initiated into the structural relations of State
power and capital and prepared for their various downstream positions in productions. Critically,
Althusser does not necessarily see school as a site of explicit propagandizing or indoctrination in
any direct sense, but rather isolates how the most supposedly innocuous and basic aspects of the
curriculum serve the larger purposes of ideological control. Inquiring into what precisely it is
that students learn in school, he writes in a paragraph that is unmistakably applicable to our
current neoliberal context,
at any rate they learn to read, to write and to add – i.e. a number of techniques and a
number of other things as well, including elements of ‘scientific’ or ‘literary culture,’
which are directly useful in the different jobs in production (one instruction for manual
workers, another for technicians, a third for engineers, a final one for higher
management, etc.). Thus, they learn ‘know-how.’
He goes on to argue that beyond these technical forms of preparation for economic production,
children also learn
the ‘rules’ of good behavior, i.e. the attitude that should be observed by every agent in the
division of labour, according to the job he is ‘destined’ for: rules of morality, civic and
professional conscience, which actually means rules of respect for the socio-technical
division of labour and ultimately the rules of the order established by class domination.366
The school, then, is one of the primary means of assigning social roles, instilling the rules of the
game of production, and the site of subjection to the established order. While this
characterization of the ideological apparatus of the school is particularly attractive to
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individualists for reasons I will discuss, it is also generally consistent with the anarchist position
on schools as they currently exist in the neoliberal social order, and helps to explain the high
degree of interest in schools and education on the part of anarchists.
While anarchists generally agree on the centrality of a robust critique of the educational
system and acknowledge its importance in any revolutionary project, the positive visions of what
education ought to look like, and what its purposes would be, in post-revolutionary society are,
perhaps predictably, strikingly different. Judith Suissa makes clear the fundamental tension
between total freedom and a positive political program that invariably arises in any discussion of
anarchist education in her authoritative treatment of the topic, writing
On the one hand, given the anarchist aversion to blueprints and the demand for constant
experimentation in the endeavour to improve society, it may seem quite reasonable to
argue that doing away with schools and formal education altogether would be a crucial
step toward the creation of an anarchist society…Yet on the other hand, the earlier
discussion of the substantive core of anarchism suggests that any educational practice
consistent with these values cannot coherently adopt a libertarian position, in the sense of
a laissez-faire attitude to children’s upbringing.367
Suissa goes on to argue that the former horn of this dilemma, while in some senses consistent
with anarchist commitment, is more properly referred to as “libertarian,” given its
uncompromising emphasis on the freedom of the child and unwillingness to impose strictures on
their behavior and development. On the other hand, it is the centrality of anarchist political
principles in the educational process that marks certain forms of education as distinctly anarchist,
rather than simply libertarian, and the imparting of these principles can indeed necessitate certain
forms of imposition and authority that would be rejected by strict educational libertarians. This
distinction is of profound importance for thinking about anarchist education in general, but
specifically for individualism, which I ultimately argue bridges the gap between libertarian and
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anarchist education by explicitly politicizing the project of subjective liberation. Before making
that case, however, I want to advance and discuss some representative examples of each horn of
Suissa’s dilemma, both theoretical and as instantiated in actually existing schools.
Libertarian Education
Two of the most well-known recent anarchist educational theorists, Paul Goodman and
Colin Ward, represent a more libertarian position on educational questions. Both Goodman and
Ward saw the formalized education system as having become so corrupt and stifling that they
questioned the need for formal schooling entirely, a hallmark of libertarian educational thinking,
advocating instead various forms of informal community-based, organically evolving educative
organizations and structures, often centered around the utilization of urban spaces as sites of
educational growth. For Goodman and Ward, both fundamentally urbanists and early proponents
of what Henri Lefebvre called “the right to the city,”368 contemporary urban spaces would ideally
serve as large-scale, open classrooms that would ultimately eliminate the need for any formalized
education or a specific educational site called a “school.” The open-endedness and near infinity
of experiences available to urban children (and the adults around them), ought to be utilized for
educational purposes and free development of children, specifically what Ward called “education
for mastery of the environment.”369 Both Ward and Goodman believed that direct contact with
the physical spaces of daily life was the most effective means of coming to understand not only
those spaces themselves, but the people who occupy them, the political implications of their
design and conditions (e.g. poverty, segregation, etc.), and one’s role in the broader community.
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Goodman, a prominent forerunner of the de-schooling theories of Ivan Illich,370 described his
vision of this radically open urban education in his 1942 novel The Grand Piano, writing
It seems to me prima facie that we have to use the City itself as our school. Instead of
bringing imitation bits of the City into a school building, let us go at our own pace and
get out among the real things. What I envisage is gangs of about six kids, starting at nine
or ten years old, roving the City with a shepherd empowered to protect them, and
accumulating experiences tempered to their powers.371
Goodman believed, with Emerson, that the highest value in contemporary capitalist society was
conformity, and that the schools had come to reflect that truth. He argued for a revitalization of
traditional progressive education, but with an even stronger emphasis on the individuality of each
child and a higher degree of “permissiveness in all animal behavior and interpersonal
experience.”372 Ward is somewhat more moderate in searching for “a compromise between the
radical ideas of the deschoolers and our own expectations of schooling for our own children,”373
but still fundamentally calls for a breakdown of the traditional organized educational system and
an entirely open school, without walls or other barriers, and a curriculum fundamentally dictated
by the immediate needs of the local community and the interests of the children, rather than a
grand anarchist political program.
Perhaps the most famous actually existing example of libertarian education in this sense
is A.S. Neill’s Summerhill School, founded in 1921 in Suffolk, England. For Suissa, Summerhill
is distinctive of the libertarian view of education and is also an excellent example of what
separates anarchist education proper from its libertarian alternatives. Neill, whose educational
methods are sometimes placed under the umbrella of “existentialist” education, put strong
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emphasis on non-intervention with the development and behavior of children, advocating what
he referred to as “self-regulation” on the part of children.374 As Suissa points out, “Neill
conceived of freedom in a primarily individual, psychological sense,”375 and indeed much of
Neill’s approach to childhood and education was driven by psychological concerns. Specifically,
for example, Neill was deeply interested in the effects of repression and discipline on the
development of children’s sexuality and ways in which allowing existentialist self-expression
might counteract what he sees as the pernicious influence of sexual repression. He even goes so
far as to claim that “To find a new orientation to sex is the most difficult task of the parent and
teacher.”376
Neill was also stoutly apolitical in his pedagogical vision, even to the point of potential
relativism, which is a radically different attitude from the anarchist’s explicit centering of social
and political reform in their worldview. Suissa cites a telling quote from an interview Neill once
gave, in which he seemed to endorse a relativistic view of pedagogical neutrality, saying “Life is
so difficult to understand that I personally cannot claim to settle the relative educational values
of anyone.”377 Neill was, in this sense, fundamentally committed to the total freedom of
individuals and saw that freedom as abstractable from social forces in precisely the way objected
to by many critics of individualism. In a strange inversion, Neill’s deeply isolationist
individualism and relativist approach can even be said to participate in the objectionable
individualism of Rand and Rothbard, fetishizing free choice and the development of exceptional
individuals even to the detriment of larger-scale socio-political concerns. Neill seems to directly
endorse this type of view when he states, “When the individual and social interests clash, the
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individual interests should be allowed to take precedence.”378 Neill’s thinking is of course
distinct from the that of Goodman and Ward, who both implicated capitalism and oppressive
political structures directly in their calls for libertarian education, but the methodological
practices advocated by all three thinkers are importantly similar, and can be characterized as
libertarian in the sense Suissa uses the term. The concluding sections of this chapter will
illustrate how an individualist education based on the left-anarcho-individualist view advocated
in Chapter Three importantly differs from the educational thinking of both Ward and Goodman,
as well as Neill.
Anarchist Education Proper: The Case of The Stelton Ferrer School
Representative of proper anarchist education, as opposed to the pseudo-anarchist
libertarianism of Neill, is the thinking of anarcho-communist Mikhail Bakunin, one of the most
well-known anarchists in history. Bakunin held that even in a fully realized anarchocommunalist society, both education and work would be compulsory for every person. Bakunin
believed that this was the only equitable, fair way to ensure that no individual’s labor was
exploited by another.379 Of course, Bakunin shared the critique of schooling under State
authority, and even more so under the influence of capitalism, and, as Suissa notes, was very
open in terms of how precisely education would be structured in an anarchist society and to what
ends it would be put,380 but still held to the necessity of formal structures of education in a
general sense. Slightly more prescriptive in his anarchist educational theory is Peter Kropotkin,
who explicitly advocated for a certain type of vocational education as fundamental to anarchist
society. Education, for Kropotkin, is primarily
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to teach him [the child] the elements of knowledge and the good methods of work, and,
above all, to give him that general inspiration which will induce him, later on, to put in
whatever he does a sincere longing for truth, to like what is beautiful, both as to forms
and to contents, to feel the necessity of being a useful unit amidst other human units, and
thus to feel his heart at unison with the rest of humanity.381
For Kropotkin, and the anarchist tradition of education in general, one of the critical goals is to
attempt to instill in children a sense of their place in the world and a sense of obligation toward
their fellow men. I do not mean here that children are to be told their place in the sense of
Althusserian indoctrination into a pre-established role in capitalist production, but rather a
communication of the ideals of cooperation, mutuality, and interdependence that generally
characterize the anarchist society advocated by the anarcho-communists and the like. Again, like
Bakunin, Kropotkin here sees work as a necessary part of that society, and so calls for vocational
training to be a component of the educational system. He sums up his view on education by
claiming that learning should come “through the eyes and the hand to the brain.”382 Unlike the
relativist libertarianism of Neill, proper anarchist education foregrounds issues of class
consciousness, anticapitalism, antiracism, and a positive vision of the common good and political
organization. For these thinkers, the conception of freedom most relevant to the educational and
social project is collective, including much more than simply relieving individuals of this or that
restriction on their thought or behavior. Suissa cites anarchist educator Fransisco Ferrer’s
denunciation of attempts to depoliticize education as fundamentally hypocritical. Rather, he
explicitly advocates for direct political content in schools, writing, “We should not, in the school,
hide the fact that we would awaken in the children a desire for a society of men truly free and
truly equal.”383
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The reference to Ferrer is particularly relevant here, as he is perhaps the most well-known
and successful anarchist educator in modern history, having founded the Escuela Moderna
(Modern School) in Barcelona in 1901. The school was the culmination and confluence of many
of Ferrer’s most closely cherished ideals. The Escuela was profoundly radical for the time and
context, advocating the political education of working-class children for their own class
consciousness and outside of the purview of the Catholic Church, an institution which at that
time closely controlled nearly all education in Spain. In The Origin and Ideals of the Modern
School, one of a tiny number of Ferrer’s few writings to ever appear in print, he wrote that
“Governments have ever been careful to hold a high hand over the education of the people. They
know, better than anyone else, that their power is based almost entirely on the school.”384 Ferrer
also rejected the strict discipline that tended to accompany formal education at the time, instead
arguing that in order to ever truly learn or engage deeply with their own education, children must
be given the freedom explore, consider, and reject ideas and approaches as they see fit. They
must be educated, that is, to become freethinking and self-actualized adults. Ferrer’s ultimate
goal was that the children who attended the Modern Schools would eventually become the men
who would lead a working-class revolution. Though Ferrer’s school ultimately closed due to his
being swept up in various political events in Spain, including a prison term and eventual
execution, his school inspired what would become the longest-lasting and most influential
radical educational experiment in American history, namely the Stelton Ferrer School, which
began in 1911 in New York City. It will be worthwhile to spend some time detailing the
historical rise and fall of the Ferrer school, as it is importantly illustrative of the tension between
libertarian and anarchist education identified by Suissa.
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Originally called simply the Ferrer School, the school was founded by notable American
anarchist Emma Goldman, Alexander Berkman, and others. In her essay “Fransisco Ferrer and
the Modern School” which appeared in her 1910 collection Anarchism and Other Essays,
Goldman treats Ferrer as a type of political martyr, writing that upon his execution “the obscure
teacher, became a universal figure, blazing forth the indignation and wrath of the whole civilized
world against the wanton murder,” and proclaimed that “his spirit would rise in just indignation
against the iron regime of his country.”385 Goldman, along with other American anarchists and
leftists, would form the Fransisco Ferrer Association and Center in New York City in 1910.
While the Ferrer Association was not a strictly anarchist project, from the beginning anarchists
took leading roles in the organization. Goldman and Alexander Berkman were prominent Ferrer
Association figures, as were Leonard Abbot and Joseph Cohen, both well-known anarchists in
New York. Harry Kelly, an anarchist who served as the first professional organizer of the Ferrer
Association wrote of the group in 1913 that a “libertarian impulse” was at the base of the
Association’s work:
The predominating spirit is anarchistic; yet it cannot be too strongly insisted on that the
association as such is not committed to any special economic theory or political ideal…
The interpretation of freedom and justice and how to attain them differ, but free
expression of opinion and interchange of ideas is the working method.386
The Ferrer Center of New York became an important anchor for educational experiments and
adult programs, with men and women of all economic classes coming to the Ferrer Center to
learn and socialize.
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The school was eventually forced to move from the city due to the involvement of
individuals associated with the Center in a botched attempted assassination of Standard Oil
chairman John D. Rockefeller.387 Harry Kelly, another anarchist figure involved in the school,
wrote of that time that “It was felt to be unfair to the children and harmful to their development
as free spirits to grow up in an atmosphere of violent partisanship and fierce revolutionary ardor
inevitable with men and women engaged in a daily struggle with the powers of darkness.”388The
school was able to procure around 140 acres of land under the incorporated name of the Ferrer
Colony Association, and then resold small plots of the land to families and individual
prospective colonists for around one hundred and fifty dollars per acre, leaving room for some
profit that was intended to begin construction of a new schoolhouse and other infrastructural
considerations.389 On May 16th. 1915, the school formally opened and thirty-two young students
came by train from the Ferrer School in New York to the new Ferrer Colony School, which came
to be known as the Stelton Modern School. Perhaps no school was more consistent in the
implementation of and commitment to these progressive values in curriculum and pedagogy than
the Stelton Ferrer school. While the school struggled to maintain a consistent staff, going through
four principals in its first year, the teachers and children saw incredible success and happiness.
There was no formal curriculum or schedule of activities, and students set and pursued their own
intellectual or personal goals. There was no standard for when children “should” read or do
certain levels of mathematics. The only demands made on a course of study was that it was
fulfilling to the child undertaking it. Education at Stelton was designed to cultivate responsibility
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in the children. The school had a weekly meeting where children could make suggestions on
school policy and make decisions on matters of discipline. A former student, Ray Miller,
summed up the nature of a Stelton education in a discussion with anarchist historian Paul Avrich,
stating:
We did everything ourselves – we were gardeners, we were typesetters, we were cooks –
we did everything with our own two hands. Instead of merely reading A Midsummer
Night’s Dream, we put on the play, and put it on outdoors. The grownups got involved
too. I never avoided taking part in anything, whereas in high school everything seemed
like a chore, even though I always got good marks…Stelton was not only a school but a
community; it wasn’t just education – it was living. 390
The 1920s represented the most fruitful and consistent time in the Modern School's existence.
Husband and wife team Elizabeth and Alexis Ferm, took over the school in 1920 and under their
leadership "the Modern School became one of the most radical experiments ever to take place in
the history of American education."391 The Ferms had significant experience in alternative
education. Before coming to Stelton, the pair had founded and run their own school, the
Children's Playhouse, in Dyker Heights, Brooklyn, and later founded one of the first so-called
storefront schools on the Lower East Side, which is where they met and befriended Emma
Goldman. Elizabeth Ferm was particularly influenced by the ideas of the German educator and
founder of the kindergarten movement Friedrich Froebel who was a leader in the progressive
education movement and argued for ideals of self-creation and self-direction in education. At
Stelton, the Ferms promoted both manual and creative work, such as printing, weaving,
carpentry, basket-making, pottery, metal work, gardening, singing, dancing and other sports;
they built a series of workshops in the schoolhouse, although the children still had the choice of
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studying more traditional academic subjects within the library, which was named after Peter
Kropotkin, appropriately, given the schools fusing of vocational and intellectual training.392 This
program led to a remarkable creative flowering among the children, who produced, among other
things, the Voice of the Children, which they wrote, illustrated and printed entirely themselves,
using a printing press provided by anarchist publisher Joseph Ishill, who would go on to found
the influential anarchist publishing company Oriole Press. Eventually, however, the Ferms began
to be questioned by some of the parents who wanted a more radical, politicized education for
their children, and objected to the lack of attention paid to academics. Refusing to modify their
methods, the Ferms left in 1925.
Though the Ferms would return to the school in 1933, their initial departure can be seen
as the beginning of the end of the Stelton Ferrer School, and the Ferrer colony itself. The
politicization of education in the colony that initially led the Ferms to leave the school would
only intensify through the 1930s and 1940s, with internal disputes between committed anarchists
and those who, with the rise of the Soviet Union, shifted their political allegiances in a more
communistic direction.393 At the same time, during the rise of Nazism in Germany, many of the
Jewish residents of the colony rediscovered their religious and ethnic identities and either left the
colony to support the war effort or began to shift away from anarchism to a more nationalistic
form of political engagement, causing further ideological tensions within the community. In
general, there was significant disagreement in terms of how to handle the threat of fascism and
whether or not the wars against it should be supported (in Spain, for example).394 As so often
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happens with the political quarrels of adults, these internal disputes bled into the school as well,
with bitter fights about what types of materials should be in the library, and how political the
school should be, with some advocating for keeping the school out of the political arena and
others demanding explicit political and ideological foci in the education of their children.
Even more damaging than the internal struggles, though, was the purchase by the United
States government of a large parcel of land directly next to the colony. Not only did this militate
against the fundamental goals of the colony, i.e. escaping city life and the influence and gaze of
the government, but it also caused tangible problems for the colony. For example, when the
construction of Camp Kilmer on the land was complete, over 70,000 soldiers moved into the
barracks. This caused a significant uptick in break-ins and vandalism in the colony, and there
was even one documented case where a young woman was raped by a solider.395 By the middle
of the 1940s there were only fifteen children left in the school, mostly very young, and the
school finally closed in 1953. The Stelton Ferrer School represents both one of the greatest
achievements of anarchist education in history, and also illustrates the fundamental tension at the
heart of anarchist educational projects, namely that “between child-centered pedagogical practice
and…anarchist goals and values.”396 In many ways, the Stelton School was brought down by the
manifestation of this tension between those who wanted the school to remain apolitical, focusing
on libertarian educational methods, and those who wanted to explicitly politicize the curriculum
and mission of the school, representing the explicitly anarchist strain. At this point, I want to turn
to the educational thinking of the individualists, and argue that individualism as described in
Chapter Three can effectively serve as a bridge between the educational tensions that exist
between libertarian and anarchist thinking, as defined by Suissa.
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Left-Anarcho-Individualist Education and Civic Epiphenomenalism
The left-anarcho-individualist tradition in education, such as it is, and in following the
general pattern of its engagement with both anarchism and libertarianism in general, has
significant points of agreement as well as critiques of those two traditions. Though, with some
exceptions, the individualists wrote comparatively little on educational matters, and rarely in any
sustained way, there is much to be gleaned from the place education has in their thought, as well
as extrapolated from their other commitments. Ultimately, I argue that individualists bridge the
gap between libertarian and anarchist education by fundamentally politicizing subjectivity and
the everyday subjective experiences that form our understandings of the world. While endorsing
many of the traditional anarchist political principles, the left-anarcho-individualists hold that still
these do not need to be formally instilled in children, but rather that education for politicized
subjectivity naturally produces feelings of mutual cooperation and genuine democracy. In this
sense, the educational theory of the left-anarcho-individualists might be referred to as a type of
democratic epiphenomenalism.
While endorsing the attitude of anti-conformity expressed by both the libertarians and
anarchists regarding educational matters, the individualists extend this critique further even to
the position of the anarchists themselves. Specifically, the individualists target the idea that
education should be aimed at producing a positive vision of the Good Citizen or Good Anarchist,
as in Kropotkin or Ferrer’s understandings of the goals of education. What is important to
highlight here is not the specific content of Kropotkin or Ferrer’s understanding of what makes a
good Citizen, but the fact that they both insist that the good Citizen has some positive content at
all, determined in advance, and to be cultivated by the educative process. It is at this point that
the left-anarcho-individualist critique is most radical. Thus far the individualist has concurred
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with the critique that schools as they currently exist, as sites of blind conformity to pernicious
social trends and as mere extensions of state power to which the anarchist of any stripe is ex
hypothesi opposed. However, the individualist objects even to what might be called the ideal
form of formalized education, that is, a world where we have a vibrant public sphere already in
existence and there is a one-to-one correspondence between the ideal of the Good Citizen needed
for the maintenance of that public and the functioning of the educational system in producing
precisely that type of citizen. The anarchist, on Suissa’s understanding, holds that the problem
with education in its current form is the mistaken understandings we have as a society about the
content of the concept of the citizen and the way society ought to be structured. If only we
understood these things in a more enlightened way, presumably along the lines that they propose,
and were able to bring the students that our educational system is creating into line with that
vision, there would be nothing left to object to in the concept of even compulsory schooling.
For the individualist, debates about the content of the type of person that schools should
work toward teleologically are mere distractions from the real problem of education, which lies
in its very structure. The ubiquitous critiques of the oppressive, homogenizing nature of
schooling in capitalist America, by which we produce only unthinking capital-C Consumers,
who take it as their highest calling in life the production and consumption of material goods, is
itself only an inverted mirror image of the same oppressive homogenizing nature of schooling
which would inevitably continue in the hypothetical anarcho-communist utopia, by which we
produce only capital-C Citizens, Communists, Anarchists, Comrades, or whatever who take it as
their highest calling in life to preserve the public sphere and engage in good deliberative
communalist relations with one another. To put the point differently, for the anarchist, the
problem with current educational system lies in our understanding of the type of person we are
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training up, whereas the individualist locates the problem in the fact that we are training people
up at all. That is, the individualist case against formal education is fundamentally structural; the
content of any given manifestation of that type of education is immaterial. For the anarchist, both
the capital-C Consumer and the capital-C Communist or capital-A Anarchist are equally
homogenizing as teleological goals of education, and equally oppressive. This line of anarchist
critique is echoed in Max Stirner's admonishing of the French revolutionaries for failing to
engage in true structural change, but only substituting a new content into the same oppressive
structures which had previously existed. He writes, “The revolution was not directed against the
established, but against the establishment in question, against a particular establishment. It did
away with this ruler, not with the ruler...”397 and later, in perhaps the clearest statement of the
anarchist opposition to the possibility of piecemeal radical change, “Much as may be improved,
strongly as 'discreet progress' may be adhered to, always there is only a new master set in the old
one's place.”398 The individualist objection to formal schooling is precisely parallel. Even
revolutionary reform agendas hoping to install a new democratic or communalistic ethos into the
structure of the formal school system are always only replacing the old master (Nationalist
indoctrination, consumerist ideology, etc.) with a new one (the ideal of deliberative citizenship,
working class solidarity, etc.), which ultimately serves exactly the same structural purpose,
namely to homogenize the identities of irreducibly unique individuals under the umbrella of a
teleological vision of what a person should be.399

397 Stirner, The Ego and its Own, 100.
398 Stirner, The Ego and its Own, 100.
399 It is, worth noting that, as is implied in Stirner's critique, that the anarchist does not reject the concept of social
improvement tout court. Rather, the idea is that there is a rather low ceiling on the liberatory possibilities for
piecemeal improvements which ultimately leave the oppressive structures in place, only changing out the content of
those structures for something slightly preferable.

157

Nietzsche, who wrote in perhaps the most sustained way on education out of all the
individualist thinkers, directly attacks the concept of education for citizenship and productive
contribution even in ideal social scenarios such as Bakunin’s social anarchist communalism. He
makes a distinction between survival and education, and goes on to argue that the two are
fundamentally distinct, and indeed incompatible, and must be approached separately. He writes,
A person needs to learn much to live, to fight his battle for survival – but everything he
learns and does with that aim, as an individual, has nothing to do with education and
culture…No course of instruction that ends in a career, in breadwinning, leads to culture
or true education in our sense; it merely shows how one can save and secure the self in
the struggle for survival.400
Nietzsche at times appears to endorse the libertarian view of Goodman that schools as
institutions ought to be done away with entirely both because of their inability to fully capture
the individuality of each student as well as the greater forms of educational experience that take
place in the world at large, outside of the schoolhouse. He asks, with respect to actualized
individuals, “how could their incalculable nature be the basis of an institution?”401 and goes on to
suggest that the path to the creation of these genuine forms of subjectivity beyond social
conformity lies outside institutions of any kind, writing “The most remarkable, instructive,
decisive experiences in life are the everyday ones; the enormous riddle before everyone’s eyes is
precisely what almost no one sees as such.”402 For Nietzsche, education must be separate from
questions of mere survival and imposed ideals or social forms, so as to allow the flourishing of
individuality. He writes “Here, with me, you will be in complete control of your own individual
personality; your gifts will shine forth in their own right, bringing you – you! – into the first

400

Friedrich Nietzsche, Anti-Education, trans. Damion Searls, eds. Paul Reitter & Chad Wellmon (New York: New
York Review Books Classics, 2016), 55
401
Nietzsche, Anti-Education, 61.
402
Nietzsche, Anti-Education, 73.

158

rank.”403 It may appear that Nietzsche is endorsing a generally libertarian understanding of
education, a la Niell. However, what is critical about Nietzsche’s view, and that of individualism
generally, is that it is precisely the individual pursuing what Emerson calls “his own secret,”404
that creates the conditions for social progress. As David Roof characterizes Nietzsche’s views
“individuals serve society best when they learn self-trust, evaluate their contemporary morals,
and envision a new world…Society is benefited when individuals seek their own personal
happiness and well-being.”405
Though he did not approach educational questions directly, Raoul Vaneigem develops
this Nietzschean view of how individual self-actualization produces social progress as an
epiphenomenon. Vaneigem speaks of “radical-subjectivity” as the production of a certain type of
united front of subjectivities produced from the mutual recognition of subjective desires for selffulfillment and actualization. He writes, “You cannot save yourself on your own or achieve
fulfillment in isolation. How can any individual who has gained some measure of insight into
himself and the world fail to recognize a will identical to his own in those around him – the same
quest, the same starting points?”406 Vaneigem holds that while each individual subjectivity is
irreducibly unique, each participates in what he refers to as the “identity reflex” (as distinct, to
refer to Chapter Three, from identification), which is the recognition of the same “will to fulfill
oneself by changing the world, to live every sensation, every experience, every possibility to the
full.”407 Here Vaneigem appeals to the Nietzschean distinction between survival and culture,
arguing that if we ignore our desires for life, living freely and honoring our subjective
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actualization in favor of mere survival, we will ultimately undercut the possibilities of communal
life, which is itself based in radical subjectivity. As he writes in an echo of Emerson’s
characterization of society in “Experience,” “Who wants a world where the guarantee of freedom
from starvation means the risk of death from boredom?”408 Jean Leca refers to this type of
emergent citizenship as a type of alchemy, citing, appropriately, one of the leaders of the French
Revolution, Louis Antoine de Saint-Just, who wrote that “Each person fights for what he loves:
that is what is called speaking in good faith. To fight for everyone is only the effect.”409
Educationally, the focus must be on the generation of subjective understanding first, because it is
self-knowledge that enables the recognition of the self in others, and that recognition will
naturally produce a social world predicated on the recognition of common subjectivity. As
Emerson pithily suggests, “Isolation must precede true society.”410
Max Stirner develops this vision of democratic epiphenomenalism in his short essay on
education “The False Principle of Our Education: Or, Humanism and Realism” as well. Grasping
Stirner's vision of the goals of the educational project is crucial for an understanding of how he
sees the relationship between the school and the rest of society. “The False Principle of Our
Education” was published in four parts during April of 1842 in the short-lived Rheinische
Zeitung, of which Marx would later serve as editor. In the essay, Stirner outlines two historically
popular positions on the nature of education, which he dubs “humanism” and “realism”
respectively. This distinction is not critical, but it is important to note that Stirner took humanism
to be a type of perennialist focus on “understanding the old classics,” a programme which was
pursued under the auspices of a type of aristocratic or “exclusive” education, and saw realism to
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be motivated by the “drive toward a universal education accessible to everyone”411 and which
emphasized practical skills for the navigation of day-to-day existence.412 Against these two
conceptions, he opposes what he ultimately calls “personalis[m].”413 While some interpreters
argue that this essay was little more than Stirner sharpening some of his conceptual tools “in the
ambience of an educational theme”414 in preparation for writing The Ego and its Own, I maintain
that the work contains a substantial view of the aims of education and the figure of the student
which is carried over into that work, rather than “replace[d]” or “abandon[ed]”415 in Stirner's
later development.
The implications that Stirner's views on authority and individuality have for education
are, in a sense, obvious. Following the spirit of the rest of Stirner's philosophy, education of the
personalist sort ought to be a process of encouraging and facilitating self-actualization, selfunderstanding, and self-expression. Jeffery Shantz glosses Stirner's view in the following way,
“For Stirner, education should assist individuals to be creative persons rather than learners.
Learners lose their freedom of will in becoming increasingly dependent upon experts and
institutions for instruction on how to act.”416 This characterization seems fair to me, so long as
one keeps in mind exactly how far Stirner's analysis wants to take the idea of “creative persons,”
that is, radically beyond the spaces of logic, reason, and language, as well as applying one's
creative powers to one's own selfhood, in a constantly regenerative, playful process. As Stirner
puts the point, education must concern itself with cultivating “eternal characters in whom
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constance [sic] only consists in the unremitting floods of their hourly self-creation and who are
therefore eternal because they form themselves each moment, because they set the temporal
concerns of their actual appearance out of the never-withering or aging freshness and creative
activity of their eternal spirit.”417 This is diametrically opposed to the stagnant, stultifying, rote
education that Stirner sees in the traditional doctrines (and which he might argue we still are
embroiled in today), which simply accumulates information and skills “like the frozen-limbed
supreme court, heaps documents upon documents, and plays for the millennia in delicate
porcelain figures” with what he calls “immortal childishness.”418 The traditional forms of
education can only ever give us control over the things of nature and the physical world (science,
engineering, etc.) and our own internal natures, desires, and beliefs (psychology, religion,
philosophy), but cannot self-actualize us in the way required by individualism. Stirner goes out
of his way to make clear that he does not reject these types of education and understanding
entirely, but rather holds that they can only ever be in the service of the free individual, and not
the other way around. He writes,
I receive with thanks what the centuries of culture have acquired for me; I am not willing
to throw away and give up anything of it: I have not lived in vain. The experience that I
have power over my nature, and need not be the slave of my appetites, shall not be lost to
me; the experience that I can subdue the world by culture's means is bought at too great a
cost for me to be able to forget it. But I want still more.419
Stirner joins Vaneigem and Nietzsche in denouncing the imposition of static identities in the
educational process, including, again, ideals of Citizenship, Anarchism, and so on. Speaking of
the French Revolution, he criticizes the ideals of the movement on precisely this basis, writing
“It was not the individual man-and he alone is man-that became free, but the citizen...the
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political man, who for that very reason is not man but a specimen of the human species, and
more particularly a specimen of the species Citizen.”420 He uses the capital 'C' in citizen here to
signify his skepticism of the idea that being a good citizen ought to be thought of as a person's
highest calling, or as the criteria for living a good life. Elsewhere, he links the idea of putting
citizenship first with the idea of finding one's worth in “being a good Christian”421 which he
reminds us is a notion which the advocates of citizenship often think of themselves as having
rejected as antiquated. For Stirner, though, trading “good Christian” for “good Citizen” is simply
to swap objects of sacred reverence, neither of which has any more warrant than the other.
Stirner sees the order in which development of the qualities of personal freedom and selfassertion, on the one hand, and citizenship, on the other, take place as critical to the ends of
personalist education. He echoes the other individualists on the natural emergence of the
Deweyan democratic sensibility when he rights, it is “only the free and personal man who is a
good citizen”422 and he cautions that “We are not yet everything when we move as useful
members of society; we are much more able to perfect this only if we are free people, selfcreating people.”423 If we ignore the individual aspects of education for radical subjectivity and
attempt to teach citizenship directly and explicitly as the dominant traditions in education have
done, we end up with individuals full of “pride and every wind of covetousness, eagerness for
office, mechanical and servile officiousness, hypocrisy, etc.”424 Though he has no quarrel with
the ultimate goals of anarchist society, he argues that putting the cart of civics before the horse of
individualism has been the fundamental flaw of anarchist educational thought. In this division

420 Stirner, The Ego and its Own, 100.
421 Stirner, The Ego and its Own, 90.
422 Stirner, The False Principle of Our Education, 16.
423 Stirner, The False Principle of Our Education, 14.
424 Stirner, The False Principle of Our Education, 10.

163

between man and citizen, Stirner echoes Rousseau's famous binary, introduced in the first pages
of Emile, where Rousseau suggests that when we are “Compelled to oppose nature or our social
institutions, we must choose between making a man and a citizen, for we cannot make both at
once.”425 While Rousseau appears to cast this relationship as an exclusive disjunction, I contend
that Stirner holds a somewhat more nuanced picture. Specifically, I think we are justified in
concluding that Stirner sees the qualities of a good citizen, not as opposed to those of a good or
natural man, as does Rousseau, but as supervenient on them. That is to say, good citizens emerge
from good men without any additional training or specific instruction. The cultivation of the free,
radical subjectivity of each individual is the entirely the educational project, properly
understood; there are no civics classes or governmental projects that must be undertaken by
students in Stirner's view, and indeed such training is self-defeating, as Stirner suggests in his list
of the qualities produced by traditional modes of education. The good citizen is simply an
epiphenomenon of the self-work that must be undertaken perpetually by individuals, and the
qualities that we want in citizens will naturally emerge if we focus our attention on cultivating
the qualities we want in individuals qua individuals. Clarity here is crucial, in personalist
education, we are not violating Rousseau's dictum, creating both man and citizen at the same
time; we are creating only individuals, but citizens and social relations emerge thereof naturally.
In an age where government has been bureaucratized and systematized beyond
imagination, and in the advent of technocratic rationalism's commandeering of the most
fundamental aspects of our human lives, it is worth re-asking what kinds of people we want
looking after these things, and how we go about finding them. Is it people who have been trained
in the “best practices” of governmental bureaucracy and administrative managerialism, and who
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can reliably and quickly execute their action items, though they have never set foot in a class on
ethics? Is it people who can sway the votes of millions of people and hit all of the right notes
when interviewed on national television but who have no relationship or investment in their own
conscience? Do we want people, in Stirner's words, of “dialectical sophistication” but who also
represent “commonness of thought and will?”426 I believe that the individualist project in
education suggests that we ought to cultivate and encourage individuals, in the true sense, for
whom the answers to the questions of government and civil society fall out of larger questions of
ethics, worth, and happiness, rather than the other way around. While embracing the broadly
libertarian view of pedagogy for self-understanding, the individualists also reject the
depoliticization of education. Rather, the individualists hold that self-understanding is itself
political, and the everyday experience both of oppression, anger, humiliation, as well as joy,
friendship, and hope, are the foundations of revolution and resistance, and must be tapped for
those purposes. Learning takes the form of learning about oneself, and ultimately learning to see
that same fount of creativity and subjective assertion in others. To return to Cavell’s Emerson,
who says “‘follow in yourself what I have followed in mine and you will be saved,’”427 the
individualist project in education, through radical subjectivity and democratic
epiphenomenalism, adds, “Follow in yourself what I have followed in mine and we will all be
saved.”
Practical Considerations
There are a number of significant practical questions that the left-anarcho-individualist
view of education leave unanswered but which are important to address. For example, questions
of pedagogical and parental authority, about whether or not there should be discrete institutions
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called “schools,” and questions of whether or not schooling in itself is a problematic form of
imposition, and at what age it becomes problematic. It is first important to note that these
questions are not unique problems to anarcho-individualism and arise with respect to most other
forms of anarchism as well, opposed as all anarchisms are to unjustified hierarchical
relationships of control. As we saw in the tension between libertarian and anarchist education
discussed earlier in this chapter, there is little agreement among anarchists on many of these
questions. For the individualist, the answers to many of these questions, as with social
formations and relationships of any kind, must always be experimental, provisional, and open to
re-evaluation. In this sense, it is impossible to give definitive or overly prescriptive answer to
them, but I will address briefly some pragmatic possibilities for a left-anarcho-individualist
educational future.
Pedagogy and Teacher Authority
Recalling the discussion of left-anarcho-individualist ethics in Chapter Three, it is worth
restating that the individualist does not give up evaluative language altogether, and retains the
conviction that certain styles of living are preferable to others. At the same time, the individualist
would reject the imposition of those styles of life onto another, despite their evaluative
preferability. Given this latter claim, it is fair to ask what individualist education would teach at
all, if anything, and how pedagogy would have to be reformed in light of the individualists
ontological and political commitments. One potentially attractive approach to these questions is
offered by anarchist philosopher Alejandro de Acosta, who argues for a type of “antipedagogy”
that views teaching in the way it has been historically understood as fundamentally
impossible.428 de Acosta’s claim is particularly relevant to individualism and its goal of
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cultivating self-actualized individuals, as he suggests that to assume the role of the teacher or
pedagogue is actually to subvert that goal, to assume yet another identity, or in his terms “egomask,” that signals “the inevitable calcification of the urge to teach into the kinds of systems we
call pedagogies.”429 Insofar as the individualist rejects rigid systems of prescriptive rules for
interaction (be they moral, pedagogical, or whatever) and obscuring identifications and social
roles, the role of teacher and pedagogue is to be subverted. For de Acosta, teaching is impossible
because it implies a final purpose, endpoint, or terminus. He writes that we ought rather to
embrace a view of learning, study, and self-work that “is interminable…endlessly frustrated and
frustrating.”430 Education must be revaluated so as to reflect the experimentalist spirit of
individualism and the sense that there are not definite or final outcomes to be aimed at other than
a fulfilled sense of self, something which manifestly cannot be taught in the way that term is
commonly understood.
In place of traditional understandings of teaching, de Acosta suggests a more minimalist
understanding of modeling styles of life. de Acosta does not argue that modeling behaviors or
ways of being for students is desirable in that it is more likely to produce some result or other
(e.g. getting the students to mimic or adopt that behavior), but only that is an entirely inevitable
side-effect of human relationships, and the educative relationship is a human relationship like
others. Modeling, however, is subject to experimentation, resistance, and reinterpretation that
calcified systems of pedagogy and traditional information transfer are not. He writes “A model
may be imitated, counterimitated, or met with sovereign indifference. We might cooperate, we
might fight, or we might ignore each other. In that social chaos, in its interstices of order and
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stillness, someone might learn something.”431 In this sense, I argue that individualist pedagogy,
or antipedagogy, is fundamentally open, viewing the educational relationship as indeterminate
and messy in the same way that other human relationships are. At best, I can show or model how
I have come to interact with and express myself, but I can never prescribe or teach that to you.
The path of self-discovery and actualization is, as it were, made in the walking.
Schools as Social Institutions
Given the views of pedagogical authority expressed above and the general view of social
institutions held by individualists discussed in Chapter Three, the individualist view of schools
seems to follow relatively directly. That is, like all social institutions, schools, if they exist at all,
must be open, malleable, and never calcified into rigid structures. The libertarian vision of Paul
Goodman, which breaks down the walls of the school entirely and opens the entirety of
environmental space as educative seems to me to be amenable to the left-anarcho-individualist
picture of pedagogy and social institutions. If the definition of “school” is expanded to mean
anywhere that educative experiences take place, or organic emergent moments of learning, the
individualist has no objection. However, when schools become something like permanent
institutions set aside from society for the express purpose of education, the individualist, I
believe, would object. “Schools” on the individualist picture, should be thought of not as static
state or even community institutions, but spaces of learning wherever they arise. Should a lecture
or a debate or any other form of learning break out, that place is a school. The individualist
rejects compulsory education and rather opts to let the world and the people that populate it
educate one another, as they inevitably always do. Compulsory education set aside from the rest
of the world is to be rejected, that is, not because it is undesirable (though individualism is, of
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course, deeply suspicious of anything compulsory), but because it is unnecessary. In this sense,
anarchist educational spaces such as the Ferrer School would indeed conflict with the
individualist educational program in some respects. It was, for example, explicitly part of that
school’s goal to separate itself from the rest of the world and society, something the individualist
sees as hampering the range of experiences available to children. The individualist might also
disagree with the explicit motivation of the school to instill a sense of class solidarity in its
students, opting rather for children to come to learn organically from their daily experiences and
informal interactions with others and the world around them.
Conclusion
In attempting to rehabilitate the tradition of left-anarcho-individualism as a tool for the
Left and specifically for educators searching for inspiration and practical forms of resistance to
neoliberal global capital, it is important to reiterate what I have not attempted. I have not argued
that individualism is the only answer available to the Left or that it perfectly responds to all
aspects of the problematic of capital. I have not suggested that the individualist vision is even
attainable in any sort of large-scale sense, and have even argued in favor of the power of the
small-scale. My goal has not been to convert individualists, but rather to present a vision of
individualism that other forms of Left thinking can view as an ally rather than the locus of that
which they oppose.
Thinking back to the conservative appropriation of individualism that came with the
advent of American economic atomism in the work of Josiah Warren and Benjamin Tucker, and
the eventual fusion of the various strains of Wayne-ian rugged individualism with Rand’s
morality of selfishness, Hayek’s Austrian economic theory with Reagan’s perverse
understanding of bootstrapping narratives, what becomes apparent is that the Right is incredibly
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capable of and willing to build within itself alliances between a variety of ideological subspecies.
Though Rand and Hayek could barely stand to be in the same room with one another,432 they
recognized in each other’s philosophy the seeds of a shared vision of the world. Though Murray
Rothbard and other anarcho-capitalists scoff of the vigorous nationalist patriotism of John
Wayne or Ronald Reagan, they happily deploy Reaganite narratives of rugged-self-reliance and
the morality of “making it on one’s own” to advance a shared agenda. The Right has proven to
be must more willing to take on allies despite areas of disagreement than has the Left, generally
speaking. Michael Apple has documented this fact extensively in the context of educations
specifically, arguing that it is precisely in the areas of tension on the Right and, critically, in
“how these tensions are creatively solved”433 by the Right that the Right finds its power and
ability to effect social change. If the Left is to counter the totalizing effects of neoliberal global
capitalism in education and elsewhere, it must study and learn from how the Right has been able
to so deftly resolve tensions between and unite groups a diverse as libertarian economists,
traditional rural workers, and evangelical Christians. The Left must expand its toolkit in the face
of a global hegemony that is both deeply entrenched and constantly anticipating, as Sloterdijk
noted, the next move of critique or resistance. To that end, I have suggested that individualism is
fundamentally compatible with various fundamental Left commitments, such as democracy,
respect for identity, anticapitalism, and the like. That is, I have argued here that left-anarchoindividualism should be one tool in the toolkit of the Left, to be strategically deployed as a form
of resistance, of identity play and subversion, or as a positive vision of the world-to-come as the
context dictates. Like the individualist understanding of the self and social forms, individualism
itself is subject to revaluation, experimentation, and mutation. If the Left has any hope of
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genuinely turning the tide of social change, it will need to creatively deploy a diverse suite of
tactics, ideologies, and positive visions and inspirations. I argue, finally, that individualism can
serve an important role in an expanded Left toolkit.
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